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I.—M. RIBOT'S THEORY OF THE PASSIONS.¹

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I.—M. RIBOT'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN PASSIONS AND EMOTIONS.

Now that the conception of System has become so prominent in men's minds and has been applied fruitfully in many different fields of research, it is time that some psychologist should study the Passions,—the most important and comprehensive systems of the human mind itself. The ordinary psychology of the text-books, which is chiefly analytical in method, cannot do justice to these systems. They are dispersed, where they are not lost sight of, in special studies of sensations, perceptions, and other intellectual processes, as well as in the separate treatment of the feelings and will. A new synthetical psychology is needed to deal with them. For they comprehend the fundamental elements and processes of the mind. They are its epitomes: the most important of the many selves which each of us contains.

In a subject on which it is so easy to write vaguely and repeat platitudes, and so difficult to advance on the general knowledge of literary men and the great observers of character, and to test and systematise their knowledge and raise it to the standard of science, it is fortunate that the work should have been undertaken by so eminent a psychologist as Prof. Ribot. M. Ribot would not indeed suppose that he had created a new science, though there is here a new science to be created. His object seems to have been to

¹ *Essai sur les Passions.* Par Th. Ribot, Paris, 1907 (Felix Alcan).

survey the ground rapidly, to bring together all the chief passions, to distinguish them from the emotions, to give an account of them, not indeed adequate, but true as far as it goes, and to trace them to their roots in our innate disposition or temperament. He has done a service to science in giving to the world his essay on 'The Passions,' as a solitary pendant to the many works it already possesses on the emotions. He has facilitated the work of those who come after him, and has initiated an enterprise that is sure to be continued.

M. Ribot limits his inquiry to three leading questions: "How the passions arise; how they are constituted; how they come to an end" (p. 8). The term 'passion' had almost fallen into disuse, supplanted by the term 'emotion,' for which, M. Ribot thinks, we in this country are chiefly answerable (p. 3). Yet the new term has not been used with any greater precision than the old one. It fluctuates from one writer to another, and no one knows what it does or does not include. It may be defined as that which moves us to action, or as a feeling with an abrupt commencement, a culmination and gradual decline; or as any intense feeling, however initiated, that has an object and is not merely a bodily pain or pleasure; or we may use it to denote fear, anger, joy, sorrow, surprise, disgust and many other secondary and derived emotions, whatever their degree of intensity or duration, so long as they possess the same quality of feeling and the same characteristic tendencies, that is so long as they can still be identified as fear or anger or joy or sorrow, etc. This is perhaps the use of the term to be preferred, because it makes the quality and tendency of the feeling the predominant consideration, and leaves its vague and varying intensity to be indicated by some phrase or adjective; for a term which expresses only an indefinable intensity and instability of feeling is not fitted for use in science. Thus in this sense we can have either intense or faint emotions, and either momentary or prolonged ones. There are angers that brood in the mind for days or weeks, and faint but oppressive sorrows that cannot be cast off. But this sense of the term is very different from that of M. Ribot. "Emotion," he says, "is defined in two principal characteristics: intensity, brevity" (p. 6). It commences by "a shock, a rupture of equilibrium" (p. 6). This view seems to rest on a confusion between the emotions that are generated with surprise,—which both gives them an abruptness of feeling and, as Adam Smith observed,¹ heightens

¹ *Hist. of Astronomy*, ch. i.

their intensity,—and others that have a diverse origin,—as those that are accumulated by slow degrees and drop by drop, until the anger or the sorrow cannot any longer be repressed, and those which are borne gently and familiarly on the stream of our thought,—the old regrets and hopes and disappointments that assail us as we project ourselves into the past or future.

In attempting to restore the other term, 'Passion,' to its use in science, M. Ribot rightly gives to it a more restricted signification than that in which it was understood by Descartes, Locke, and Hume. It will no longer denote the emotions of Fear, Anger, Joy, Sorrow and Surprise, as in the lists of these writers, but it will be confined to the more complex and stable feelings, as Gluttony, Drunkenness, Sensuality, Ambition, Avarice, Love of gambling, adventure and sports, political passion, Patriotism and Religion. We must approve of this attempt to find some term to express these chief systems of character and to distinguish them from individual emotions, and the term 'passion' is probably the best, if not the only term in the French language that could be used for this purpose; whether it is the best term in ours is open to question. In attempting several years ago to interpret these same systems I adopted the term 'sentiment' as on the whole the most suitable term in English to express them.¹ The French term 'sentiment' does not correspond to this, has a wider signification, and is nearest in meaning to our term 'feeling'. But passion in English means a violent and uncontrolled feeling. Thus we speak of 'a passion of grief' or of rage. On the other hand, when we speak of a 'master-passion' we are not thinking so much of a violent emotion as of a principle of character of predominant strength and persistence, such as the passion of gambling or of ambition may become. Thus in either case 'passion' means something having predominant strength, though in the one case this may last for only a few minutes and in the other for the greater part of a life-time. Now it is just this conception of predominant strength without relative stability that we do not want to suggest as the essential character of this class of facts. On the contrary we want a term that shall suggest relative stability in all cases without the conception of predominant strength. For the characters in which two or more passions compete with and restrict one another, as party-passion and patriotism, or religion and

¹"Character and the Emotions," MIND, N.S., vol. v., p. 217 *et seq.*
See also *Manual of Psychology*, G. F. Stout, bk. iv., ch. ix., § 5.

sensuality, or sexual love and ambition, are much more numerous than the characters in which one passion has freed itself from all control and obtained the mastery. And on the other hand sensuality, avarice, ambition and religion show a relative stability in comparison with most emotions. Thus the term 'passion' is unsuitable because it does not suggest relative stability and does suggest predominant strength. In contrast to it, the term 'sentiment,' in one of its senses in English, does suggest something relatively stable in comparison with emotion without implying either violence or predominant strength. Thus we speak of the 'moral sentiments,' the æsthetic sentiment, the family sentiment.

This term has also another superiority to the term 'passion': it implies a higher intellectual development. Now there is no more striking difference between emotions and sentiments than the poverty or irrationality of thought of the one and the comparative richness and rationality of thought of the other. In joy we are apt to repeat the same foolish exclamations, 'How delightful,' 'How beautiful'; in sorrow the same laments; while violent anger to its sterility of thought joins such a degree of irrationality that it has been called a short-lived madness. But in pride and avarice the higher processes of thought are involved, as essential to their organisation, and in some, as the love of knowledge or art, the highest; while even the love of the pleasures of the table has a superior intellectual development to the corresponding appetite. Thus the term 'sentiment' is better adapted than the term 'passion' to denote those most complex and relatively stable systems of our character that lack a distinctive name. That it also, like the term 'passion' denotes emotions,—though of a more delicate and lofty nature than those which the latter term suggests,—is a disadvantage that we cannot avoid whichever term we employ, because the distinction itself between these two orders of feeling has never been clearly grasped by the common mind. The particular defect of the term 'sentiment' is that it is a weak term, ill-fitted to express the strong loves that grow with our lives and end sometimes by absorbing them. Yet here too we are not without resources, and the term 'Master-sentiment,' though a neologism, is as strong and expressive as the term 'Master-passion,' yet free from that suggestion of violence which, except in certain characters, is as foreign to the ordinary behaviour of these systems as it is destructive of their stability.

These violent delights have violent ends,
 And in their triumph, die; like fire and powder,
 Which, as they kiss, consume: . . .
 Therefore love moderately; long love doth so. . . .

Passing from this verbal question which the common accord of writers can alone finally settle, we come to the deeper problem underlying it: How are we to interpret the difference that we feel between emotion and passion or sentiment? "The more difficult it is," says our author, "to establish clear divisions in the fleeting world . . . of the feelings the more desirable is it to put at least in clear relief certain manifestations of them which seem to possess proper and specific characters of their own . . ." (p. 7). What then are the proper and specific characters of the passions? Starting from a difference of degree that seems to be familiar to us,—from the greater complexity and duration of the passions in comparison with the emotions, we have to ask: What "belongs to passion and to nothing else"? (p. 20). These characters seem to M. Ribot "reducible to three, which are, in the order of their importance, the fixed idea, duration, intensity" ("l'idée fixe, la durée, l'intensité," p. 20). We are accustomed to regard the fixed idea as pathological, but our normal ideas, M. Ribot remarks, may be also fixed, and the difference between them he thinks is vague. Scientific and artistic ideas sometimes impose themselves upon us and we become their prey, unable to guide or control them (p. 21).

We had thought that M. Ribot intended to disclose the characters that belong only to the passions, which distinguish them from the emotions, but the first and in his opinion the most important of these characters, the fixed idea, is, in his wide sense of the term, common to passion and emotion. Not only morbid emotions, but ordinary fear, sorrow and anger, while they last, are dominated by their own ideas. And if the ideas of passion last longer, and can therefore with greater propriety be described as fixed ideas, still the difference is one of degree and not the difference of kind that we had been led to expect. We turn next to the second and third characters, and we are offered in all their baldness characters common to all mental states, duration, intensity ("la durée, l'intensité," p. 20).

Failing to obtain the specific characters we had expected, we are brought back to the differences of degree from which we started as the only means of distinguishing between passion and emotion. The passion is just a more complex and stable feeling than the emotion. Its superior

complexity is chiefly shown in its intellectual development, and the different processes involved in that have been carefully analysed by M. Ribot. These are ordinary and 'systematic association,' 'constructive imagination,' 'affective memory,' 'logical operations,' 'constructive reasoning,' and last—the most important of all—judgments of the value of the object, and reasonings in justification of this value (pp. 27 to 42).

These processes, which seem to enable us to distinguish clearly between passion and emotion, all work under the guidance of the 'fixed idea'; and this fixed idea is not merely intellectual: it has its affective side (p. 27). Hence we find M. Ribot repeating in the present essay the conception of passion which he expressed in his earlier work on *The Feelings*. Passion is "a fixed emotion" (p. 27) or a "prolonged and intellectualised emotion" (p. 7). He offers this definition with certain reserves, and these seem to be that, in his opinion, there is at the root of every passion a tendency, which maintains the fixed idea with its feeling, and through it controls the complex intellectual development of the passion (p. 27). But these reserves do not qualify the statement that passion is a fixed emotion, because the emotions also have such tendencies. There are instincts at the roots of fear and anger that account for the characteristic behaviour of each, and may be held to determine the nature of their feelings and ideas. As M. Ribot rightly regards emotion not as an abstraction of feeling, but as a concrete fact constituted of "movements and inhibitions of movements" (p. 6; see also *La Psychologie des Sentiments*, première partie, ch. vii.), his reserve serves only to emphasise an aspect common to both emotion and passion.

We return therefore to the conception of passion as a fixed and intellectualised emotion. What emotion then is it? This important question M. Ribot does not ask.

If we take an example we may perhaps be able to answer this question. What is the fixed emotion of avarice? Is it the joy of the avaricious man in the possession of his wealth, present in the thought of it, expressed in his handling of it, and gloating over the sight of it? This, at least, seems to be the centre of his passion in favourable circumstances, to which his activities converge. But suppose that he loses his wealth or a part of it; or even that he fears to lose it. What becomes of his joy? It is replaced by sorrow or fear. But if his passion is identical with joy, then it ceases to exist when his joy ceases.

Now we know as a fact that a passion does not cease to exist because the joy felt in the possession of its object is

replaced by sorrow at its loss or fear at its apprehended loss. On the contrary the sorrow and the fear are both evidence of its continued existence. If the avaricious man did not feel them in the appropriate circumstances he would not love his wealth. What then is the love of his wealth? what is its fixed emotion? we cannot answer this question.

Now it is true that when an emotion or feeling is 'intellectualised' it tends to become more stable. The more intense our joys, the more unstable and the less intellectual they are apt to be, whereas there are calm and thoughtful joys that have a prolonged duration. Inconsolable sorrows are not violent, or if violent at the commencement, in becoming chronic they are so no longer. They live then in recollection of the dead or lost object, and if at times the vivid image of past scenes revives the first anguish, yet on the whole all prolonged emotions are calm and lacking in intensity. Yet this stability of feeling does not serve to transform them into passions. For if a man were uniformly prosperous, and were to maintain the possession of what he loved most undisturbed, and with rare constancy to preserve the joy or pleasure in its possession, still his passion would not be identical with this most stable joy or pleasure. It would never be true that were misfortunes to come, though they did not come, and his joy or pleasure to be transformed into its contrary, that his passion would cease to exist, or be transformed into its contrary, as love into hate; or that were he to welcome the change and feel the joy or pleasure in the relief from his riches which he felt before in their possession, that he would still love them. Thus a passion is neither identical with an unstable emotion nor with the most stable and intellectualised feeling into which we can conceive it subsiding after the loss of its first intensity.

In a curious section of his work, and as if forgetful of having called passion a fixed emotion, M. Ribot raises the question, "Can the emotions become passions?" (p. 134). Certain of them "with time may be transformed into a state analogous to passion," others cannot. But his thought remains indefinite, and he concludes with his favourite doctrine that "only tendencies engender it" (p. 134). Yet he offers one example of this vital transformation:—the emotion of joy may become the passion for pleasure. There are those who make pleasure the end of their lives. But he does not admit us into the secret of the psychological development. He points out only some of the obvious external conditions,—health, idleness, riches, and perhaps companions (p. 132). Nor does it occur to him that joy may

be the source of many different passions, and that it would be interesting to inquire why under its influence some pursue and others avoid pleasures.

He is more embarrassed to find any plausible reason why certain fixed emotions which he at length recognises, are not and cannot be transformed into passions. He considers three, anger, fear and grief. There are men so irascible that to be angry with some one or something becomes a need, constant as a passion. Here then is a fixed need,—and M. Ribot regards such (*"besoins, instincts, tendances,"* p. 127) as the source of all or most of the passions,—a fixed, or at least a frequently recurring emotion, and an unlimited field of men and things on which to exercise it. Why then is it not a passion? Is it that the need is not always felt, and that the emotion is not constant but frequently recurrent? But what greater constancy have any of our passions? Are their needs always felt? Are they not broken by hunger and thirst and sleep and bodily exercises, even when they have absorbed the most of a man? Are their feelings or emotions any more unbroken? Will they not be liable to constant changes and interruptions, like the emotional life of man himself? All these questions we cannot but answer in the affirmative, and they make the distinction between these two orders of feelings the more embarrassing. What explanation has our author to give? That hate is the passion, and anger the emotion, and that experience convinces us that "the irascible are rarely haters" (p. 130)! And he criticises Bain, who it is true made the mistake of regarding hate as a species of the emotion, anger, because he said that it sufficed to have an irascible temper, and to suffer frequent provocations and offences, for hate to develop as a permanent affection, a blunder he thinks which such a psychologist would hardly have been capable of had he not "misunderstood the difference of nature between emotion and passion" (p. 130)!

The other emotions are as embarrassing; nor will it help us if we refuse to call them emotions because of their relative stability. There is fixed fear and "inconsolable grief". With regard to the latter, M. Ribot resolutely faces the facts. "Are there not here," he asks, "all the characters assigned to the passions: a fixed and importunate idea, duration, intensity?" (*"idée fixe et obsédante, durée, intensité,"* p. 131). "Yet, common opinion will refuse to identify endless sorrow with passion." But his theory affords him no ground for distinguishing them. The best explanation he can find is that the fixed idea of passion is "a part of

oneself," whereas in prolonged sorrow it is "something foreign" ("un corps étranger") from which we cannot escape (p. 132). Now it is true that when we struggle with our grief, the fixed idea connected with it is dissociated from ourself. But the same result overtakes many of our passions. The drunkard, the gambler and the sensualist sometimes struggle with their vices and endeavour to escape from the fixed ideas connected with them. Nor is it true that in grief we always oppose ourselves to its idea. Far from it. No idea are we more apt to hold to as to something sacred. We reject all comfort. To forget seems to us unworthy of ourselves. There is the ideal of unswerving constancy. And how complex is the intellectual development, how unlike what it is in our ordinary emotions,—the living in the past and future,—as in all passions,—the recollection of past joys and happiness, "sorrow's crown of sorrow"; and in the future, the one hope of reunion in death.

We must then judge that M. Ribot's theory fails to interpret the facts admitted by himself, first the difference between the passions and ordinary emotions as something more than a quantitative difference; secondly the difference between the passions and fixed emotions of sorrow, fear, or anger,—where the quantitative differences of stability and complexity may be eliminated; and lastly by conceiving passion as an intellectualised and prolonged emotion, which he at least sometimes does, he is logically bound to conclude, that when this emotion changes, as it should do, in response to changes in the environment,—as joy into sorrow or fear, or desire into satisfaction,—that then the passion itself has come to an end. The source of the failure of the theory to explain such fundamental facts is to be traced, not merely to the vagueness and uncertainty of its principal conceptions, but chiefly, as it seems to me, to this, that M. Ribot has altogether misunderstood the relation in which emotions stand to passions or sentiments. Having conceived of emotion quantitatively and not qualitatively, as distinguished by intensity and brevity, he naturally formed a quantitative conception of passion, as distinguished by the stability and complexity of its feeling. He thus cut the one off from the other. The two states "are not only different but *contrary*" (p. 7). Even when a passion appears to be born suddenly, as sexual love, it "must pass through an embryonic period more or less short during which it will free itself from the characters of emotion in order to assume those which are proper to itself" (p. 140). It must then have been a surprise to him to find that, sometimes at least,

there are still emotions in passions. In one place, he admits that "every passion that has a long duration is crossed by some interruptions of emotion" (p. 7). In what way then does he regard this irruption of emotions into this opposite state of passion? He regards it as a relapse of passion into emotion, or as evidence that there is no true passion (p. 7). Thus children and savages, he thinks, are, on the whole, incapable of passion (p. 26). They live in a world of emotions. And in considering the love of Alfred de Musset for George Sand who both loved and hated one another, and alternated between sudden "gushes of tenderness" and "cries of rage," he remarks that this is not "passion, which is a chronic state, but its counterfeit made up of a succession of acute states or crises; it is a return to the state of emotional disposition" (p. 69). That there is a certain truth in this may be admitted. The more violent our emotions, the more they endanger the stability of passion. For passion is an organised system which involves the control of emotions; and when these break from its control, they are no longer parts of its system, but act on their own account. But suppose that they are not so intense, or that nature in giving a man a disposition to strong emotions gives him also a strong will to control them. What then? We do not know. But in M. Ribot's sense of the term, an emotion that has not reached a certain degree of intensity—a degree quite indefinite—is no longer an emotion. It falls into a third class, which is neither emotion nor passion, comprising all the feelings of our daily life that have only a "moderate intensity" (p. 73, see also p. 5).

Thus the principle underlying M. Ribot's classification is a division of the feelings based on quantitative differences of intensity, stability and complexity. The first class comprises the feelings of moderate intensity, the second those of considerable intensity and instability or the emotions, the third, those which are stable and complex or the passions. And this principle apart from its defect, that, where these differences are either not susceptible of or not subjected to exact measurement, it can only issue in vague statements of little or no scientific value, has here a more serious consequence. Through his application of it M. Ribot has isolated the emotions from the passions and failed to understand their intimate, reciprocal relation.

II.—THE NATURE AND GENEALOGY OF THE PASSIONS.

In one respect M. Ribot's theory of the passions is typical. It represents a new attempt to interpret on the lines which

have generally been followed since Kant the difference between the emotions and passions. Hence in criticising the inadequacy of his theory we criticise also the inadequacy of the older conception which remains, in spite of the fresh way in which M. Ribot deals with it, substantially the same. This older conception is expressed in the simile of Kant that emotion is like a flood that bursts its dam, and passion like a river that wears for itself a deeper bed. The one is a sudden force soon expended; the other grows stronger with the habits of thought and action which it slowly forms. The picturesqueness of the conception and the amount of truth which it contains explains its wide acceptance. There is such a difference as it represents between the feelings; only this difference does not coincide in all cases with that between the emotions and passions. For there are emotions, as we have seen, that have the stability of passions, and like them are strengthened by habit and reflexion, as morbid fears, inconsolable sorrows, and we may add, subtle emotions of respect or contempt that, once felt for an individual, are frequently borne to him for the remainder of his life. And as there are stable emotions, so there are unstable passions as, in so many instances, sexual love. If we then apply the theory consistently we must include in the class of the passions the fixed emotions, and in the class of the emotions the unstable passions. But if we do this we shall be uniting things that we ought most to separate, and separating others that we ought most to unite. And it will be due to the persuasiveness of this conception which has caught just those differences which are most readily observed.

If we pass from these two classes to the third class which M. Ribot has formed, comprising the feelings of "moderate intensity," which are the most frequent in our daily life, this addition to the older theory, possessing the same kind of obvious and indefinite truth, so far from lessening the difficulties in its path, aggravates them. For it is certain that there are passions which through the greater part of their life-history often do not exceed such a moderate intensity of feeling, as the passion for science; while there are other feelings, which the term passion is ill-adapted to express, but which yet have all the stability, complexity and intellectual development assigned to this class, as the calm and steadfast affection for our children and friends. But to make the evil greater: into this third class fall also all our emotions when they do not reach the indefinable standard of 'brevity' and 'intensity' which M. Ribot requires of them, although the lower degrees of anger and fear are still the same emotion as the higher,

possessing the same nature and tendencies in a weaker or less conspicuous form. And thus we take away from the class of the passions and from the class of the emotions what really belong to them, only to confuse their differences in this third class of feelings of moderate intensity.

Now in opposition to this principle of classification based on the quantitative differences of the feelings, which confuses their important differences to make way for those which are obvious and indefinable, we shall advance quite a different conception, not based on vague differences of intensity, complexity and stability, but which will interpret the greater stability and complexity of the passion or sentiment which as a rule exists. The difference between emotion and passion is not, as M. Ribot thinks (pp. 7, 130), an opposition of nature, or they would exclude one another, which they do not. Nor does the quantitative difference between them, which as a rule exists, mean that feelings of one degree of intensity, duration and complexity are emotions and feelings of another degree, passions: for in this case also, however artificially our classes were constituted, still they would exclude one another; feelings on one side of an arbitrary line would be emotions and feelings on the other side, passions. The emotions would have no legitimate place or function in the passions, and if they sometimes occurred there we should have to regard them, as M. Ribot regards them, as a relapse from passion into the acute form of emotion (pp. 69, 89). But the emotions have an essential place and function in the passions, and the true distinction between them is the distinction between the same feelings regarded alternately as individuals and as forming a higher organisation. This higher organisation is the passion: passion is organised emotion. In every passion there is a system of self-control regulating more or less efficiently the intensity and behaviour of its emotions; whereas when emotions act independently there is at most the restraint which one exerts on the others; there is no system of self-restraint within the emotion. Thus we speak of the impulsiveness of men given over to the dominance of their emotions; and although fear sometimes excludes anger, and sorrow, joy, this does not imply the self-control of which they stand in need. But a man dominated by ambition or avarice is no longer impulsive: the emotion is controlled by the system.

But the complex nature of passion is not sufficiently defined as organised emotion, it is also organised desire, and here the same system of self-control works to subordinate the lesser desires to the greater. For since many of our emotions have impulses, inseparable from their nature as

fear, anger, shame, disgust, pity, gratitude, etc., and since impulses that are checked are apt to rise into conscious desires that we feel, frequently recurrent desires become part of the life of passions; and in fact it is only when they are either latent, or given over to their few moments of triumph or enjoyment, or perhaps when crushed by sorrow that they do not feel them. Thus passion is an organised system of emotions and desires; but not only or mainly of emotions in the restricted sense of M. Ribot, but more often of delicate or calm emotions which are suggested in the current of our thought. The violent emotions, except in some temperaments, chiefly occur in crises in the history of the passion. For its self-control is exercised in restraining all intensity and violence lest they deflect it from its ends. Hence emotions in their secondary and acquired state as organised in passions have not as a rule the explosive violence of their primitive forms,—and where they have they are apt to break up the organisation of the passion and become again independent forces on their own account. But it would be a mistake to suppose that the diminution of their intensity involves weakness. The anger which explodes uses up its strength at once, and is followed by regret; but when its outward manifestations are checked and its vindictive thoughts multiply and consolidate in calm reflexion, anger is deepened and strengthened: and we have only to think of the steadfast hope that inspires every passion in its first and vigorous growth to see how efficient the calm but strong emotions may be in the service of the passions.

Thus if we take a comprehensive view of any passion from its commencement to its decline we find that it consists in an organised succession of emotions and desires; but we must not infer from this that at every stage of its process its feeling is defined as emotion.

The intellectual development of the passions and the various processes of thought they bring into play have been carefully studied by M. Ribot, and we may admit unreservedly that every passion has a much higher intellectual development than any emotion if we mean by 'emotion' *independent* emotion. In fact if we think of political ambition, the love of truth or art or religion, we shall hardly find it an exaggeration to say that only in the passions are the intellectual powers of a man developed to their fullest extent. Now it is precisely when our thoughts are most defined and closely organised together that the feeling of them is apt to be most undefined and faint. Solitary thoughts rise in our minds and draw with them so often hopes, despondencies or

regrets, or feelings of anxiety or anger; but these concatenated thoughts will not condense into any emotion that we can name or recognise. We can sometimes say on reflexion that their tone is faintly pleasant or disagreeable; but not that the state as a whole is either joy or sorrow, hope or despondency. Since then passion requires so much thought and reflexion to organise its emotions and desires, and to accomplish and harmonise its ends, there will be recurrent phases of its history in which it is without emotion. But passionless as it then appears, it is still moved by one or other of its great, controlling desires, it is still from beginning to end an organised succession of desires and emotions.

Finally this theory of the passions interprets their greater stability in comparison with the independent emotions, which as a rule exists. For since a passion has the duration of all of its emotions and desires it must have a greater duration than that of any one of them; and it has, moreover, the stability which self-control and organisation always manifest in comparison with unregulated impulse.

Let us now see what value this theory has in interpreting the passions which M. Ribot has collected. His list includes gluttony, drunkenness, sexual love, love of sports and adventure, the passion of gambling, avarice, ambition, hate, jealousy, the passions for art, science, politics and religion, patriotism, the moral passion, the collector's passion for engravings, pictures, books, stamps, etc., the love of pleasure. The first two are ambiguous. They are inordinate appetites or passions according to the meaning we attach to the words. When we call a dog gluttonous we mean that his appetite is excessive. But an appetite is not a passion. It may, like emotion, be organised in the service of passion, or be left in its independence, liable to excess and deficiency. In the second sense, gluttony is the love of the pleasures of the table, something different from appetite though developed from it; and it is this that M. Ribot understands by the term (p. 48). It is the same with drunkenness and sensuality: and from three natural appetites three passions may be developed, which seem to be varieties of the love of pleasure. But the proper meaning of the terms in English, at least of the two former, is inordinate appetite and not the passion developed from it. Here too we see that just as emotions sometimes have the stability of passions, so our natural appetites have an even greater stability, and that by this characteristic alone we cannot distinguish the passions.

Now if we compare the remaining passions on this list a remarkable fact is disclosed. All of them with the exception

of two, hate and jealousy, are like the three first that we have already considered, varieties of love, and we do not require to strain the meaning of the term to bring out their common affinity. They are the love of sports, the love of adventure, the love of gambling, avarice or the love of wealth, ambition or the love of superiority or power, the love of art, the love of science, the love of a religion, the love of a political party, patriotism or the love of country, the love of collecting and the love of pleasure. Religious passion may seem to be an exception, since fear of its object or of God is more common than the love of him; and what we call the passion may be only a stable fear, like the fear of death. But a stable fear, like an inconsolable sorrow or an indestructible appetite, is not passion in the same sense, but only in the loose and popular meaning of the word. It is always the same emotion; but a passion is sometimes one emotion, sometimes another, according to circumstances. But if the fear issues in certain other emotions, as it often does,—for deliverance from evil fills the mind with joy, and even gratitude to the deliverer,—and there arises from the fear a system of emotions where before was only a single emotion, then the fear which survives is not the passion but one only of its emotions. Religion based on fear has grown into love,—love of its rites and practices or of the being who is the object of it.

We conclude that all the passions on this list with the exception of two are varieties of love; and one of these two is hate. Thus among this variety of loves we meet with the solitary figure of their opposite, hate. For we grow into love naturally; but we are driven into hate by a kind of inversion of our natural life. From the child to the old man love multiplies and branches into new directions, reorganising the same old emotions in new objects; but hate is an ugly episode from which we are in a hurry to escape unless our nature be peculiarly evil. Hence hate is so often a barren passion, which by destruction of its object destroys itself, and branches into no new systems. It is a curious fact that of the varieties of hate most are dependencies and complements of love. Thus patriotism is often accompanied by the hatred of foreigners, and religion by the hatred of heretics, and the love of knowledge by the hatred of ignorance and falsehood, and the love of beauty by the hatred of ugliness. Yet there are a few independent forms of hate of which the most important, in addition to the hatred of individual persons and places, are class-hatred, sex-hatred and misanthropy.

We come next to the other exception, Jealousy. Now it appears to me that M. Ribot has here confused a violent and

prolonged emotion with a passion, and it is a mistake which is likely to arise from the use of the term 'passion' to designate these higher systems. For jealousy is not even a primary and independent emotion, like fear or anger. It is one of those derivative and dependent emotions which seem only to be developed within the system of love.¹ Thus we find it in sexual love, and in the love of anything that we desire to possess exclusively, as power or fame. The proud and vain are prone to it. Louis XIV., according to Saint Simon,² was one of the most jealous of men, and his jealousy was rooted in pride and vanity. He was jealous of statesmen, generals and of any one who threatened to eclipse him in one of the qualities on which he prided himself. For jealousy has a proper place and function in sexual love and pride, being obviously directed to preserve exclusive possession of their objects. It is true that it is, as M. Ribot remarks, composed of opposite elements (p. 65); and the opposition does not merely arise from the conflict between it and other parts of the system of love,—as between the disinterested and tender emotions of sexual love and the desire of exclusive possession; there is a conflict in jealousy itself. There seems to be fused in it the opposite emotions of fear and anger. The jealous man anxiously and persistently strives to separate the woman he loves from the presence of his rival, as the miser tries to hide his gold where it cannot be stolen; and here jealousy acts like fear. But the tragedies of jealousy arise from its other, aggressive element. Anger is felt against the rival and against the woman herself so far as she supports him. Thus a man's behaviour under the influence of this torturing emotion represents one or other of its elements, being timid or violent according to circumstances. If this be true, jealousy and love are not, as M. Ribot appears to hold, two opposite passions combined together (p. 65), but the one is an emotion developed within the system of the passion, through, as far as we can see, a conflict between two of its primary emotions. The relation of a violent and often prolonged emotion, like jealousy, to the passion of love is no more obscure than the relation of love to its other emotions. Like them, unless it be restrained by the system as a whole, it will be more injurious than useful. Inconsolable sorrow which M. Ribot found so hard to exclude from the class of the passions has not any more an independent origin: who ever heard of it where profound love did not precede it and survive with it?

Through the exclusion of jealousy from the list of the

¹ See "Character and the Emotions," *MIND*, N.S., vol. v., pp. 219-220.

² *Mémoires*, xiii., 1.

passions, all of them are now shown to be varieties of love or hate. Does not this remarkable fact suggest that the difference between the passions and the emotions is the difference between love and hate and the emotions? And if we include in the list of the former, friendship, love of the home and the reciprocal affection of the members of it to one another, so far as that occurs, which because of their "moderate intensity" M. Ribot would regard as neither emotions nor passions, the result is still the same: these varieties of love, though not so apt to absorb the whole man as ambition or avarice, have essentially the same organisation. If then there be other passions than love and hate, they must be comparatively obscure or infrequent.

Now we must admit that this distinction between love and hate, on the one hand, and fear, anger, joy, sorrow, jealousy, shame, and all individual emotions, on the other, is not involved in the ordinary meaning of the terms; and from Descartes' *Traité des Passions* to the present time, love and hate have been placed in the same class with these emotions. The dictionary definitions of love take no account of it as a system of desires and emotions, but, when they do not give an alternative expression, as 'regard' or 'affection,' define it by its most conspicuous emotion, as joy or delight, or 'taking pleasure in' something, or tender emotion.¹ And were we to ask, what is the relation of love to the sorrow that arises through the destruction or even prolonged absence of its object, the answer would probably be, that this sorrow is a mere effect or consequence of love. Yet if love is joy or pleasure it ceases to exist when pain has excluded pleasure, and sorrow, joy; which no one would maintain. But the dictionaries cannot give an adequate definition of love, because the conception of it as a complex system of emotions has not been grasped by the common mind.

We come next to the genealogical problem on which M. Ribot lays so much stress. Its importance we cannot deny; but it is much more difficult, in psychology, to show how some constituent of our mind and character has been developed than to analyse it after it has been developed in our mature experience. Where are we to find the facts on which the theory of this development must be based? If there were extant a systematic collection of documents bearing on the development of the passions in the child and the man, then we should have a comparatively safe basis on which to construct such a theory of the passions. When novelists and

¹ See Johnson's *Dictionary*, Art. "Love".

observers of character lend themselves to this great work of psychical research, and instead of seeking mainly to please us, form systematic studies of the growth and behaviour of the different passions, then the science of character—with an influence on human life and destiny which who can now forecast—will advance rapidly in truth, coherence and completeness. In the absence of this essential accumulation of facts we can only form hypotheses which we know not how much we may have to modify in the future. The available evidence at present must be drawn from (1) such recollection of the growth of certain passions in ourselves as we may seem to possess,—and how many of these are sufficiently definite or trustworthy?—(2) the knowledge that joy or pleasure is the conspicuous emotion in love as evidenced by dictionary definitions and the descriptions of psychologists; (3) such accounts as we may be able to collect from novels and biographies.

Premising this much, and that no genealogical theory of the passions can be, at present, more than tentative, we may proceed to give some account of what seem to be the original source and subsequent development of love. If we assume that joy, either suddenly formed, as in sexual love, or, as in friendship, often of insensible growth and accretion, is the first emotion of love (which is only a supposition, for pity or fear may in some cases precede joy), then we have at least a standing ground from which we can calculate the occurrence of other emotions. It seems to be an assured and familiar law of our minds that whenever joy has been felt in the presence of an object with sufficient strength that either immediately, or after a certain interval, during which the object is not experienced, pain or sadness will be felt in connexion with an impulse; and wherever the necessary ideas are forthcoming this impulse will be defined as desire for renewed experience of the object. Hence some definitions of love centre in this desire. Thus Descartes defines love as an emotion of the soul "which incites it voluntarily to unite itself to an object that appears suitable".¹ Now whether the vague feeling of pain in the absence of the object is further defined as sadness or sorrow seems principally to depend on (1) the length of the absence, and (2) on whether the desire for the presence is felt to be now or for an indefinite future time, unattainable. Further we cannot be certain in this law of the succession of pain, sorrow and impulse to joy whether the pain must be felt before, after, or simultaneously with the impulse.

¹ *Les Passions de l'Ame*, Deuxième Partie, Art. 78.

Now given the uprising of desire we seem to be able to enunciate another emotional law governing the development of love. In proportion as the desire persists and is not realisable at once, and is subjected to a variety of circumstances, some favourable, others unfavourable to its realisation, the prospective emotions are aroused in the circumstances appropriate to each. These are specially hope, despondency, anxiety, confidence and despair, but also all the primary emotions when aroused by the thought of a future event, as anger when we anticipate opposition and fear when we anticipate danger. Whether they are aroused in any given case of desire, and how many of them, and in what strength, depends on the strength of desire, and the circumstances acting on it, which vary from one case to another. But we may perhaps infer that, in a normal subject, all of them would be elicited were the circumstances sufficiently varied, and the desire sufficiently strong. Finally the last stage of desire is reached, and with the accomplishment of its end, renewed joy or satisfaction is felt, and its process terminates.

Now it is generally at some such stage of the development as in this return to joy after the pains of absence that is constituted that valuation of the object in and for itself which is an essential feature of all love, and recognised as a constituent of the passions by M. Ribot. This valuation may be latent in the first joy, which at least is an essential condition of it, but it seems to be chiefly in the recurrence of joy after sorrow and desire that it rises as a conscious emotional belief into consciousness. And this is implied in the common observation that we never really value anything until we have lost it. Now it sometimes happens that after the first succession of joy, pain, desire and attainment that reunion with the object does not arouse joy but disappointment. We hear people say 'He was delightful at first but afterwards he disappointed me,' or 'What was it that I saw in him that so greatly pleased me?' But when disappointment is felt instead of a recurrence of joy, then the intrinsic valuation of the object which is essential to love is either not constituted or is destroyed. And the process comes to an end. For separation will no longer be followed by sadness and desire; and the object no longer occupying our thought will be forgotten. But where love is constituted there is a recurrence of joy with renewed experience of the object, followed again by pain and desire. And thus in the main, the course of a passion is a recurrent succession of joy, sorrow and desire. For not only does separation from the object occasion desire, but so does also its injury or destruction, its unsatisfied wants,

where it is a human being, or its immaturity, where it is knowledge or wealth or a little child.

With the accumulation of experiences of the object in correspondence with the succession of joy, sorrow and desire, and the prospective emotions, and the emotional belief in the value of the object, memories are formed which in their turn become the source of retrospective emotions. And thus love has its regrets as well as its satisfactions, its delights in past scenes and its disappointments, and so often cannot escape from remorse, self-reproach and shame.

Now although joy may not be the first of this long succession of emotions and desires, it is nevertheless the fundamental emotion of the system. For if, earlier or later, joy were not felt in the presence of the object there would be no feeling of pain in its absence, no sorrow in its injury or destruction, no desire for its presence, possession, or improvement, no hopes or anxieties on its behalf, no disappointments in our expectations of it, no despondencies at failures to reach it, to help it or be reconciled to it, and no regrets for its injury or neglect; and therefore no love. And this essential importance of joy to the development of love we all recognise in certain cases. Thus not only would sexual love be inconceivable without the intense joy in the mere presence of its object, so different from the restless appetite of sex, but even friendship could not be formed without a mutual pleasure in company, nor the mother's love without the tender delight in the sight of her offspring. We only miss the persons or the things or the modes of life that have been a delight or pleasure to us, and we only love those that we miss and which we have joy again in recovering. The mother who does not feel the tender joy in the sight and touch of her child, in tending it and playing with it, does not love it. She may fulfil in part her duties, but coldly without love. And hence it is that so many definitions of love go so far as to identify it with joy or pleasure in the presence of its object. Thus Spinoza defines it as "pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause,"¹ and the ordinary dictionary definitions identify it with taking pleasure or feeling delight in the presence of a person or thing. And from Aristotle's time to the present day, where this confusion is either avoided or for the moment forgotten, the position of delight or joy as a cause of love has been constantly recognised. Thus Aristotle says, "It is indeed ever the beginning of affection to find pleasure not only in a person's presence but in the recollection of him too

¹ *The Ethics*, Part iii., Prop. xii., note.

when he is away";¹ and Prof. Westermarck in developing Herbert Spencer's theory of the origin of maternal love as being essentially the love of the weak and helpless, observes, that the mother "is in close proximity to her helpless young from their tenderest age; and she loves them because they are to her a cause of pleasure".² And again of sexual love he remarks: "The tendency to feel some attachment to a being who has been the cause of pleasure—in this case sexual pleasure—is undoubtedly at the bottom of the instinct".³

Now it seems strange that out of all this variety of emotions in the sentiment or passion of love, one emotion alone should possess this function of being an essential basis and condition of all the rest. This fact, if it be a fact, we cannot pass by; we have to explain it: we must inquire by what means joy alone becomes a cause of this organised succession of emotions and desires which love is. Now whatever truth there may be in the contention that the passions are secondary and acquired products of character compared to the emotions ("Toutes les passions étant de formation secondaire, sont nécessairement acquises, . . ." p. 9) still we should not acquire them were there not in the constitution of the mind a secret and instinctive disposition to organise its emotions; and it is this very complex instinct that accounts for those empirical laws of their succession which we have been considering. That is to say the law connecting the cessation of joy with the feeling of an impulse,—whether arising at once or after a certain interval,—and the laws connecting this impulse developed into desire with the occurrence of the prospective emotions in their appropriate circumstances, and the law connecting the cessation of these emotions and desire itself in the attainment of its end with the recurrence of joy as satisfaction, and that connecting this process as a whole with the repetition of it in the changing circumstances of absence, of injury to the object, of its defective or immature state and of its unsatisfied wants,—that all these laws point to the existence of a bond between the emotions which is innate in us and part of the very constitution of the mind. It is this bond that I think we may call an instinct, and there are two things to notice about it, that it is a very complex instinct, connecting together the dispositions to a great many emotions and desires; and secondly,

¹ *The Rhetoric*, Weldon's trans., p. 79.

² *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, vol. ii., ch. xxxiv., p. 189.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

that this instinct is developed into love by a sufficiently strong feeling of joy, not necessarily an intense emotion.

To understand this better we must consider that each one of the primary emotions is connected with its own emotional disposition in the nervous system or in sub-consciousness, and that these emotional dispositions are themselves instincts, causing us to behave under the influence of fear, anger, disgust, surprise, joy and sadness much as the animals behave under them. But the instinct of which we are speaking is not any one of these instincts at the roots of the primary emotions. Nor yet is it all of these dispositions or instincts regarded collectively. For the primary emotions often act with relative independence of one another. We enjoy moderately a performance at a theatre without experiencing any subsequent sadness through its cessation or desire to witness it again; we experience even sadness independently of joy when it is connected with a depressed state of the bodily functions, and joy independently of sadness when their activity is healthy and vigorous; we experience anger independently of fear, and fear of anger, in their primitive forms, as well as both organically connected in a passion; we experience an independent disgust, as well as that self-disgust when we have missed opportunities of realising the desires of our passions. Thus the instinct on which the development of love is based is not any one of these instincts at the root of the primary emotions, nor all of them as a collection, but is their total existence as an organised system. And the evidence that this is an instinct is that undoubtedly there is a system of emotional dispositions involved in the love of an object, and that however much this system may be developed in our experience and in coming to love the object, still the structure of it seems to be innate and instinctive. For we do not learn by experience to put desire and sorrow after joy in separation from the loved object and in failure to unite ourselves to it afresh; nor again, do we learn by experience to connect with this desire in the changes of circumstances to which it is subject the different prospective emotions; but these manifold connexions are part of the very constitution of the mind. And if we reflect on an instinct which is admitted to be such by both biologists and psychologists,—the maternal instinct of animals,—we shall be brought to the same conclusion. For the behaviour of this instinct is most complex. The mother animal will fight in defence of her young, will conceal them or flee with them when they are in danger, will procure food for them, will play with them, will search for them when they are lost, and

manifest pleasure in their recovery. And it is clear that this is not the conduct characteristic of one of the emotions, but of many combined. Fighting in defence of her young is the manifestation of disinterested anger, fleeing with them or concealing them, of disinterested fear, keeping them in her neighbourhood and playing with them, of joy, wandering disconsolate in search for them, of sorrow and frustrated impulse, and the expressions of pleasure in their recovery, of renewed joy. Thus the maternal instinct is in some way a system of many emotional dispositions, and the particular instincts connected with them, and gives rise to that emotion and conduct appropriate to the circumstances: and however much it may acquire from experience this fundamental structure of it is innate. And if we reflect on those forms of love which seem the most removed from instincts, as avarice or ambition, we shall yet find in them the same structure of emotional dispositions, unlearnt from experience however much else be learnt.

And now to interpret the special relation of joy to this instinct. The instinct of love, though the most complex of human instincts, is not itself love in any proper and complete sense of the term until it has found a suitable object. It must be aroused by and referred to this object before there can be said to exist a love of this object. Now joy is the signal that it has found an object; for the meeting with this object is joy. Often, as in sexual love, it is a most surprising joy, wonder and admiration.

And though I stood abasit tho a lite,
No wonder was; for why? my wittis all
Were so o'ercome with pleasure and delight,
Only through letting of my eyen fall,
That suddenly my heart became her thrall,
For ever of free will—for of menace
There was no token in her sweete face. . . .
Then I study in myself and sayn;
Oh sweet! are ye a worldly creature,
Or heavenly thing in likeness of nature?

But joy is not merely the signal of the union between the instinct of love and its perceived object. It is no mere otiose accompaniment: it has an important function. For it is essential to the development of love that the instinct be related to some object of perception or thought, and secondly that it be bound to this object so that not merely one of the emotions of its system, but all of them, and not merely at one time, but at various successive times, may find in this object an identical point of reference. Now joy can fulfil both of these functions. We cannot love any kind of

object, but we can love any object in the presence of which we feel an enjoyment or delight sufficiently strong. Where we feel no enjoyment the attention is not arrested by the object, unless some other principle detain it. But fear and anger though they detain the attention do not of themselves give rise to love, though often to hate. 'Interest' both directs and detains the attention, but by 'interest' we do not generally mean enjoyment in a thing for itself, but, at most, for something else connected with it. We are interested in any thing or person that arouses our curiosity. The desire of knowledge detains the attention, not for the sake of the object, but itself. Thus we are interested in the young because we desire to know what their future will be; we are interested in a book because we desire to know the conclusions to which it will be brought, or how the plot will develop and what will be the fortunes of the persons represented in it. But such interest does not lead to love unless there arise an enjoyment in the thing for itself. For as soon as our curiosity is satisfied we are done with that thing and pass on to some other.

Now joy does detain attention on the thing for itself, and alone seems to furnish the kind of object which can become an object of love. But, in the first place, this joy must have a degree of strength that we cannot with our present knowledge define. Innumerable things please us, but only a few of them do we come to love. In the second place, this joy must not be merely that diffused joy of health and good spirits, but must be specially aroused by some object of perception or thought.

Joy then seems to be the fundamental, the indispensable emotion in the development of love, that without which the instinct will not develop into love, that which selects an object to be loved, that which must be present at the orientation of the system however many other emotions be absent. Hence it is that we see so many people living together languidly without love, from duty and habit, or bound to some joyless occupation. They do not love the occupation, nor each other, because neither the one nor the other have ever been a joy to them. See on the other hand, how where there has been this joy and the love developed from it, in what a different way this joy has bound them together. For having developed the love, the joy may now be absent for long intervals without destroying the love. But the memory of it remains. And how often but for this memory, when the inevitable disappointments arrive, and exhausting labour has to be undertaken, and misfortune to be borne, on behalf

of the object, should we not cry out, 'What is the good of it?' But this memory holds us constant, and enables us to persevere with courage to the end.

This genealogical theory of love, or any other that we may adopt as an alternative to it, for the reasons that we have already given, can only be advanced tentatively. But at least it seems probable that joy has a quite peculiar relation to love, as evidenced by the common confusion between them, and the number of observations which point to it as the chief agent in the development of the passion.

On the assumption of the truth of this theory we have to add to and modify the definition of the passions which was derived from a statical analysis of them in consciousness. We defined love as an organised succession of desires and emotions, involving self-control, including an emotional belief in the intrinsic value of its object, and possessing recurrent passages in its history, more or less long and frequent, in which the concatenation of its thoughts does not allow of the formation of definite emotions. And some such definition as this we must give when we confine ourselves to the history of love as it appears in consciousness. But love is more than its history; and it sometimes springs into sudden and tumultuous life when its history has hardly begun. It is always a great possibility, and has more possibilities than those which come to fruition. For if it is now inconsolable grief or frustrated desire or a final hope of reunion or remorse for wrongs done to a loved object, the same disposition which caused these emotions in certain situations would in others have caused different emotions. Thus love is a hidden cause as well as a manifest effect. Hence it is that so often in the first fresh and strong love of an object we feel a mysterious power beyond the present emotion approaching to govern our future, and we think sometimes with terror of what we are committed to, and sometimes with terror that this new object of joy may be snatched from us.

She was shy from the great bliss in her bosom,
And was made timid by the fervour of her affection.

We can now give a second and causal definition of love supplementing our former definition. Love is the system which, under the action of joy, organises the dispositions of the primary emotions and desire, and of the prospective and retrospective emotions, on behalf of one and the same object, and which according to circumstances is manifested either as emotion or desire.

These two definitions we may use as tests to decide in a

given case whether what is felt for an object is or is not love. The first leads us to inquire into the history of the feeling in consciousness. If a mother's feeling for her child has been exhibited as a succession of emotions and desires organised on behalf of it, in which two chief desires control the rest, desire to maintain union with her child and desire for its preservation and development, then assuredly this is love. But in other cases where love is suddenly formed, as in sexual love, and sometimes in the passion for science or art, when a young man in the first wonderful moments of a new joy knows what his future career will be, there may not yet be any organised succession of emotions as proof of the existence of love. Yet often there is a vivid consciousness that the power of this first emotion is the power of love; and if we may take the sudden belief as any evidence of its truth, that joy has already aroused the latent instinct of love in relation to its object, so that were the circumstances at once changed and sufficiently varied he would feel any one of the emotions of love appropriate to them, then love already exists although one only of its emotions have been felt. And as if to justify the belief there is sometimes an imaginative forecast of the future in conformity with it, in which the images of events and conduct bring with them an echo of coming emotions. Thus while love must have some emotional effect, an organised succession of desires and emotions is only its fuller manifestation, it remains, in addition to them, a deep-seated cause and instinct ready to arouse any one of the fundamental emotions in the appropriate circumstances.

The peculiar position of joy in relation to the different passions of Love does not seem to have been suspected by M. Ribot. In his *Psychologie des Sentiments*¹ he excluded both joy and sorrow from the class of the primary emotions, assigning the curious reason that otherwise he would have to include in the same class bodily pleasure and pain. He discerned no essential difference between joy and sorrow and a pleasant or painful bodily sensation. Yet in the present work he admits them in a "very restricted sense" (p. 131, note). And after remarking that he has sought for the origin of the passions in "needs, instincts, tendencies" ("besoins, instincts, tendances," p. 127), he asks, "Is there another source? Can the emotions become passions . . . ?" (p. 127). One after another, as we have seen, he rejects them. But when he comes to joy he anticipates a different conclusion. He thinks that it may become changed into one passion, the love of pleasure (p. 13).

¹ Introduction, ii., 5, and part 1, ch. ii., 11.

Now joy can no more be changed into a passion than an organ of the body can become the bodily organisation as a whole: but it is the determining emotion of not one passion but all passions of love. Its relation to the love of pleasure is peculiar. Here the element of pleasure is abstracted not only from the joy, but from pleasant bodily sensation, and pursued and valued for itself. It becomes the object of a passion, not the passion itself.

Now if Joy has the unique function we have assigned to it of selecting the objects of so many and such different passions of Love, we can hardly suppose that it is always the same in all of them without variations. For the differences of the passions seem to be reflected in the nature of their joys, or the differences of their joys in the nature of the passions. And as there is perhaps no other emotion so rich in varieties as joy, so this may account for the fact that there is no other passion so rich in varieties as love. There is a joy in intellectual, as well as in muscular activity, hence there is a love of knowledge as well as a love of sports and exercises; there is a peculiar joy in the possession of power over other men, and hence ambition; there is a different joy in admiring or reverencing great men, hence the love that surrenders power; there is a peculiar joy in being admired, and hence vanity; there is another joy in beauty, hence the æsthetic passion; and there is a quiet joy which precedes or follows the doing of good deeds, and hence benevolence. Thus the varieties of love seem to depend on our susceptibility to different varieties of joy. And if we ask why in one man one passion is developed and in another man a different passion, we must answer that either there is a greater innate susceptibility to the joy on which the one is based than to that of others, or else that circumstances have favoured the development of the one passion and been unfavourable to the rest.

And now to return to M. Ribot's theory. Instinct is, as we have seen, at the source of every passion; but instinct is not one source and emotion another distinct from it; the activity of the instinct is manifested in consciousness as emotion or impulse.¹ Thus the passion is not only based on the highly complex instinct of love, but also on the instincts which are involved in the dispositions of the primary emotions; and the activity of these instincts is manifested not only in the behaviour characteristic of them, but in corresponding emotions.

Over and above this basis of instinct common to all men,

¹ It is seldom that the relation of instinct to emotion is clearly interpreted. See W. McDougall's excellent account, *Physiological Psychology*, ch. vi., p. 109.

on which the development of their passions depends, there is sometimes also, where a master-passion is developed, an innate disposition peculiar to some. The joy which lies at the source of such a passion, it would seem, must have an extraordinary degree of strength, not the momentary strength of intense emotion, but that persistency or capacity for recurrence which is generally conjoined with a lower degree of feeling. But what is the source of this strength? It is evident that the minds and bodies of men are often adapted to different kinds of work, and that the work for which a man is adapted carries a susceptibility to a corresponding kind of joy and a capacity for the permanent recurrence of this joy distinguishing it from those ephemeral joys so soon destroyed by familiarity or satiety. In one man the surplus energy of his system finds its natural outlet in an activity which is predominantly muscular, and, if he have leisure, he develops the love of some sport or game, in another man in the systematic activity of the higher nervous processes, and he develops the love of some science or art, or he is finely balanced and capable of both. But, in other cases, passions may be developed which do not seem to spring from an innate disposition to a particular kind of joy. Every man enjoys the possession of money, but the disposition to this enjoyment is generally supposed to be acquired and not innate. The passion of avarice often rises on the ruins of other passions that have preceded it in youth, and grows from an acquired enjoyment. And how often is the religious passion seen to be a last resource of the soul to acquire some joy that shall endure, some outlet for its instinct of love, after the disappointments of affection, disgust with sensuality, or the collapse of ambition.

I have ventur'd
This many summers in a sea of glory ;
But far beyond my depth : my high-blown pride
At length broke under me ; . . .
Vain pomp and glory of this world, I hate ye ;
I feel my heart new opened. . . .

Thus the joy which is at the source of a passion may be either one for which we have an innate disposition or one the disposition for which is acquired, and developed into strength by the circumstances of our lives. But in either case it acts only in conjunction with instinct as the other and hidden source of the passion. And where an instinct or innate disposition ripens within and does not meet with its appropriate object without, it commonly happens that a painful impulse is aroused. It may be long before a man discovers the kind of mental activity for which he is fitted ;

and the impulse remains vague and objectless because he does not know what will satisfy it. And thus while an unsatisfied impulse often precedes the first emotion of joy, until its object be discovered and joy for it be felt, the instinct cannot develop into passion, having no common centre to which its several emotions can be referred.

Love, then, being based on a most complex disposition and instinct, relating all the fundamental emotional dispositions in a single system, developed through the selective action of joy, it is obvious that this instinct precedes the growth of the passion in the individual and probably in the race. And if evolution teaches us that the bodily functions, instincts and mental processes of animals are organised for their individual preservation and the preservation of their species, what is this but the precursor of love on a lower plane of existence? For this organisation includes that of their primary emotional dispositions, and these dispositions are therefore already related in a system. Thus long before there is self-love or the altruistic love of the race there is something that takes its place, which acts as an instinct without consciousness of its object and end. Yet although the emotions and appetites of animals are not independent principles of action but regulated in their discharge and related one with another, so that the animal acts as if it loved itself, and pursues its own preservation and welfare, yet we should regard it as a misuse of the term to call this systematic activity self-love; because we think the animal incapable of forming a conception of itself or of understanding in what its welfare consists. Yet here already is all that is most important for love,—the system, and its possible improvement through experience. What does it lack? The higher intellectual processes that are involved in a clear conception of the object and end, the rational choice of the means after comparison and reflexion,—all that improvement of an innate system due to the activity of a conception: and with this the joy based on conception and the consciousness that the animal loves both itself and others. Yet were love used in a broader sense to denote the instinct at its base, there would still be preserved that fundamental distinction, to which the whole of this article has been directed, between any one of our emotional or appetitive dispositions and that system in which they are organised with or without consciousness of their object and end.

II.—THE IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT AND ITS APPLICATION TO HISTORY.

BY GEORGE GALLOWAY.

THIS paper does not pretend to answer the large questions which belong to the province of the Philosophy of History. It is meant to be a discussion of the applicability of the notion of development in the sphere of historic phenomena, which may prepare the way for a detailed examination of the principle in the domain of religion. Our purpose will be realised if we succeed in setting the idea in a clearer light, in showing with what qualifications we must employ it in the region of human culture, and in suggesting the postulates which this use involves.

The word development is popularly used with a slender appreciation of its connotation. And even in scientific circles the term is applied without reflexion: it has in fact become one of the *idola fori*, a stock-phrase of the scientific marketplace which it is not thought needful to justify. Speaking of words like 'latent,' 'potential,' and 'tendency,' Mr. Bradley cuttingly remarks, "It would be hard to overestimate the service rendered by these terms to some writers on philosophy".¹ And the same is precisely true of development. But the facility with which the word is predicated of objects so diverse as a plant, a man, a nation, and a type of culture, should suffice to give the critically minded pause. It is only natural to ask whether the idea has the same significant content in each of these examples. These are matters about which we must be clear, ere we can decide on the validity of the conception of development when applied to historical phenomena.

At the outset it may be of advantage to consider the origin of the idea and its introduction into modern thought. Like most of our philosophical ideas we inherit it from Greece, and it was first definitely formulated by Aristotle. The *χωρισμός* of Plato's ideas seemed to make process and becoming unintelligible, and Aristotle sought to solve the pro-

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, first ed., p. 384.

blem by his theory of a vital relation of form and matter which is realised in the constant transition from the possible to the actual. An object which is a concrete whole can be analysed into a form and a matter, and the fact that it passes through definite phases or stages must find its explanation in the form or *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*. Change and movement are the outcome of the innate striving of matter after form, but it is the form which *ποιεῖ καὶ γεννᾷ ἐκ τοῦδε τοιόνδε*.¹ Here Aristotle sets over against a mechanical (*ἐξ ἀνάγκης*) a final and immanent causality (*οὐ ἔνεκα*) which explains the process of unfolding in things. The form is at once the *τέλος* as it is also the universal by means of which we know the object.² Aristotle thus read the meaning of becoming as a transition from potential to actual existence,—a transition which is based on the presence even in natural organisms of an intelligible form or constitutive idea. With the difficulties and inconsistencies in which the carrying out of this thought involved Aristotle we are not at present concerned. But it is hard to overestimate the influence of this great conception on all later thought. The point we have to note is that Aristotle never seems to have considered history in the light of this theory of development. Indeed the classical world, when it thought of history, thought of a cycle and not of a progressive movement towards some far-off goal: and Aristotle himself threw out the hypothesis that the fruits of culture might more than once have been lost and found again.

The spread of the idea that human history is a process towards a divinely appointed end was directly due to Christianity. Eschatological notions flourished greatly in the primitive Church; and if some of these notions were crude, the whole movement had the effect of bringing the wide field of human life under the scope of a comprehensive teleology. Men were made familiar with the thought that the world and its inhabitants were moving forward to some end appointed by God. The view of history as the unfolding of a divinely ordained plan gradually fulfilling itself received an impressive expression at the hands of Augustine. In all this, however, we have history broadly treated on the basis of certain religious postulates rather than a deliberate and reflecting endeavour to interpret it through the principle of development. We must come well down into modern times ere we find the steps taken which led towards such an attempt.

The first significant treatment of the idea of development

¹ *Meta.* vii., 8, 1033 b, 12.

² *κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἅπαντα γινώσκουμεν*, *Meta.* iv., 5, 1010 a, 25.

in modern philosophy is that of Leibniz. From Aristotle he derived the conception of a continuous inner process teleologically not mechanically determined. The complete idea of the organism implicitly existed in the germ and directed its unfolding. Leibniz applied the same idea to the striving of the monad through the different stages of mental life towards completed self-knowledge. Then the system of monads has its Sufficient Reason in God, who must thus be the ground of that orderly development of their inner lives which stands for experience to each of them. Under the figure of the Choice of the Best Possible World Leibniz expressed the thought that the ground both of the world's existence and development is a highest Ethical Value. To apply his conception of development to history would perforce have been very difficult for Leibniz, inasmuch as the evolution of each member of the system must be rigidly determined from within, and his philosophy excluded the notion of fruitful interaction of elements with one another.

Both in the theoretical and practical philosophy of Kant, in many ways under the influence of the eighteenth century, the notion of development is notably in the background. Still, in his *Lectures on History* we find him putting forward the idea, often to be repeated by others, that the aim of history is the development of all the natural capacities of man. For a more striking exposition and enforcement of this idea we must turn to the work of Herder. A new and deeper view of history had already been given by Lessing, who applied in the historic sphere the notion of development learned from Leibniz. But it was Herder who first, in an impressive and comprehensive manner, treated historical phenomena from this point of view. Both in nature and human life he saw the tokens of a great process of growth; and even those who (like the present writer) have only a slight knowledge at first hand of the *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* are struck by the boldness and confidence with which he carries the idea of development from the organic into the spiritual world. In both spheres a similar drama is advancing to its goal. History for Herder is just the development of human nature towards a perfect humanity which takes the form of freedom. The movement unfolds after the fashion of a natural organism, and the religious optimism of the writer enabled him to pass somewhat lightly over the failures and the ruin brought about by conflicting human wills. Despite the suggestiveness of Herder's theory and its influence on Hegel and others, it must be said that his use of the term development is vague

and uncritical: and this is apparent from his failure to draw any clear distinction between natural and spiritual evolution.

Hegel's grasp of the notion is of course more subtle and profound; it was substantially a revival of the Aristotelian idea. Development for him meant the unfolding of what has already potential existence, and its course and end, alike in the regions of nature and of mental life, are determined. Nothing, strictly speaking, can arise *de novo*, and the process is only a bringing to manifestation of what already has being somehow. The same movement of thought takes place in all levels of existence, and Hegel has no hesitation in affirming that what is substantial in history is mind and the process of its development.¹ Thus we find him saying: "As the germ carries within itself the whole nature of the tree, the flavour and the form of the fruits, so the first vestiges of mind virtually contain the whole history".² The essence of mind is freedom, and Hegel declares that freedom—the full and harmonious realisation of human capacities as Herder put it—is the goal and moving idea of history. But the universal Idea can only work itself out in the medium of particular human interests and passions: the two in their inseparable connexion constitute the warp and the woof of the growing web of man's history. The Particular stands in the foreground and enters into oppositions and is involved in conflicts: the Idea stands in the background, and through the shocks and jars of time calmly and inflexibly brings forth the predetermined end.³ It is here that Hegel shows that there is a difference between natural and historic development; for in the former the process goes on in an immediate and unhindered way, while in the latter progress is through antagonism. And this because in the sphere of history the passage of the Idea into realisation is mediated by human consciousness and will.⁴ It is no part of our purpose here to consider how Hegel treats history as the realisation of freedom with reference to the historic nations. But there is a point in Hegel's conception of historic development on which he himself lays stress and which deserves notice. It is most important, he says, for the understanding of history, to grasp the conception of change, the process of transition.⁵ The fact is borne home to us by the thought of ruined cities and vanished empires. Yet as life dissolves in death, so out of death arises new life. There comes a point, Hegel thinks, in the history of a people as of an individual, where that

¹ *Philosophie der Geschichte*, p. 21, ed. 1848.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 23.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 68.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 90 ff.

opposition between the latent ideal and the actual which is the spring of progress, is overcome: it has now realised the function which it had in it to fulfil. The nation's historic office is discharged; the fruit it brought forth goes to thrive elsewhere; and it can only linger on in the life of custom. In the true sense there is no dislocation of the process, for the spirit which has wrought a relative completeness, by its negative movement transcends the given stage in order to find an ampler fulfilment. The strict continuity of the movement is asserted by Hegel when he declares that the stages which, from one point of view, are a succession in the past are really eternally present in the inner depths of the Universal Spirit. The different national spirits are only the moments by which the Idea rises to a self-inclusive totality and comes to its goal.¹ Contingency is excluded, and each element has its determinate meaning and function in the movement of the spirit.

Here we have the most profound and thorough application to history of that idea of development originally outlined by Aristotle. The difficulties it raises need not now be discussed; they will to some extent be dealt with when we consider the general applicability of the idea of development to history. Meanwhile it may be well to refer to the less speculative use of the principle in the sphere of history by men like Spencer, Comte, and J. S. Mill. Here the thing insisted on is the presence of causal connexion between the parts and the evidence of the reign of uniformity in the region of historical phenomena. Mill, to whose statements we confine ourselves, thinks that "that which is only probable when asserted of individual human beings indiscriminately selected, [is] certain when affirmed of the character and collective conduct of masses".² At the same time he admits that as regards the succession of historical phenomena our inference can at the most amount only to an empirical law, not to a law of nature. Yet this is not because the uniformity is less strict, but because it is due to our imperfect knowledge of the conditions. Historical science, like meteorology, is not certain in its deductions, but in either case law reigns. The aim of social dynamics would be achieved, "If every one of the leading general circumstances of each generation were traced back to its causes in the generation immediately preceding".³ Progress, in so far as it exists, Mill agrees with Buckle in attributing mainly

¹ What we construe as future is eternally realised in the Absolute.

² *Logic*, sixth ed., vol. ii., p. 428. ³ *Op. cit.*, p. 519.

to increase of intelligence. The important feature in the views of Mill and those who follow him is, that they recognise no qualitative difference between historical and natural laws. They do not seek to interpret human progress through final instead of mechanical causes. Historical movements are explained rather by what has been than by what is to be; the cry is to establish continuity with the past rather than to recognise the appeal and indwelling power of the end or ideal.

In Hegel and Mill, then, we see two well-defined types of historical philosophy which have points both of contact and of difference. Both agree in fully maintaining the sway of the principle of continuity: neither would admit the emergence of elements *de novo* in the historic process. But while for Mill the succession of historical phenomena is to be explained by an extended application of the principle of causal connexion, for Hegel it is to be interpreted through the idea of development. Here the end dominates the means, and for the deeper understanding of what is we must not simply consider what has been but what is to be. Whether either method is satisfactory is doubtful, but the only way to reach a decision on the subject is by a closer examination of the idea of development itself.

If we regard the principle as it is illustrated by the growth of organisms, we find presuppositions involved. There is first of all a determinate basis called the germ, then a continuous process within the germ in virtue of which it assumes successive phases, then an end which is set over against the beginning and contrasted with each intermediate stage. The further assumption is made that the end is that for which the beginning was, and controls the movement throughout. In other words, organic development in its specifications depends primarily on internal character, and only in a secondary degree on external environment. The urgency of the teleological concept is partly due to the felt inadequacy of the ordinary causal view. For when we think out what the common idea of cause implies, we are inevitably led to the notion of the interaction of elements within a whole; and this whole conditions the interaction of the particular parts, which interaction regarded in abstraction from the rest is termed cause and effect. And when we identify the relation of parts and whole with that of means and end, there is truth in Kant's contention that end is the complementary notion to that of cause and one involves the other. Obviously, however, this conception as it stands does not meet the case of development which requires progress in

time, and where, in order to secure the operation of the final whole throughout, we postulate its potential or implicit existence in the earlier stages. Here the idea of cause is not merely completed, it is transformed by the idea of end; and the question lies on hand, Can we justify the notion of an end implicitly operative? It has been objected that by teleology we simply give the semblance of explanation by repeating as ground what we find as consequent.¹ But this criticism, it seems to me, depends for its validity on a particular application of the idea of ground. If it is taken to mean that the developed consequent really exists in miniature form in the germ from which it exercises a definite propulsive energy, then this no doubt is a sheer assumption, not a justifiable hypothesis. The problem raised by development is in no way furthered by denying the validity of the idea of final cause. It has been truly pointed out that our subjective experience has given content to the notion of end. Our sense of voluntary effort or effective causality embodies itself in our representation of end as something to be achieved, and our feeling-consciousness invests the realised object with a value as contrasted with the means. Nor do we deny that without the feeling and volitional aspects of our nature we should not evolve the teleological view. At the same time it is necessary to remember that it was experience itself out of which this idea grew and was generalised; and so it must be *bene fundatum*; there must be that of which it seeks to be the expression in the constitution of experience. And this would hold even if it could be shown, as has not been done, that our idea of end is an illegitimate construction from our experience. Moreover it may be urged that the notion of end coheres with the principle of continuity without which we could not make our experience rational. Indeed teleology is only a more highly specialised application of the principle of continuity. And the intellectual need we are under of so thinking experience is justified by the practical success with which the ideas work.

In what way, then, do we hold that teleological process obtains in nature? Evidently we must postulate that the elements which constitute the beginning prefigure in their character and disposition the complete result, and yet not in the sense that by themselves they are the sufficient means to the result: elements from without are always necessary.

¹ Adamson, *The Development of Modern Philosophy*, vol. ii., p. 187. Prof. Adamson's criticism is exceedingly acute, but also, it must be added, very unsatisfying.

Further, if the end does not operate throughout, the process is not intelligible. We speak of the process having a law of growth, which law determines that the elements in the process of differentiation stand in definite relations to one another and the whole. If we say that the end which finds working expression in the law is only a subjective point of view, we simply make development a mystery. It is more profitable to ask what meaning the term law can have in this connexion. Evidently it cannot connote an ideal principle which rules the elements from without, and invests their actings with a necessity to which they would not otherwise be subject. Law is a name for the way of acting of the elements which are supposed to illustrate it, and expressed as a generalised formula is useful for purposes of description but not of explanation. A law of nature is essentially abstract; it expresses only a particular aspect of the behaviour of things, and its necessity is hypothetical; and the more concrete the experience the less adequate will be the attempt to express it in terms of mechanical law. Accordingly the explanation of organic growth must lie in the character of the elements themselves, which by their interaction make such growth possible. These elements are 'compossible': each is qualified by relation to the rest, and so all are subject to the limitation implied in mutual determination. The question is, then, What do we mean when we say that the given whole has a disposition to work out a particular line of development? If a mechanical propulsive power, a *vis a tergo*, is excluded, we seem compelled to postulate something in the connected elements which corresponds to awareness of the end to be produced, and conative impulse towards it. That is to say we have here something which, on a higher grade, appears as instinct, and finally as conscious volition. In other words the ultimate essence of the developing object is related to the psychical life, and so operates under the principle of end or final cause. The existence of a real continuity between the rational will in man and the conative life of a lower organism is our ultimate justification for interpreting living process through the idea of end, an idea whose psychological origin is in our own volitional experience. If this statement is accepted, it follows that the mechanical interpretation of experience can at no point in the scale of being be true, but it is less untrue in the lower than in the higher ranges of psychical existence. You can use the mechanical conception with good results in the case of a planetary system, while it is notoriously inadequate if applied to a social whole. But the temptation to

transfer methods which are useful in a lower sphere to a higher is great; and the language of natural science has been applied to society with misleading results. Phrases like 'social statics' and 'social dynamics' introduce a false simplicity at the outset and conduce to defective theories in consequence.

On the theory we have so far advanced we have now to ask, whether we can interpret historic progress as an organic development. Ere we try to come to a decision on this point, let us note certain differences between the conditions which obtain in the two spheres. And, in the first place, the elements which enter into organic development, if in their essence psychical, are nevertheless not self-conscious. There must be a difference in the reactions of a factor which stands on the level of conation merely and those of another which stands on the level of self-conscious will. For man plays a conscious part in his own development and a plant does not. We cannot suppose that antecedents are taken up into the focus of self-consciousness, whence they issue as consequents, and that the self exercises no efficient causality in the process. In the case of a psychical whole whose reactions are instinctive, the end may operate in the part with a uniformity which has the semblance of being mechanical. But with the self-conscious individual the relation of his conduct to the end will depend on the way he takes the end up into his conscious purpose. Hence in the historic life, which consists in the interrelated actings of a multitude of self-conscious individuals, the principle of teleology finds an altogether fuller and higher expression. A feature which emphasises the distinction between organic and spiritual or historic development is the presence in the latter of the momentous contrast of what *is* and what *ought* to be. As Prof. Ward has said, in history purpose carries with it the notion of good or worth, and the great difference between nature and history is that between what *is* and what *ought* to be.¹ Science and history set out from the same world of experience, but the one proceeds outwards, the other inwards: so the one deals with connected facts, the other with related values. To the historian progress means the realisation of value, and he appreciates events and characters by their relation to some value conceived as end. It may be objected that the contrast of fact and value is drawn too sharply, and it may be argued that the difference between what is and what ought to be is represented in the develop-

¹ *Vide Hibbert Journal*, Oct., 1905.

ment of an organism. The 'ought' is just the fulfilled idea, the completed process of growth, and each partial phase of evolution has to be transcended that the end may be achieved. But we have only to compare this conception with spiritual process to see that it does not rightly apply to it. The elements of an organic body have no meaning for themselves; in a social whole each unit has a unique self-meaning. In the one case we say the end *has* to be, in the other it *ought* to be, and the difference in the terms expresses a significant difference in the processes. Moreover in organic growth each phase has a positive function and value as a step to the end: on the other hand, in spiritual development we find within the process itself elements which impede the realisation of the end and which ought not to exist. By no fair interpretation of the facts can we identify natural imperfection with moral evil. Hence historic development has a new complexity and depth of meaning as compared with natural growth, and this because of the unique individuality of the elements which go to constitute it.

There is a further consideration which should make us careful about trying to construe historical development after the analogy of organic growth. In all organic growth the process starts from a definite basis, which as beginning we contrast with the end. And the question lies to hand, Is it always possible to specify such a determinate basis in the case of historic development? Here we might take up the question discussed by Dr. M'Taggart, whether society is justly entitled to be called an organism. And it is plain that if we accept Dr. M'Taggart's definition of organism as that which is the 'end of its own parts,' society cannot be fairly regarded as the final end of the individuals who compose it.¹ On the other hand, it might be said that, though society is not a perfect organism, still it reveals some of the essential features of organic development; and especially that the historic process is the unfolding of an immanent idea operative from the first. Here the difficulty already mentioned confronts us, the difficulty, namely, of assigning a determinate basis on which the process begins and a well-defined whole

¹ *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 185 ff. One may doubt whether Hegel, in view of his treatment of the state as the objective Will and the realisation of Freedom, would have accepted Dr. M'Taggart's statement as an adequate interpretation of his own doctrine. On this point, see the instructive remarks of Prof. Bosanquet, *MIND*, N.S., No. 25. But I have no claim to speak with authority on the subject, and after all the point is not of importance for our present purpose. Dr. M'Taggart may quite well be right in the view he advocates, but wrong in supposing that Hegel would have endorsed it.

persisting through change within which the idea works. Shall we take the nation as the unit within which historic development manifests itself? then we find it impossible to apply the rule that the whole moves altogether, if it moves at all. Within the whole we encounter very various degrees of spiritual culture, and while certain elements are progressive and make history, others are so fettered by prejudice and custom that instead of co-operating in a forward movement they are a positive obstacle to advance. Moreover, among the progressive parties there is commonly divergence of spirit and tendency, which issues in antagonism and conflict over the course to be pursued. Nor is it an unusual thing for the reactionary elements in society to triumph for a time at least. These facts, if they do not disprove development, at all events show that the phenomena are too varied and complex to be satisfactorily interpreted on the analogy of organic growth. And, if further argument were needed, one might point out that, while in the physical organism the inward principle is of primary importance, and the environment, if essential, is still of secondary importance, the same cannot be said of any social whole which you choose to regard as the basis of historic development. For here interaction with other social wholes—tribes, nations, or races—is as important for the progress of the given social whole as its own internal character. To put it concretely, the historic development of a nation cannot be deduced from any assumed fundamental character of that nation, taken in abstraction from the influence of other nations.

Still more difficult is it to justify the application of the term 'organic development' to the history of particular phases of culture within a society. Phrases like the 'development of art' and the 'development of religion' occur very frequently, and convey a sufficiently definite meaning for practical purposes. But when you push your analysis a little deeper, you may find the phrase is made to cover unjustifiable assumptions. For the language used often suggests that the particular type of culture has a vital principle within it, and unfolds its meaning by some inherent power of its own. It is needless to say that in speaking thus people personify an abstraction and treat it as having being and energy for itself. In truth a particular phase of culture only exists as an element in the self-conscious life of individual persons. To recognise this, however, is to recognise that the spring of progress is not in the given phase of culture by itself, but in the self-conscious minds of which it is an aspect. Accordingly it seems to me false to say that religion, for example, has a

constitutive idea which can explain all the characteristic features of its evolution in a race. For religion as a state of the subject interacts with the other contents of self-conscious experience, and if it helps to mould these, it is equally moulded by them. That is to say, the evolution of a people's religion can never be explained by isolating some particular feature of it and calling that its constitutive idea. It has developed as part of a larger interaction of elements, among which we reckon the political, the artistic, and the scientific consciousness.

The drift of the foregoing argument has been to show, that the key to the meaning of historic development is not to be found in a generalised conception of the process as a whole but in the psychical life of individual selves. For the constitutive forces which make for progress, whatever be their ultimate explanation, have their living centre in the self-conscious minds which, by their interaction, produce development. Psychical events in men are the real kernel of history, as Sigwart justly remarks.¹ Any profitable discussion of the larger question must, therefore, base itself on the cardinal features of psychical development. What are these features? Here I make no pretence of saying anything new, but am content to state the results to which the best recent psychology points. Mental development is throughout teleological, and so in its lowest as well as its highest phases. In mental process the equivalence of cause and effect, which we attribute to natural process, is not found; and no analysis of sensation-elements, for example, will explain how they come to be represented by a sense-perception. So instead of interpreting psychical development causally, we must read it as a purposive process which takes form in a continuous 'acquisition of meanings'. The point of view is inward, and the end functions in the conative unity of the subject. Hence we regard mental development, with Prof. Stout, as the study of conscious endeavour as a factor in its own fulfilment. We reach no satisfying insight into the process, if we treat it from the outside and try to establish a causal connexion between the elements.

In harmony with this inward reading of mental development, we find that its facts are more than facts: they are values, and each value stands for a unique experience. Mental contents in the individuals A and B which we treat as the same, never mean exactly the same to each: there is a qualitative difference between them which is

¹ *Logic*, vol. ii., p. 441, Eng. Trans.

bound up with the unique self-feeling of the two percipients. And it may be pointed out that the ultimate justification for maintaining the unique character of historical succession lies in the fact, that history is a complex amplification of the psychical process in the individual.

Some further observations may be made in this connexion. On any level of psychical life purpose is practically operative though the end is not the object of conscious reflexion. But the end always forms part of the content of will in the higher spiritual and artistic creations, and at each stage it is in some degree the object of self-conscious endeavour. On the other hand, it is true that the ends which ordinarily move us are proximate not final ends. And as a matter of common experience, the more distant objects of desire seem to define themselves and take on practical importance largely from the way in which we achieve our more immediate purposes. Still it may be said that the remote end really moves us even in the region of common experience, and the final purpose is really latent in the proximate purpose which is its means. On this view the latent purpose would be an aspect of the reflective purpose, an aspect which is always coming into clear consciousness. Now it is true that a man seeks more than he can clearly define at any one point of his history, and as he ages he learns much. But the facts do not warrant us in trying to press the view before us into the service of a determinist theory of mental development. Both in the personal and collective history ideals are subject to growth, modification and decay; and it is to beg the question to say that an ideal which prevails must have been implicitly present from the first. Here the matter is settled not on the evidence but by an *a priori* assumption, and the assumption is not indispensable that the process may have meaning. The way is open for us to hold that ends which have become objects of conscious endeavour to an individual or a society in the later stages of growth need not be latent in the earlier. None the less these remarks must not be taken as suggesting that remoter ends do not play a part in personal and historic development. For some who deny this come in the result to a non-rational view of all human progress. This opinion is held by one or two writers in our own country, and it has been forcibly advocated by Prof. Villa in his recent volume, *L'Idealismo Moderno*. Villa's psychology is based on that of Wundt, and he lays the greatest stress on the constitutive function of proximate ends in development. From this he is led to deny that more distant ends are really operative, and to affirm that

the cogency of the proximate end is entirely a matter of the feeling-consciousness. So man impelled by certain value-feelings strives after nearer objects, but he neither knows nor concerns himself with the remoter issues of his choice.¹ In harmony with this, Villa expressly declares that history is the very antithesis of logic. It may be argued in support of this doctrine, how little of conscious purpose there seems to be in the evolution of a nation, how little clearness and concord as to ultimate aims among different classes of the people. I venture to think, however, that this is a theory which, starting from a sound psychological principle, overstrains it, and in the result seriously misconceives the teleological aspect of history. While the nearer ends are of most pressing moment, the more distant ends are also kept in view, for man is a being 'of large discourse' who looks 'before and after'. If immediate feeling is the constitutive force of history, it is hard to see how there can be progress; for feeling unqualified by a purpose which extends beyond the present resembles instinct in its working, and instinct, though it serves to perpetuate the species, does not minister to progress. But Villa's assertion that the immediate ends to which feeling prompts express values would seem to carry us further than the realm of feeling. For that which has value must have meaning and be distinguishable from other values. And since we exercise selection on our proximate ends, assigning to some more and to others less importance, it is obvious that we do so because we have introduced a certain coherence into our value-ideas by connecting them with some standard of value. That human conduct has a measure of order and consistency in it is only possible because the variety of approximate ends is appraised and co-ordinated by reference to a general end or higher good. This good, although not to be realised as an immediate end, operates in our choice of such ends, as is amply shown by the way in which man controls an immediate desire in the interests of his larger well-being. And the same holds true in the history of a society or a people. The policy of a nation is never determined simply by the proximate ends to be achieved. In selecting among such ends it will be found that the past history and the aspirations of the people work as influential factors, and that the nation not only considers what will serve the purpose on hand but owns the duty of bringing the policy of the day into accord with the national ideals:—

¹ *L'Idealismo Moderno*, 1905, pp. 205-209.

*Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento ;
Hae tibi erunt artes, pacisque imponere morem,
Parcere subjectis, et debellare superbos.*

Probably it is not necessary to labour the point further. But what we have said leads naturally up to the question in what sense and in what degree the principle of continuity obtains in historical development. Already we have come to the conclusion, that the form of evolution which is the constant unfolding of an idea potential in the beginning and strictly fixed in all its stages cannot be shown on the evidence to apply to historical development. Still it is plain that, though there be not a rigidly determined continuity in the historic process, continuity of some kind there must be; otherwise there could be no field for the historian who shows how the past prepared the way for the present and how the present is 'great with the future'. Neither in the case of individual nor people can we satisfactorily understand its conduct to-day in isolation from its actings in bygone days. At this point in the argument it is necessary to distinguish between the general or universal element in the historic process and the individual element. The existence of both aspects is indisputable, and the important thing is to relate them rightly to each other. The interaction of mind with mind within a social order goes to build up fixed dispositions and tendencies which have a collective value and perpetuate themselves. Although these general functions are only actualised through individuals, we do not find their explanation and source in the individual. Such social products as speech, custom, and belief, while they pervade society like an atmosphere and vitally affect the individual, are not the creation of private initiative and invention, but the outcome of social wants. Consequently they do not reflect the fluctuations of individual desire, but reveal the uniformity and constancy which fit them to function as the instrument of the continuous life of the collective whole. These universal, social creations go to constitute the mind of the individual, and they form the general background of his thought and action. What is personal in the individual's character must be developed upon this common ground and cannot be distinctive apart from it. Accordingly the attempt is sometimes made to bring the individual element in culture under the dominion of the universal, and to regard men of light and leading simply as the embodiment of tendencies potentially or actually at work in society. So J. S. Mill, while he thinks it wrong to attribute only a trifling influence to great men, yet lays the stress on that aspect of human

evolution which can be 'reduced to uniformity and law'. In harmony with this we find him saying that the influence of great men operates rather in determining the *celerity* than the *direction* of movement.¹ Even more distinctly does Hegel make the individual factor in history depend on the universal. The great man is only great because the universal is immanent in his ends: his function is to bring the general unconscious inwardness to consciousness.² Nor indeed is any other result possible for those who hold that historic development is a strictly determined movement. The view, again, which lays stress on the individual element in development is sometimes called the 'Great-Man-Theory,' but it has not won the same amount of support as the other. A prominent advocate of this view was Carlyle, whose enthusiasm for dominant and heroic personalities led him to term history 'the essence of innumerable biographies'. On the same side Prof. W. James has spoken some trenchant words: "The causes of the production of great men lie in a sphere wholly inaccessible to the social philosopher".³ In contrast to Mill he traces the mutations of societies mainly to the examples of individuals, and thinks that the accidental presence of men of genius is the ferment which decides in what way society shall evolve.⁴ In his own words, James emphasises the importance of 'individual variations,' not the 'dead average': but he sees that the indeterminism is not absolute; "not every man fits every hour". And one can sympathise with his outspoken declaration: "It is folly to speak of 'laws of history' as of something inevitable".⁵ It is important nevertheless that we should not so exalt the individual aspect of historic development as to lose sight of the universal aspect, for in the latter case it is hardly possible to speak of development at all. If we resolve the historic movement into centres of personal influence, we ignore the essential fact that it is only through their interaction within a whole that the process can have meaning and value. It is indeed true that psychical events in men are the kernel of history, but these psychical events are not intelligible apart from the social and spiritual environment which supports them. The action of well-known personalities can only show against that relatively stable background which embraces law, morality and religion. These change; but they change slowly, and the effect of any isolated individual upon them is necessarily small. The pioneer of progress can

¹ *Logic*, sixth ed., vol. ii., pp. 535-537.

² *Phil. d. Geschichte*, pp. 37-39.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 227-229.

³ *Will to Believe*, pp. 225-226.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 244.

only bring about progress by making the many experience the force of his appeal: as Lotze has said, "Any personal power requires for its efficiency the receptivity of the masses".¹ And to realise this is to realise that a continuity will always be maintained between the present and the future.

The course of the discussion has brought us now to the point where we must try to give a definite answer to the question, how far the historic process is continuous. Put briefly the thesis we wish to uphold is this: the degree of continuity in development which satisfies our logical and ethical demands is not a continuity which binds progress down to one particular line. That is to say, within limits alternatives are possible: the previous development does not determine that only one of these alternatives can become actual. And here we must dissociate ourselves from the Kantian view, that successive events can only be taken up into the content of the one self-consciousness in so far as they are connected by the self in accordance with the principle of cause and effect. This is a proposition of which Kant never offered any satisfactory proof; and if we may trust our own experience on this matter, we certainly can have knowledge of a succession without also qualifying it by the causal predicate. And this is still more obviously true in the region of psychical events, where we cannot say that *a* is the cause of *b*, *b* of *c*, and *c* of *d*; for, while there is connexion, the connexion is teleological, resting not on the structure of the elements of the series but on the conative unity, the active interest of the self. Or, to put it otherwise, the connexion is not in the facts but in the active self of which they are the expression. So likewise in the case of moral action you cannot postulate character as a fact in time which, in virtue of its inherent causality, brings about a determinate succession of temporal acts. For it is a mere assumption that a man's character can be regarded from without as a complete whole, so that each act in time is related to it as effect. Here again the fallacy seems to lie in taking the elements as if they had a connexion for themselves, while in reality it is the inward self which relates them to each other. Viewed from without, character as a whole of habits, dispositions and tendencies is identified with the self. But here it must be remembered that we are qualifying the self by predicates which to some extent are discrepant. And so long as the self does not will as the

¹ *Microcosmus*, vol. ii., p. 192, Eng. Trans.

completely unified character, the diversity within character makes it possible that a man's act should always be related to some aspect of his character, and yet that there should be an element of indeterminism in his self-development. In the psychological problem we postulate the apperceptive activity and selective interest of the self as giving coherence to mental events: in the ethical problem we postulate the self as will which relates choice to some aspect of character, and which is the ultimate ground why, when there is conflict of motives, one aspect of character is expressed in action rather than another. In further support of this theory of moral freedom I would urge that it seems on the whole to square best with the facts of moral experience. It may be well to repeat also that it is necessary to distinguish the judgment of the spectator who interprets from that of the person who acts, and I venture to think that personal experience lends some countenance to the view here put forward.¹

The interpretation we give to the freedom of the individual cannot but materially influence our way of regarding historical development. A strictly deterministic theory of personal character must have as its correlate the purely necessarian conception of collective evolution. What seems contingent in the historic process only wears the appearance owing to our imperfect knowledge; to a more comprehensive insight it would appear as a necessary factor in the general movement. To us, on the contrary, historical development in virtue of its individual aspect will always have a contingent element whose operation is real if subordinate. That it must be subordinate is apparent when we consider that what is distinctively new, even in the most gifted individual, must be relatively small in comparison with what he derives from the culture of the past and his social environment. And even the reformer who is in keen antagonism to an existing social order has his significance in virtue of his positive relation to the system against which he reacts. If the reforms he introduces are not susceptible of an organic relation to the existing structure of society, they must perish for lack of life. But to affirm this does not preclude conviction that there are points in history where alternative courses were possible: we may assert this and still give a legitimate scope to the principle of continuity. For it must be remembered that these diverging possibilities are not introduced *ab extra* by great

That it does so has been conceded by so careful and unbiased a critic as the late Prof. Sidgwick. *Vide Methods of Ethics*, sixth ed., pp. 65-66.

personalities, but are prepared for and presented by the prior development. To take a rude illustration. At a particular point it might be possible to divert a stream in one direction rather than in another, but the possibility is given by the previous course of the stream itself. With a different direction, or a different degree of fall, perhaps no such diversion could take place at that point. The alternatives which are open to those who 'make history' are the alternatives developed by history itself; and therefore the process cannot suffer dislocation though either course is chosen, but the issue will be different. As the outcome of the historic drama, Luther was confronted with the alternative of defying the Pope or submitting to him. It is conceivable he might have submitted, in which case the religion and political evolution of the European peoples would have been materially affected. And yet can any one doubt that that historic development could have been made as coherent and intelligible to reflective thought as the present development has been? In the light of the result the historian would have simply put another valuation on the spiritual forces at work, and if he were a determinist would have shown to his own satisfaction that the issue could not have been otherwise. Our conclusion in short is, that the process of historic development has within it a certain flexibility, but this flexibility is within the limits prescribed by the principle of continuity. In the case of personal development those alternatives only are possible which are presented by a man's character: in historic development they must be such as are presented by history itself. Hence at whatever point we examine the historic process, we shall never find it absolutely broken and disconnected. The most original genius must speak the language and use the forms of thought of his time, and no leader, however daring, can initiate a movement which will persist, unless the stream of the historic life has made the movement a possible one. It is given to a few individuals in each generation to find an answer to the problems of progress: the problems themselves have been set by the historic life of humanity.¹

But while there is continuity in history, we cannot say that the movement is continuous in one direction, the direction of progress. A Philosophy of History, however optimistic its tone, has to find a place somehow for such facts as the decadence and final disintegration of a nation's life. Indeed the stream of culture seldom runs smoothly for

¹ Cf. Lotze, *Microcosmus*, vol. ii., p. 188, Eng. Trans.

a long space: it breaks into eddies in its course, and at points the current seems to move backward rather than forward. The ordinary spectator would hardly question the view that history presents at many points the spectacle of a loss, not an increase, in value. To this the reply from those who profess to look deeper will be that the loss is apparent rather than real, since it is compensated for somewhere and somehow. So it might be urged that the loss implied in the decadence of the intellectual and æsthetic gifts of the Greek, and of the Roman genius for law and civic order, has been more than counterbalanced by the contribution these peoples have made to the wider culture of the Western world. Yet it would hardly be possible to show by any broad inductive treatment of history that the principle of compensation always holds, and that there never is a good really lost. The conviction that 'all things work together for good' can never approve itself to us as a simple generalisation from the facts: it is a postulate which rests on other grounds. The problem pressed on us here is one which we must deal with if we are to reach a satisfactory conclusion on the main point of our inquiry, which is the applicability of the idea of development to history. For development in the proper sense is more than continuity of process; it means that through the process an increase of value is brought about, and that the end is better than the beginning. When we put the problem in this way, we see that the answer is by no means a simple one and raises some perplexing issues.

The first question is: How are we to decide whether development is present in history or not? For it sometimes happens that the movement which one person terms progress another pronounces to be on the downward way, and the phase of culture which is rated highly in one epoch finds only a slender appreciation in another. Plainly this is because the ideas of value which form the basis of the judgments are not the same. And we can only come to some agreement as to the degrees of value revealed in the stages of the historic movement, if we agree on the standard by which we are to judge. If, for example, the theory of Eastern and Western Pessimism is correct, history is an evolution which spells deterioration; for it is a lapse from the unconscious which is best. Hence the paradox that the process of history brings about an increase of value by itself running out to a close. Such a theory of the good precludes the idea of a development in time, and is best refuted by the personal instincts and practical tendencies of mankind. History itself does not speak a clear word on the matter at

issue, for history, as has been said, is the "battlefield of values," and the ideal takes new forms with the changing life of humanity. Yet we cannot remain enclosed in the sphere of relativity, and merely try to judge one type of culture by reference to another. For in the end we must either declare some type to be of primary worth, or relate the different types to an ideal as of ultimate value. Now we may agree that the ultimately valuable must be some form of 'desirable consciousness,' but to fill in the content of this consciousness is exceedingly difficult.¹ There is, however, a certain amount of agreement over the direction in which we are to look for the ultimate Good. For instance few thinkers of importance at present would argue that the Absolute Value is to be construed in terms of pleasure, though pleasure may be an element in it. The trend of thought is to find the Supreme End or Value in a heightened form of the personal life, in the full and harmonious realisation of personal capacities and powers.² For it must be through existing values, and more especially through the values realised in the ethical life, that we try to define for ourselves the general norm of our valuations. The ethical end from a formal point of view is adequately described by the term 'self-realisation,' taken to mean the making real by the will in the given personal life of the projected idea of a higher self. And the end of society would be to minister to the fullest, most varied and harmonious expression of the powers of human nature, in short to subserve the development of personalities. Hence we can accept the test put forward by Höfding, here giving a fresh turn to Kant's thought, that perfection in a society is the degree in which each personal being is so placed and treated, that he is not only a means but also at the same time an end.³ To those who object that such a test of social value is only formal, the thing to say in answer is that no other answer to the problem is possible. The traveller cannot describe in detail the country which as yet he only beholds afar off. The degree in which we have already realised value in our own lives is the only clue we have by which imaginatively to give content to the Ultimate Value.

¹ Prof. Mackenzie (*Social Philosophy*, first ed., p. 270) speaks of the ultimately valuable as what belongs to the consciousness of the world as "a systematic and harmonious totality". This is vague. Nor is it clear why the consciousness of the world as a harmonious system must be the most valuable form of consciousness.

² One may see tokens of this tendency even in such definitions of the ethical end as 'self-conservation' and 'increase of life'.

³ *Philos. Probleme*, p. 89.

That the Ultimate Value must be conceived in terms of persons can scarcely be doubted when one remembers that only in the personal life is value actualised. Every judgment of worth has reference to a self-conscious subject, and a society has neither mind nor will apart from the individual persons who compose it. We talk loosely of the value which pertains to a definite type of historical culture, but in the last resort we must think that value as present in the spiritual subjects who, by their thought and will, give actuality to the form of culture in question.¹ Taking, then, this personal view of what is ultimately valuable, and bringing this standard to bear on the process of history, we ask: Is it possible to describe that process as a development in the sense of a movement from less to greater value? The vagueness which attaches to the content of the ideal must militate against a confident dogmatism on this point. We may indeed reject the pessimistic theory of history with some firmness of conviction in virtue of the unjustifiable assumptions which it makes at the outset. And there is surely some warrant for the belief that the growing significance of personality, which is observable in the course of civilisation, is the sign of an advance in inner value. No doubt, as we have already seen, a calm survey of history does not entitle us to infer a uniform or consistent progress. At points the stream becomes stagnant, and sometimes the current moves backward. The state in one aspect is a means towards the development of the personality of its citizens, but the state may decline; and corresponding to this the personal values of life will become poorer, as, for example, was the case with civic life under the later Empire of Rome contrasted with that in the palmy days of the Republic. But if we take a broad view of the historic movement, we seem justified in concluding that our Western civilisation at all events shows a real increase in the virtues of humanity, justice, and freedom. And if there have been losses of value in particular directions, we may fairly argue that these are balanced by a wider diffusion of good and a better opportunity of realising capacity. With some degree of assurance, accordingly, we hold that, on the average and over a wide area, the evolution of culture represents an increase in the value of personal lives. And our right to apply the notion of development would briefly be this. The process, if plastic and susceptible of modifica-

¹ Vide Grotenfelt, *Geschichtliche Wertmassstäbe in der Geschichtsphilosophie*, p. 165.

tion from within, is still continuous. If there are losses in value there are also compensations. And in the light of the Ultimate Value, so far as we are able to define it, we judge with some confidence if not with certainty, that the movement of history discloses an increase of value in the line of the end or final Good.

We have reached a result, somewhat qualified indeed, yet so far definite. But our difficulties are not over, and if our argument is to be profitable these difficulties must be met. The objection will be urged that no value which is in process can in the nature of the case be final; while if the Absolute Value is conceived as a final state, the idea seems to lose what in our eyes is an essential quality. For to us the ethical values are ever associated with personal endeavour and the progressive realisation of the good. When we try to conceive the movement of history coming to its goal in a social order, the constituents of which are perfect persons, we cannot help feeling that such a life without spiritual ideal is something less than the highest. The life of growing goodness has an intrinsic quality which makes it preferable to that of stationary perfection; and a mundane society where upward endeavour and progress are impossible does not seem to us, as we are constituted, desirable. An attempt may be made to find a way out of this perplexity by discarding the idea of the Supreme Value as a fixed state, and asserting that what is ultimately valuable lies in the process of development itself. The final Good is just the continuous evolution of values. But here the old problem of a valid norm is thrust upon us again. For how is the standard to be defined where all is process? Clearly, as Siebeck has argued, we would have to define the Absolute Value in terms of the stages in which it is realised, and these in turn could only be appreciated by reference to the Absolute Value.¹ Besides involving ourselves in this awkward circle, we should have to meet the objection that moral evil with all the antagonisms it provokes is a constituent element of the Supreme Value, and that sin in all its forms is unreal or merely good in the making. The argument followed out in either direction seems to lead to an *impasse*, for neither the idea of a perfect final state in time nor that of endless progress in time satisfies the demands of a consistent theory.

The truth is that, if we try to think out coherently the implications of the notion of development as applied to

¹ *Vide* his *Religionsphilosophie*, section on "Die Bestimmung des Menschen"; also his *Rektors-Rede, Ueber die Lehre vom genetischen Fortschritte der Menschheit*, 1892.

history, we are led into the region of Metaphysics. The final presuppositions of history as of ethics are speculative not scientific. And however some people dislike the domain of Metaphysics—the scene, as they think, of incessant warfare where no victory is conclusive—our only chance of escape from the dilemma which faces us is by making an incursion into it. Now the crucial point of our difficulty in the present instance arose in connexion with the time-idea: neither a perfect final state in time nor an endless process in time was satisfactory. Shall we then say with Kant that time has no ultimate reality, but is only a valid form of perception for the phenomenal world? There are serious objections against the Kantian treatment of time which it is not possible to discuss at present; but it must be pointed out how hopeless it is for any philosophy which makes time purely phenomenal to deal with history. For the historic process, with its gradual evolution of values, must lose its meaning and worth if time is declared to be fundamentally unreal; it becomes an idle show, a ‘tale of little meaning’. Neither the interpretation of time as absolutely real nor absolutely unreal seems philosophically tenable, and neither view sheds light on the problems of historic development. For, to adopt one side of the alternative empties history of value, and to adopt the other precludes any consistent way of relating the process to its goal. In dealing with this formidable question the most hopeful method appears to be that which proceeds on the principle of Herbart: *Soviel Schein, soviel Hindeutung auf Sein*. An appearance cannot float unsupported in the void; it must have reference to the real, and it must be the appearance of something. Whether you say that time appears, or is a form in which things appear, at all events it is an experience and as such must qualify the real in some fashion. And if we reject, as we are warranted in doing, the Kantian figment of a pure form of intuition read into the matter of sense, we cannot avoid the inference, that there must be that in the constitution of experience itself which imposes on individual subjects the obligation to construe their experience in terms of time. This necessity cannot have its ground in what is accidental: the question here is one of epistemological validity. This question must be carefully distinguished from that of the temporal genesis and growth of our ideas of time. The problem in this case is psychological, and the way we answer it cannot be held to decide the validity or degree of reality in the time-idea itself. Yet the psychological aspect of the matter is certainly interesting and important. The highly

developed and generalised conception of time which the modern civilised man shares is far apart from that of the primitive savage, who had no chronology and had not a generalised notion of time apart from the events which take place in it. Then in the stage of life-development represented by the higher animals, we find spatial and temporal percepts as yet undistinguished; for both are fused together in the fact of movement, a fact of the greatest importance in ensuring the conservation and maintenance of life. This varying practical attitude of living beings to time may suggest to us how the psychological significance of the idea must vary with the living interests which are bound up with it. We ought not to assume that our present time-idea, elaborated by intersubjective intercourse, is an absolute standard: a being higher or lower than man would have a different 'time-span'.

On the other hand, the valid element in the time-idea must lie in the fact that it has to be developed as a form of order out of the actual content of reality, and cannot exist as an empty form by itself. Aristotle has said that time is the measure of change, and we may agree with Lotze that the time-form could not possibly give rise to the real process of change. If this be so,—and I assume Lotze's argument to be justified—then, while the meaning of a series of events would not in all respects be the same to two beings with different conceptually developed ideas of time, still either view would be more than subjective, because grounded on the process of the real. On this theory history represents a real process of change, which we construe through our developed ideas of time, dividing it into the past, present and future. A Being for whom 'a thousand years are as one day' would see farther and deeper into history than we do, but this would not make our view illusory. The speculative examination of the time-idea does not take away our right to predicate development of history, though it suggests that limitations attach to our use of the principle.

Yet the conclusion at which we have arrived, though it delivers us from the scepticism of treating such progress as we can see in the race as mere appearance, hardly serves to solve the problem we have on hand. The fact is borne upon us that our present time-ideas are not adequate to the representation of the goal of history. A perfect society in this mundane time-order we found to be for us a contradictory conception, nor, as we saw reason to conclude, is there any immanent law in history constantly working to bring about

such a result. Indeed the evolution of the physical universe might preclude this.¹ Finally, even granting that such an Absolute Value were to be reached in time, how are we to relate it to the personal values of the historic process? Are all earlier forms of personal good only to have their meaning as a stage to the distant goal? If so, the means and the end seem utterly disproportionate to one another, and the many are sacrificed to the few. Here we have the same moral anomaly which is involved in the interpretation of history as an 'education of the human race'. The great multitude of human beings are reduced to a mere means of bringing about an end in which they can have no share. For practical purposes no doubt it is often legitimate to treat individuals as a means to the increase of the good of the social system. But our justification for so doing is that the good of the whole is reflected in the life of the members, in other words it is expressed by an increase in personal values. And in the last resort we must stand by the truth of the Kantian principle, that persons are ends in themselves.

The outcome of the argument is that, while our reading of history in terms of our time-idea is not illusory, yet when we try to give a satisfying meaning and end to the process in terms of this idea the statement is manifestly inadequate. We seem driven to the conclusion that the goal and meaning of history are not to be found in this temporal order of things at all. The facts themselves appear to necessitate the acceptance of some form of transcendency.² I am quite aware that this may seem the invocation of a *deus ex machina* to cut the knot: still I venture to think that this is not a fair reading of the situation. The point, we repeat, is that we are not able to find a meaning in history, viewed as a mundane process in time, which will satisfy the reason and do justice to the moral values involved. That the process is not meaningless we are bound to assume. Accordingly we make the postulate that the ultimate meaning of history must lie in a sphere which transcends the present temporal order: and the postulate will justify itself in the degree in which it meets the demands of our moral and intel-

¹ Huxley in the Prolegomena to his Romanes' lecture on 'Evolution and Ethics' anticipates such an issue. He thinks man's struggle to maintain the State of Art in opposition to the State of Nature will go on "until the evolution of our globe shall have entered so far upon its downward course that the cosmic process resumes its sway; and, once more, the State of Nature prevails over the surface of our planet" (*Works*, vol. ix., pp. 44-45).

² This conclusion is accepted by Siebeck, Rickert, Eucken, and Grotenfelt.

lectual life. It will not do so if the possibility of continuity between the temporal and transcendent values is excluded. This is a point which, as it seems to me, has sometimes received too little consideration from competent thinkers. Rickert, for instance, finds the timeless necessary to give meaning to the temporal process, and only timeless Reality, he says, can be the support of timeless values.¹ Yet he holds that the temporal process must be real if there is to be a philosophy of history and a significance in moral endeavour. Nevertheless in Kantian fashion he regards the dialectic of ideas as evidence that we have reached the limits of our knowledge, and that the solution of the contradictions lies in the transcendent sphere. The difficulty here is that no way is left open of relating the mundane to the supramundane values, so that the latter might be regarded as the fulfilment of the former.² And if there be no continuity between the temporal and eternal values, the elements of a solution are not present and the postulate fails to justify itself.

If our postulate is to work, the transition from the temporal to the eternal must be accomplished within the personal life, and cannot come merely as the result of historic progress. For it is persons who make history and embody the worth of the historic life; and, as we have seen, we involve ourselves in contradictions if we treat them as a pure means to a hypothetical development of the race in the future. By insisting on the inner relation of each personal life to the Eternal, it seems possible to do justice to personal values and likewise to maintain that the meaning of history is being realised at each stage of the temporal process. The crucial point is whether we can so conceive the relation of the temporal to the eternal in the personal life that a continuity between them is possible. That we can coherently think out the connexion between the two is not in the least likely, and the attempt to do so would involve the importation into the higher sphere of ideas and images which properly belong to the lower. We may suggest, however, that the Eternal must not be conceived as indifferent to, or taking no notice of, the distinctions which are implied in the time-process. If it be true, as we have contended, that our present time-idea grows out of the content of the real which

¹See his article on the Philosophy of History in the *Festschrift* for Kuno Fischer, entitled "Die Philosophie im Beginn des XXten Jahrhunderts," 1904.

²Eucken's position in this regard is also unsatisfactory, for he hardly discusses the relation of time to the suprahistorical and eternal life.

changes, then it may well be that what we term an eternal state of being means simply the deliverance from the limitations of our present time-span, and is not incompatible with change and activity. In the case of God we are led on speculative and moral grounds to postulate that he is above the limitations of our time-idea, but also that he is active and comprehends the distinctions of our temporal history. And if it be true that the human spirit has its ground in the Divine Spirit, we may infer that the more fully man develops his essential personality in this eventful earthly history, the more completely is he being transformed into harmony with the Divine Nature. The faith that the deepening spiritual life reaches beyond the present time-order, is a legitimate faith that the values which give meaning to this life are not subject to decay and destruction because they are of God.

The reader who has followed us up to this point may complain that we have travelled somewhat far from our original theme. Yet on reflexion he will perceive, perhaps, that we have been trying to follow the lead of the argument. He will remember that we saw reason to deny that history could be regarded as the necessary evolution of an immanent principle. Taking a broad survey of history we seemed to see evidence of progress actually achieved, but no evidence of a law of progress whose persistence was assured. Here the question emerged whether the meaning of the historic process did not depend on the assumption that it was a movement towards some perfect goal. Yet the discussion of the assumption appeared to yield the conclusion that it would not solve the problems at issue. And this led us to show that the more satisfying interpretation of history was to be found in a direct relation of the personal values to a higher order in harmony with the Eternal. On this view the meaning of history is continuously being realised, and does not depend on the mundane process coming to a perfect close.

"Do you then," it may be asked, "discard the idea of development in history? It would surely be a narrow gospel to tell men that the value of the efforts of those who 'spend and are spent' for city and country is concerned with themselves alone. Those who toil patiently to bring in a better day are inspired by larger motives!" In reply we might point out how fully we have recognised the interdependence of the personal and the social values: in a real fashion a man saves his life by losing it in a wider service. The increase of the common good is reflected in the heightened value of the personal life; and the deepest good of the self cannot be

gained apart from others. We go farther and urge that, in virtue of the solidarity of personal and social good, man must strive to further the development of society even as he strives to develop himself. Moral and spiritual progress is a vocation for the race just as it is for the individual.¹ In neither case can the process work itself out by impersonal means. The development of the race is a task which lies before the men of each successive generation, and in the degree that they fulfil this task will history reveal a growing good. As with the individual so with humanity, the exercise of freedom precludes us from characterising development by any rigid formula. In both cases we find fulfilment and failure to fulfil the higher vocation: the single soul instead of struggling upward to the light sometimes sinks back into the darkness, and in a society, and even through a whole epoch of history, we may see visible signs of retrogression, not of progress.

Development, historical and personal, is gravely hampered by the antagonistic forces of evil, and, though these are defeated, Proteus-like they assume fresh forms and return to renew the conflict on a later day. Yet those who are on 'the side of the angels' can find tokens which bid them hope. Humanity always holds within it regenerative powers, and if the potentates of evil win a victory and establish their rule, a reaction comes which breaks their sway and the tyranny is overpast. Looking backward we certainly seem to see evidence of development, though the development has not been constant nor uniform in its movement. That the upward movement will prevail, that mankind which has tasted the good things of the spirit will not relapse into barbarism and ignorance, this may well be our faith, though neither reason nor faith requires us to expect the advent of a perfect kingdom of God among men. The historic process has an ever present goal, when personal lives can through it so grow and deepen that they find their completion in a Good which is Eternal.

¹ Here I agree with Siebeck, *op. cit.*

III.—THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT FOR DESIGN.

BY D. H. MACGREGOR.

I.

IN this paper it is proposed to take stock of the results of recent research on the eternal problem of natural design. It is justifiable to do so, since the Gifford Trust has specially fostered the defensive side of the argument, and has drawn into this service the most eminent philosophers and theologians. Some of these writers, notably Prof. Ward, have changed the whole aspect of the discussion by abandoning the inductive grounds on which the design argument so long rested, and by appealing to broad metaphysical theories of the adaptation of nature to thought. Further, the prevalence of what is generally known as the Idealistic method of philosophic reasoning itself places the inductive argument in a less predominant position; for the whole tendency of Idealistic philosophy is optimistic and religious, and if the structure of the universe can be proved spiritual we can take the mechanism on trust. I have given reasons for doubting the cogency of both these lines of argument.¹ It appears to me also that all attempts to extrude the direct evidence of natural facts and processes will fail. If much of this evidence seems to cut two ways, or to be vague and tentative, that is perhaps because no criterion has been applied to distinguish the valid from the invalid. Religious faith, at any rate, cannot rest very securely on the position that, though there are deductive reasons for believing the world to be purposeful, we are practically unable to verify these in the concrete; so that part of the universal design is self-concealment. The inductive argument is inexpugnable; it must still and always stand.

There are three assertions which can be made at the beginning. First, the design argument is not necessarily theological. The question is not of the existence of God, but of the validity of a predicate or category. Design is, like causa-

¹ *International Journal of Ethics*, January, 1906; *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1906.

tion, an aspect of natural events, though it groups these events in a different way. The sole question is whether some events or series of events are such that a purely causal explanation is not adequate, does not exhaust the content of the series. Second, it is idle to personify the forces of Nature themselves. Fifty years ago, Darwin impatiently pointed out that Natural Selection was a metaphor which need deceive nobody. Yet since then all the plausibility of some theological reasoning is based on the personification of Nature. For when Nature is personified, she becomes a person of such majestic stamp as to be at once invested with all the sublimest attributes of power, and rationality, and foresight. Mr. Balfour, for instance, employs this method to write down Naturalism; an authority like M. Janet slips into the same temptation.¹

Third, and most essential of all, it is quite necessary to exclude from the evidence for design all results which we know to be partially or completely the results of the efforts of finite intelligences. If I make a machine for my own use, it is no evidence of natural design that I can use it. That things are capable of manipulation is implied in the laws of causation; but design rests on the idea that manipulation is not required, the result being brought about without it, either in those cases where we could have done it ourselves, or in those where the vastness or infinite detail of the result denied us the power. Every extension of the evidence for finite endeavour is a bar to teleological reasoning. These two vary inversely.

The marks of causation are uniform and necessary sequence; those of design are contingency and utility. The evidence to look for is that of series of events which converge in useful results, with no known cause for the convergence. So far or as soon as we account causally for the convergence there ceases to be a design argument from these series. Finite endeavour is one of the causes which thus discount a teleological inference.

As a final preface, we must meet the assertion that by our definition there can be no teleological evidence at all in nature, since all natural facts are causally connected with each other, in one broad network of relations, which allows of no contingency or accident. Such a reply would misunderstand the position. It is granted that this causal interconnexion exists everywhere; only it does not exhaust the content of some series of events. Let us take two events, A and B, and call the whole natural system X. Then A and B are

¹ *Foundations of Belief*, seventh ed., pp. 70, 79; *Final Causes*, p. 193.

fully explained causally by (X-A) and (X-B). But there is coincidence if the reference to X is superfluous, so that A and B explain each other. A is not a complete causal explanation of B, nor B of A; yet they make subordinate the mediation of X, and stand directly related to each other. These are the coincidences on which the design argument rests. The causal explanation is not adequate to the entire series of events and relations that is given. A general objection to teleological evidence cannot therefore be maintained.

II.

When, with these provisos, we turn to the inductive argument for design, we find a dilemma. The evidence is greatest in amount where it is least convincing; and where it would be most convincing it scarcely exists at all.

Where ought we to look for the strongest evidence of natural design? Not, it is clear, to results brought about by human creation; these have already their adequate causal explanation. Further, it is clear that instances drawn from beyond the human sphere will be more cogent in proportion as they are farther removed from this domain of conscious agency. The nearer they stand to this domain the less certain we can be that they are not adequately explained by finite volition, clear or dim. Throughout the whole organic world, however, the factors of pleasure, pain, and volition are operative on a continuous gradation of planes of intelligence. The tendency of organisms to seek pleasure and avoid pain, their powers of association and recollection, give us strict causal explanations of a multitude of biological results, so that no further cause need be invoked. We ought to look to the inorganic world for the strongest teleological evidence. Here at any rate we are sure that conscious agency is eliminated, and if there are adaptations realised here, which are useful in a high degree, we are strongly placed for the assertion that purpose is a feature of the natural universe, no less than causation and reciprocity.

But as soon as we glance at the inductive case for design, we find that the tendency is to draw the evidence almost exclusively from the biological sphere. We hear no more of the litho-theologies, helio-theologies, and hydato-theologies of mediæval speculation. And if we take our evidence from the conduct and structure of living things, which to some extent can guide their own activities, and create their own pleasurable results, we cut the ground away from the design argument, whatever else we substitute for it. This dilemma

is rendered the more acute because the biological sphere is that in which the rival hypothesis of evolution holds good, explaining by sentient and quasi-volitional forces the growth and mutual adaptations of organisms to organisms or to the environment. From the sphere where his evidence is less open to challenge, where his principle ought to apply with at least as much force as anywhere, the teleologist brings no evidence, and he comes into court with a prejudiced case.

It is not difficult to substantiate the fact that it is on the organic world that induction now relies. Such a book as M. Janet's discussion of *Final Causes* is full of proof of this. "Let the problem," he says, "be well understood. On the one hand, the final cause is incontestably manifested in the psychological sphere; the question is whether it is manifested lower down. On the other hand, the mechanical cause is evidently manifested (at least, as far as appears) in the inorganic sphere; the question is whether this kind of cause suffices higher up. Between the psychological and the inorganic domains extends the domain of the living organism—that is the tourney-ground of the two causalities, the two methods of explanation."¹ It is this "middle space" he elsewhere asserts to be "the object of debate".

To take another authority. "Even if," writes Sir George Stokes (and the concessive form may be remarked), "the evidence of design in the adaptation of inanimate environment to the wants of future living beings were deemed to have failed altogether, there still remains the consideration of the adaptation of living things to their environment supposed given. To my own mind, it is in living things, especially animals, that the evidence of design is the strongest. And the higher we ascend in the scale, the stronger it becomes."²

For the sake of teleology, the converse had better have been true—that the evidence is stronger as we go lower down. The instinct of the bee is a better instance than that of the ape, since there is less reason to suppose the creature's own intelligence to be a sufficient explanation of its skill. But here again it is enough to note the tendency to limit evidence to the organic.

Mr. Balfour, again, writes as follows: "Natural Theology dwells principally upon the numberless examples of adaptation in the organic world, which apparently display the most marvellous indications of ingenious contrivance and the

¹ *Final Causes*, p. 177.

² *Gifford Lectures*, first series, p. 39.

nicest adjustments of means to ends. From facts like these, it is inferred that Nature has an intelligent and powerful creator."¹

And, very recently, one of the much-debated instances which seemed to extend the notion of finality into the inorganic world—the formation of the crystal—has been given away by Lord Kelvin, in a remarkable letter. Let us note the deliberate stroke of the pen by which he deletes the inorganic from the evidence for theism. Writing to the *Times* in May, 1903, he says:—

"In your report of a few words which I said in proposing a vote of thanks to Professor Henslow for his lecture 'On Present Day Rationalism' yesterday evening, in University College, I find the following: 'Was there anything so absurd as to believe that a number of atoms by falling together of their own accord could make a crystal, a sprig of moss, a microbe, a living animal?' I wish to delete 'a crystal,' though no doubt your report of what I said is correct. Exceedingly narrow limits of time prevented me from endeavouring to explain how different is the structure of a crystal from that of any portion, large or small, of an animal or plant, or the cellular formation of which the bodies of animals and plants are made; but I desired to point out that, while 'fortuitous concourse of atoms' is not an inappropriate description of the formation of a crystal, it is utterly absurd in respect to the coming into existence, or the growth, or the continuation of the molecular combinations presented in the bodies of living things. Here scientific thought is compelled to accept the idea of Creative Power."

These statements are sufficiently typical, as any one may see who reads M. Janet's classical study of *Final Causes*. There is nothing inherently wrong in the method of the inductive argument for design: the confession of weakness is in the nature of the evidence adduced. Two steps can be taken to remedy the defect, and restore their evidential value to the "choir of heaven and furniture of earth". Research may extend the evidence by demonstrating the utility of inorganic adaptations; or the rival theory of evolution may be combated. Waiving the former, let us consider for a moment how it stands with the latter policy. Two lines may be followed. The validity of Darwin's principles may be challenged, or it may be claimed that they imply purposive factors which render Evolution itself a teleological process.

¹ *Foundations*, p. 176.

III.

It is difficult to find among modern philosophers a clear statement of how they regard Darwin's theory. Sometimes arguments are employed which clearly ought to put Darwin out of court; for instance, there is the general theory that any evolution of the intelligent from the unintelligent is absurd, since the statement of the process itself "implies intelligence". Or, again, it appears to be held by Prof. Seth that any evolution of the higher from the lower—which appears to mean any evolution at all—is not possible.¹ On the other hand, the standpoint of evolution is just as often implicitly accepted, and Prof. Ward seems content to take the second method of discussing it. While men of science have enthusiastically accepted and expanded Darwin's reasoning, it is scarcely possible to say what speculative thinkers make of its results. We still await an explicit verdict.

Darwin left it open to his critics to take two positions of attack, both of which would still be well chosen. In the first place, similarities of type must be admitted to exist between organisms, such that it is a legitimate speculation to inquire what is common in these structures, and how the common element is related to the variations. Yet it is possible to object that a logical relation of similarity amid a number of variations cannot at once be translated into an order of development in time. The right to take this step must depend on more than the similarities themselves; these only indicate analogies, but analogies do not always mean common origin. Like the theory of creation, that of common ancestry is a possible descriptive hypothesis; either will fit the existing facts. Lower and higher, decadent and progressive, structures give to the biological system a continuity which is certainly translatable into terms of historical evolution, but which *need not* be carried beyond a purely static gradation of forms. It has often been asked—Who has seen Natural Selection at work changing the type? And Darwin, as we know, answered this question by drawing on indefinite time, a reply which is no solution. I think that on this preliminary ground a demurrer could still be maintained.

The second position of attack which Darwin left open has reference to his factor of variation. He insisted that no

¹ *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, Essays I. and II. especially, pp. 15-17: "All explanation of the higher by the lower is philosophically a hysteron-proteron".

theory could explain this factor. It is haphazard and unaccountable. A variation is not due to Natural Selection, which can only get to work on given varieties. "A variety when once formed must again perhaps after a long interval of time, vary or present individual differences of the same favourable nature as before; and these must be again preserved, and so onwards step by step." We are quite ignorant, he insists, of the causes of variations. They occur, and competition fastens on them. Now evolution is merely progressive variation; and clearly a theory of evolution is severely taxed if it must simply assume variation. It becomes, to a great extent, the statement of a series of changes of which we can only say that they occurred, and were by competition maintained. A theory of the *growth* of species might well enough assume origins and dwell on development; but Darwin deals with the origin of species. We have a process which lacks necessity and continuity, and which concealed this fact by the claim that time was infinite enough for all the possibilities to have come about. And Darwin admits this. "I believe," he says, "in no law of necessary development."¹ This is an enormous, but quite a necessary admission. We translate a similarity of forms into a temporal order, by supposing that variations happened and endured; that others subsequently happened, coincided with the former, and also endured, and so forth!

It can be replied that we can easily parallel this conception of development in cases where variation is equally accidental. Thus if a man goes to the Bar, his becoming Lord Chancellor depends on the chance of his first brief, *plus* the chance that he won his case, *plus* the chance that note was taken of his success, *plus* the chance that another brief followed before the last success was forgotten, *plus* the chance that he won the second case, and so forth. These chances are the explanation, to a great extent, of his final position; there is no "necessary development" here either. But this eludes the point, chiefly because it deals with individuals not with types. If a new society of lawyers were founded, a Lord Chancellor and Crown Counsel would be appointed straight off, who might never have 'evolved'. And our question is precisely whether the theory of historical development is complete enough to entitle us to translate similarities and variations into a time-order at all.

Darwin himself sometimes spoke of "Laws of Variation," and his successors have in various ways sought to rationalise

¹ *Origin of Species*, ch. iv.-v.

this factor.¹ But in both Darwin and Wallace this is a loose use of the term "Law," and it refers to a mere statement of the fact that variation occurs. Lamarck went further, and the tendency is now to make variation itself a product of selection, as the fleetness of a beast of prey is explained by the fleetness of the prey. A great deal of work is still being done on biological variation, and it is likely that this flaw in Darwin's hypothesis will be made good.

And even if the "natural theologian" could maintain the attack on such grounds as these, it would profit him little to cast doubt on Evolution. The overthrow of this theory would not leave the design hypothesis master of the field. So long as the evidence is limited to organisms, which can guide their own actions by recollection and association of pleasures and pains, it will not be a contingent but a necessary result that there are pleasurable adaptations on the whole. Many theological attacks on Evolution assume that more is to be gained for theology by its fall than would actually be the case.

IV.

Nor is the outlook more hopeful if the method is adopted of seeking to prove Evolution itself a teleological process, in that the selfish endeavours of organic beings lead without foresight to fortunate results on a wide scale.

There is a consensus of authorities for the opinion that Evolution cannot be as a whole regarded as a progress toward what is better. The very phrase "survival of the fittest," which seems to have an optimistic ring about it, is deprived of this significance by parties on both sides. Huxley, indeed, describes it downright as "the fallacy of the fittest".

"Fittest," he says, in his Romanes Lecture, "has a connotation of best; and about best there hangs a moral flavour. In cosmic nature, however, what is fittest depends upon the conditions. Long since, I ventured to point out that, if our hemisphere were to cool again, the survival of the fittest might bring about, in the vegetable kingdom, a population of more and more stunted and humbler organisms, until the 'fittest' that survived might be nothing but lichens, diatoms, and such microscopic organisms as those which give red snow its colour; while, if it became hotter, the pleasant

¹ Wallace, *Darwinism*, ch. i.

valleys of the Thames and Isis might be uninhabitable by any animated beings save those that flourish in a tropical jungle. They, as the fittest, the best adapted to the changed conditions, would survive."

This conclusion has been endorsed by Mr. Spencer. "The law is not the survival of the 'better' or the 'stronger' if we give to these words anything like their ordinary meanings. It is the survival of those which are constitutionally fittest to thrive under the conditions in which they are placed; and very often that which, humanly speaking, is inferiority, causes the survival."¹

In Darwin's principles alone, Prof. Ward writes, "there is nothing teleological: neither struggle for life, nor selection by nature, nor survival of the fittest, but simply conservation of the stablest".²

We have no guarantee, it would therefore seem, that Evolution is a tendency toward a greater good. It is void of moral significance altogether. Whatever is, is good, whether the process were to face the other way or not; and we have no warrant that it will continue on its present lines of development.

I think that this gives away too much. It is in a sense true to say that the survival of the fittest is only the survival of that which survives. But in the same way it would be a truism that the market price of an article is that at which the quantity bought is equal to the quantity sold. These, however, are truisms because they take no account of the nature of the competition, but state only the fact that competition tends to equilibrium. The Economic idea must take note of the positive factor of utility in the thing bought and of sacrifice in the thing sold; and then it is no longer a truism but a statement about human nature—that no one makes a sacrifice (in the business world) without an equivalent reward. And if we fill up the content of biological evolution in the same way we see that what survives is that which takes pleasure in such acts as conserve its being, and finds pain in such as destroy it. Those organisms which remain are not merely such as are there *de facto*, but those which have on the whole a pleasanter or less painful existence than any others which were possible. Even if the sentient world gave way altogether to the lower organisms, that would at least be better than its survival in perpetual pain. And as pleasure-pain is the main content of the

¹ *Essays*, vol. i., cf. A. Seth, *Man's Place*, etc., p. 16.

² Vol. i., p. 275.

good from the biological standpoint, Evolution cannot be dismissed as utterly a non-moral process.

Still, this result is unsatisfactory. For we can only speak in negatives. We cannot say that the sum of pleasure tends to increase from generation to generation, but only that there is less pain than would have been otherwise. The sum of pleasure might be diminishing, and we should have the cold comfort of reflecting that possibly it might be diminishing faster than is the case. Can we base any kind of optimism on considerations of what might have been, but is not? or on evil which might have been greater, but is not? It is very doubtful if any one would accept a teleological argument based upon negatives. If organic life ceased altogether, and material forces had their own way universally, it would be absurd to regard this as teleological, because there was no pain. In the general sense of the word, therefore, Evolution cannot be regarded as itself purposeful.

V.

Since even the indication of flaws in the argument of Evolution would not leave the design argument in a much stronger position so far as the evidence of the organic world is concerned; and since there appears no tendency to find evidence in the more convincing inorganic sphere, for both these reasons, the form of the inductive argument for design has changed, so as to give quite a new meaning to the conclusion that it is sought to establish.

The most recent form of deductive reasoning on this subject was that in which it was indicated that, letting alone the wheels within wheels, there remained the broad fact that the laws of nature were adapted to the constitution of man, being uniform so that he could think them, and manipulate for his own ends chains of causes and effects. This is teleology in its very widest aspect. And, corresponding to this deductive argument, the inductive argument has proceeded to show that particular organisms (for its evidence remains organic) strive on their own behalf to realise their own good and that of their kind; so that there is more than mechanism, there is 'anabolic' process or continual subjective endeavour toward improvement, in the biological world, which therefore is throughout purposive.¹

It is legitimate that the argument should in this way change its form, provided the change is noted, and it is under-

¹ *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. i.

stood that 'purpose' is being given a new meaning. We are now referring to a number of purposes, not to a general purposiveness; to finite endeavours, not to arrangements which dispense with the necessity for endeavour. In short, this is the substitution of an ethical and subjective for an objective and metaphysical form of design.

Many of the historical abuses of the design argument are nothing but the confusion of these two different things. If a thing is created by finite beings for themselves, the further hypothesis of a foreordained arrangement is superfluous and often ridiculous.

For example, Chrysippus took as evidence of Divine providence the fitness of the ox for ploughing, of the horse to ride on, of the dog for hunting. Epictetus tried to show that the ass was fore-ordained to bear burdens. Fénelon asserted that water was created "in order to sustain those immense floating edifices which are called vessels. The ocean which seems placed between the continents to divide them for ever is, on the contrary, the meeting place of all nations"—an argument similar to that of Izaak Walton, who pointed out that the sea alone enabled us to sail to Venice and see the pictures. According to B. St. Pierre, "dogs are usually of two opposite colours, one dark and the other light, in order that wherever they may be in the house they may be distinguished from the furniture". The literature of Stoicism is full of such arguments, as is also that of the Schoolmen.

How Voltaire made merry over them is well known. Was the nose, he asked, made to carry spectacles, or the cork-tree to cork bottles?

What Prof. Ward calls 'teleology within the range of biological ideas' is a new conception of the inductive argument for design, and yields a totally different conclusion as to the nature of the world. Its strength varies inversely with that of the objective design argument of the "natural theologians"; it lessens the need for the hypothesis of Providence.

But it may well be claimed that by this change of form the inductive argument is made more and not less valuable; that causation is of greater worth than fore-ordination. This seems to me true, provided that one thing can be proved—that all these finite purposes work together, so that they are added, and do not cancel each other in the result. This cannot be proved inductively. It requires some sort of deductive proof of the unity of the world. It must be shown that individuation has some counterpart of integration.

VI.

Lotze is the only philosopher who ever tried to prove the unity of the whole world, spite of the self-distinction which gives each individual its own degree of independence. His argument is classic, and is as follows.

He takes it for granted that the internal modification of a thing by its own organic processes is conceivable, since we are here dealing with continuous changes. But when we ask how one thing can influence another thing, we cannot represent to ourselves the process implied, and so we are driven to conclude that there is no such thing as "transeunt action," and that all apparent interactions are but modifications of one all-including reality.

Here is the proof that the interaction of independent things is inconceivable. When a body A acts on a body B, we must suppose, if these are independent of each other, that some state E passes over from A to B. "But, granting that E could separate itself from A, what gave it its direction at the particular moment to B, rather than to C? If we assume that A has given it this direction, we presuppose the same process of causative action as taking place between A and E for which we have not yet found an intelligible account as taking place between A and B. Nor is this all. Since it will not be merely on B and C, but presumably on many other Beings that A will put forth its activity, we shall have to ask the further question what it is that at a given moment determines A to impart to E the direction towards B and not towards C, or towards C and not towards B?

"Finally it is important to realise how completely impossible is the innocent assumption that the transferred E will all of a sudden become a state of B, when once it has completed its journey to B. Had this homeless state once arrived at the metaphysical place which B occupies, it would indeed be there, but what would follow from that? Not even that it would remain there. It might continue its mysterious journey to infinity, and, as it was once a no-man's state, so remain. For the mere purpose of keeping it in its course, we must make the yet further supposition of an arresting action of B upon it. And given this singular notion, it would still be a long way to the consequence that E, being an independent state, not belonging to anything in particular, should not only somehow attach itself to the equally independent being B, but should become a state of this B itself, an affection or change of B. These accu-

mulated difficulties make it clear that the coming to pass of a causative action can never be explained by the transfer of any influence."¹

Now if space were considered real, the impossibility of conceiving such processes as detachment, direction, and attachment, would certainly tell against the argument for independent things. But in the beginning of his second book, Lotze cuts the ground clean away from this position of his by arguing that space is not real, but only phenomenal; a form of the mind, not an aspect of things. He proves this by a very closely reasoned metaphysical discussion, which aims at showing how impossible it is to conceive space as belonging to reality itself. But if this is so the argument against independent reals, so far as based on the inconceivability of transeunt action, disappears; for it is no argument against a theory of reality that it renders impossible a process in a medium which is not real.

VII.

The more the inductive argument for design takes the method of demonstrating finite purposiveness, the more it will become dependent on some valid proof of the unity of the world. Otherwise it is clear that the tendency is to disintegrate the conception of teleology, and substitute the conception of strife. Most proofs of the unity of the world have failed, like that of Lotze, because by an inveterate habit of philosophic thought, it is constantly assumed that the only true notion of unity is that of comprehensiveness, or interpenetration of parts, or interfusion. The result is that at once we have space metaphors and the paradoxes of continuity. There is no need to create these difficulties, which beset nearly every form of Pantheism.

Unity can be represented in other ways, which do not confuse thinking with pictorial imagination. Thus a mathematical formula represents a unity, a relation which is valid for a large number of individual cases, a law which they obey. It is a more valuable idea of the unity of the world to consider that what is sought for is some "expression for" the joint activities of individuals, not some receptacle which literally includes the individuals. Lotze went some way in this line of reasoning, though he continually lapses into the space metaphor. The notion of the unity of the world, in which individual purposes are allowed for and related to each other, seems to be best represented in a formula which

¹ *Metaphysics*, § 56.

is dynamic as well as static. To pretend to entertain the idea of "getting an expression" for the meaning of the world is to lay oneself open to ridicule. My point is that this is a better *method* of representing the unity of a world of purposeful individuals than the method of showing that they are not individuals at all, but parts of some sort of continuum. These reflexions are led up to by the modern change of face in the design argument.

IV.—PROFESSOR BAILLIE'S 'IDEALISTIC CONSTRUCTION OF EXPERIENCE'.¹

BY R. F. ALFRED HOERNLÉ.

THE attitude of present-day thinkers towards Hegel may well be described by saying, that they regard him as an awe-inspiring colossus but still a colossus with feet of clay. Even those who call him master have been amongst his most unsparing critics. No one has accepted his system in all its details, but yet the diluted 'Hegelianism,' born of selection and compromise, which forms the substance of so much of modern thought, stands convicted of ineradicable difficulties, both by the arguments of its opponents and by the admissions of its own candid friends. This being so, the strategic movement known as a '*concentration en arrière*' was bound to suggest itself. Might not the weakness of modern Idealism be due to its having fallen away from Hegel? Might its salvation not be found in recanting heresy and doubt? Might a whole-hearted 'return to Hegel' not be the best defence against the onslaughts of hostile critics and the more insidious grumblings of the malcontents in its own camp? From this point of view we shall appreciate the importance of Prof. Baillie's book. Its author is, in many respects, the most 'orthodox' of present-day Hegelians. He acknowledges himself his indebtedness to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*, and for many of his views he might claim the authority of Hegel's great name. This will justify an examination of some of the doctrines of this most recent restatement of Idealism.

The first point that will strike an impartial reader is that Prof. Baillie has hardly done the best that he could have done for Hegel. In the first place, the book impresses one as curiously out of touch with modern thought. There is indeed in ch. i. an attempt to deal with Pragmatism by admitting the *purposiveness* of experience on which it insists, whilst denying the applications which it makes of this con-

¹ *An Outline of the Idealistic Construction of Experience.* By J. B. Baillie. London: Macmillan & Co., 1906. Pp. xi., 344. Price 8s. 6d.

ception. But though the recognition of 'purposiveness' is emphatic enough at the time, it turns out to be, in reality, very perfunctory and barren. For in the rest of the book no further use is made of the conception; the purposiveness of experience drops completely out of sight, and, in fact, the mention of it in ch. i. reads like an isolated after-thought.

Again, there is almost no reference to the critical work that has been done on Hegel's philosophy since Hegel's time. Yet many points, which have been fiercely debated, are here simply reaffirmed without any fresh defence, without an attempt to meet the critics with counter-criticism.¹ Prof. Baillie may be right in asking us to go straight back to the Hegel of the *Phenomenology*, but surely he cannot expect that we should forget, as we turn back, all the philosophical work that has been done since 1806. We cannot at this time of day accept without question an Idealistic Construction of Experience making practically no reference, *e.g.*, to Mr. Bradley's Absolutism, which on the one hand owes so much to Hegel, and yet on the other challenges some of Hegel's most essential doctrines so forcibly. And has Prof. Baillie wholly forgotten the criticisms which he himself urged in the last chapter of his *Hegel's Logic*? I recall, *e.g.*, an eloquent argument against the identification of Absolute Experience with Reality, because that would break down the distinction 'between a process of knowledge and the course of events' and thus make the position 'indistinguishable from pure subjectivism'.² The present book throughout assumes the identity of Absolute Experience and Reality. Do the difficulties, which Prof. Baillie once saw in this doctrine, still exist? Then why does he pass by such a crucial point in silence, and leave the anxious reader in sore perplexity? Or if his doubts have vanished, why not communicate to others the sources of his illumination?

Further, the book might have been made far more convincing, if the validity of the principles which it defends had been brought out by more frequent illustration from modern problems. Thus in discussing the development of self-consciousness, Prof. Baillie makes full use of Hegel's famous illustration from the relation of master and slave, and refers merely in a footnote to the modern 'Labour-problem' as a parallel instance. How much more interesting would it have been, had we found Hegel's illustration in the footnote, and the development of self-consciousness in the Labour-

¹ The only philosopher who comes in for constant criticism (not all of it deserved) is that *bête noire* of all Hegelians, the unfortunate Kant.

² *Hegel's Logic*, p. 355.

problem worked out in the text. It would have been the surest way of bringing the truth of Hegelianism home to a modern reader. As it is, a certain air of unreality hangs about the discussion, which is not dispelled by the emphasis that many passages borrow from an all too liberal use of Italics.¹

None of these defects, perhaps, are very serious, and they may be inevitable in a mere 'Outline'. But that merely shows that an 'Outline' is after all not enough to re-establish Hegel or 'to do over again' seriously the work of the great Idealists. One could have wished that Prof. Baillie had attempted the task on a larger scale, and given us a re-interpretation of Hegel unfettered by the creaking armour of Hegel's bizarre technicalities. We may hope that he will do so yet. Assuredly, the attempt would be welcomed.

However, we must now turn to a more detailed examination of the construction of experience which we are offered. Among the various approaches to the fundamental conception of an Absolute Experience that at the beginning of ch. ii. is perhaps the most illuminating. Knowledge is an activity and has an end, we are told; it is a process with an ideal; but the ideal is not merely something beyond and not yet realised; rather it is the actual moving-power in the process, it is what is realising itself in the process. We can understand experience only with reference to this *immanent* ideal, which manifests itself in that always and everywhere we strive to make our experience self-complete and harmonious. The ways in which we try to achieve this end differ, so we may put it, according to the materials in which, in each case, we have to realise unity. Hence the different forms and kinds of experience from sense-perception to science, morality and religion. Each has its truth, each its objectivity, each under its own special conditions is a way of realising the ideal which is at work in all. And this ideal is a single, absolute, individual experience.

To understand this better it is necessary to bear in mind that knowledge or experience, both as a whole and in any one of its forms, is not (in Prof. Baillie's phraseology) an 'adjective' of the mind or an event in the mind in contrast with a world outside, but that it is the very 'substance' of the mind, its very life and being, its most concrete form of existence.²

¹ This is, I believe, a mannerism which Prof. Baillie has learnt from Hegel.

² For this use of the phrases 'adjective' and 'substance' see, e.g., pp. 275, 276.

That this point of view has great advantages is undeniable. The flank of all Dualism and all Subjectivism is turned at once if we refuse to start our reflexions on experience with the distinction of knowledge and its object, and, on the contrary, base ourselves on the ultimate fact that experience, defined in the most general way, means *awareness of something*, and therefore implies from the very first objective existence. If we grant this basis, the task of the philosopher consists in distinguishing the various forms of our 'awareness of something' according to the degree in which diversity of content is reduced in each to the greatest possible unity. And more. We do not merely get *different* forms, each constituting a cosmos or sphere of its own, with its own peculiar facts and categories (such as, *e.g.*, science and morality), but we can arrange these forms in a scale of value, treat them as respectively higher and lower levels or 'planes' of experience. In short, each level of experience is defined by its objective content, and the objective content is defined by the characteristic *category* which we employ in each case to give unity to the multiplicity of details which confronts us at that level. And one level is higher as against another, if its category includes the category of the other as a 'moment' in itself. Thus, *e.g.*, Perception as a plane of experience is characterised by the category of 'Thing' which brings unity into the diversity of qualities; whereas at the level of Understanding we have the category of 'Force' of which the many 'Things' are the 'expressions'. And thus we advance upwards to the category of Self,¹ first as opposed to its Other and then as identified with it, until we reach the level of experience where we deliberately and consciously take up 'the point of view of the whole,' *i.e.*, work with the category of the Absolute. Here we have the completest unity in the completest diversity, for in so far as the individual self takes up the point of view of the whole it identifies itself with the whole and thereby with everything which, besides itself, is contained in the whole.

Another advantage gained by approaching the problem of experience in this way is that we do not confine ourselves to the perception of the external world or to science, but embrace within our survey every form of *spiritual* experience as well. Prof. Baillie rightly points out that to treat external perception as if it alone offered difficulties to epistemology is absurd, and that the 'truth,' *e.g.*, of religion deserves to be discussed no less than the 'truth' of science. What, in spite of all its

¹ Cp. esp. p. 213.

difficulties, gives to Hegelian Idealism its vitality and attraction is undoubtedly just this claim to deal with the self-conscious and spiritual modes of experience, and indeed to find in them the principle for the interpretation of the lower planes. And whoever raises the question of the 'truth' of our moral or religious experience will at once discover the inadequacy of dualistic assumptions. For how the distinction, so commonly and so glibly made, between our 'ideas' and the real facts over against them is to help us here, is far from clear. If insisted on, it can only lead to treating the language of spiritual experience as metaphor—inspiring or inane according to the critic's taste—and its objects as 'illusions' and 'superstitions'.

However, granting the advantages of the Hegelian position so far, it is clear that it is also beset by a number of difficulties, some of which are worth discussing.

In the first place, there is a difficulty about the word 'experience,' which has associations that make us 'shy' at the statement that reality is a single, all-inclusive experience. It is not the *unity* of the world, asserted in this statement, which is difficult. We are quite accustomed to regard ourselves and all other beings as making up one total self-contained universe. Nor do we shrink from trying to determine the nature and substance of this universe; we have called it matter; we have called it spirit; we have called it God. But we find it hard to call it experience. For that seems to involve not merely the assertion that we can have true knowledge of the nature of the Absolute, but also that the Absolute is just our knowledge of it, and even—self-consciousness being the highest form of experience—that our knowledge of the Absolute is the Absolute's knowledge of itself. All this seems to be involved in the harmless-looking statement that 'we can take up the point of view of the whole'. That is a statement with which fewer philosophers would be inclined to quarrel, if it were not asserted that, in admitting it, they had also admitted what to them is unintelligible. I have praised Idealism above for including the truth of spiritual experience in its survey, but I cannot follow when an attempt is made to squeeze out of these experiences metaphysical assertions which they do not seem to contain. Let us argue the question first as it arises in the religious experience. In religion, so Prof. Baillie tells us, '*we are at the point of view of the whole as such*, and think in terms of it'.¹ This is explained in the chapter on religion: 'The *point of view* of the

¹ P. 26. Italics by Prof. Baillie.

Absolute Reality is deliberately and consciously *adopted* as an attitude of experience. In Religion man places himself at the point of view of God's spirit and looks, thinks, feels, and acts in the "sight" or in the "light" of it.¹ Further, to be at the point of view of God is not to be God: 'we must not suppose that in Religion the finite mind suddenly *becomes* God. To be one with God consciously, to take up the position of Absolute Spirit is possible without man being God,' etc.² All this is moderate and indeed obvious enough. To deny it would be to deny that men can feel themselves to be at one with God, can identify their will with his will, can bring their lives, both in what they do and in what they suffer, under the conception 'thy will be done'. But this is intelligible because so far we have been describing the religious experience from the side of individual men who 'have religion,' who 'take up the point of view' of God. If that were all, who would object? But the point is just that for the Hegelian idealist it is *not* all. He does not merely assert that men are conscious of God, or even that God is conscious of himself, but that *God is conscious of himself in men's consciousness of him*. Nothing less will do for him.³ Let us listen to Prof. Baillie: Spirit must not be merely an *object* for conscious individuals. 'Being self-conscious, it must be, as a whole, and in its completeness, conscious of its *own* self. . . . This complete self-consciousness of Spirit, its being Spirit *in* and *to* itself as a unity, is only found in its proper form in the *Religious Life*.'⁴ And the real meaning of 'being at the point of view' of Absolute Spirit is presently explained to be: 'In religion . . . we are at the point of view of Absolute Spirit, conscious of what it is *for itself*, conscious of how its *own* self-consciousness proceeds'.⁵ I confess I fail to see

¹P. 314. ²P. 316.

³In his previous book (*Hegel's Logic*, p. 333) Prof. Baillie also points out, that for Hegel the highest mode of experience is 'not our knowledge of Absolute Truth, but the Absolute's knowledge of itself'. What has become of the difficulties which Prof. Baillie then saw in this view?

⁴Pp. 311-312. Prof. Baillie presently adds that in the religious life we have 'the absolute Reality conscious of itself *as such* and operating *as such*; independent of individual consciousness'. One would like to know what is meant by 'independence' in this context. And are we not told that man, not God, is the religious being (p. 316)? It is then presumably man who leads the 'religious life'. In short, there is no way that I can see of torturing the statement that man has experience of God into the statement that this is God's experience of himself.

⁵P. 320. Italics (as always) by Prof. Baillie. A still more characteristic passage is found on p. 322: 'Religion is the consciousness of the Life of God in man's experience. God is Absolute Spirit and is conscious of Himself as Spirit, and is conscious of Himself in Spirit. The ways in which He is conscious of Himself constitute and form the types of Religion.'

what difference has remained between being at the point of view of God and being God, if I can truly be said to be conscious of the way in which God is conscious of himself. And this way of putting it becomes positively grotesque when we think of some of the historical types of religion. Prof. Baillie wisely refuses to discuss these: 'we are not discussing these "religions"'. We are discussing Religion *as such*, Religion as an attitude of experience.¹ This statement must be rightly understood. Most readers will at first tend to take it as meaning that under the heading 'religion *as such*' Prof. Baillie is discussing the *generic* or typical character of religion, the character which we expect to find realised in *every* form of religion, wherever and whenever it may be found. They will, perhaps, point triumphantly to the crude and brutal religion of some savage and ask, how the savage can be said to be '*at the point of view of the Absolute Spirit, conscious of what it is for itself; conscious of how its own self-consciousness proceeds,*' or how in the savage's religion God can be said to be 'conscious of Himself'. But this criticism would not quite hit the point. For Religion-as-such is not the character which all religions have in common. Rather, all historical religions are 'moments' or 'phases' of Religion-as-such. They are the forms in which the Absolute Spirit realises itself under the conditions of each level or plane of experience, and all historical religions *together* (so one might put it) make up the life of Religion-as-such. This, no doubt, gets rid of the above difficulty, but does it not raise a crop of fresh ones? Prof. Baillie claims to be able to show the *necessity* of each 'moment' (*i.e.*, each historical religion) as a content of the Absolute Spirit. But history is not at an end yet; new religions may be invented. What of their necessity? Again: it may be true to say of Religion-as-such (including, as above defined, all historical religions as its moments) that in it we are 'at the point of view' of Absolute Spirit. But then Religion-as-such is no one's actual religion; historical men have some historical form of religion, and of these, as we have seen, it is absurd to say that they represent 'the point of view of the Absolute Spirit as it is *for* and *to* itself'. Or again, if we admit that even the savage's religion is, in its way, a consciousness of God, and therefore a form of God's consciousness of Himself, yet we cannot but regard this form of religious experience as defective and shot through with error. But then we have on our hands the puzzle that even such imperfect manifestations are somehow necessary

¹ P. 321.

to the life of the Absolute Spirit. This difficulty takes us deep into the question of the coherence of the whole Hegelian 'construction' of experience. And there is another difficulty, which similarly touches on the structure of the system. All 'modes,' 'levels,' 'planes' of experience are for the Hegelian forms in which the one, single, absolute experience exists and realises itself. One of these modes or planes, so we had been told at the beginning, is religion, where we are at the point of view of the Absolute. At no lower level, then, are we at this point of view. Yet now it appears that religion itself has its levels and stages, and that each plane of experience has its own appropriate type of religion. These cross-divisions are surely very puzzling. Religion is both the highest plane¹ and apparently present at all planes. The one assertion is due to a regard for the *logical* value of the categories by which each plane is defined; the other is an attempt at the same time to do justice to *historical* facts. We have here an instance of an ambiguity that runs through the whole Hegelian philosophy, the ambiguity arising out of the fact, that in some historical successions we can trace a logical development. But this ambiguity must receive separate treatment later on.

It is instructive to trace an analogous difficulty in the treatment of Morality. Here, as in the case of religion, certain aspects of our moral experience are rightly and truly insisted on, but interpreted in a way which makes it hard to accept them. The difficulties all turn on the exact meaning to be attached to the phrase 'universal self-consciousness'. The point of the argument is, I take it, directed against extreme individualism. The object is to show that morality and society do imply a common life and a common good, and cannot be accounted for by assuming an aggregate of discrete individuals, each shut up within his own sphere, and not recognising any community of interests between himself and others. So far no wise man will object. Nor will he object, when he is told that his 'conscience' is 'either implicitly or explicitly universal, *i.e.*, contains something which others hold good and respect. It is not a principle of distinguishing one individual spiritual life from that of others. It is a principle of deeper *union* between individual spirits. If its content is universal, it must be because others either can or ought to share in it.'² And again: 'a universal self is a self

That is, omitting philosophy which also is at the point of view of the Absolute. Its relation to Religion, by the way, is left undefined in this book. Prof. Baillie merely gives a reference to his *Hegel's Logic*.

² P. 295.

including "others"'.¹ In this sense we may say of individual spirits that they find their self-completion in the moral life, the life which they lead as members of a social whole. And in so far as each of us accepts his position in the social whole (identifies himself with his 'station and its duties'—a phrase not used by Prof. Baillie) we may even agree that 'I am I (universal) through a universal self which I am conscious of as one with *me*, but which is wider than "*me*"'.² All this we may accept as true and even obvious. But the question is: Having admitted so much are we bound also to admit that therefore the whole, of which we as self-conscious individuals are members, is itself a universal self-consciousness, or, more strictly, a 'Universal Self-conscious Individuality'? Personally, I fail to perform this astonishing leap. The more so, as it seems to imply not merely that Morality (alias any kind of social whole, which are all 'moments' of morality) is a self-consciousness, but is conscious of itself in our consciousness of it or, rather, in our consciousness of ourselves as one with it! Yet this is, surely, the meaning of such passages as these: Social life is '*literally the activity of a social, of a universal self-consciousness*';³ 'Morality is the self-differentiation of a universal self-consciousness into specific individualities';⁴ and to give the central passage: the moral life involves two opposed or contrasted factors. 'These are the life of the universal self-consciousness,—substantial and actual universality; and the life of each moment of it—the distinct individual centres sharing in and living by that universality. The specific individuality has a twofold character by its being conscious of self by self: *one* self is what we have called the substantial universal, the *other* is the determinate limited individuality each possesses, and which makes each distinct from another. The first is the same *for* all and *in* all; the second is restricted to a certain area or sphere of that totality. Similarly, the universal substance "*duplicates*" *its* self in virtue of its being a *self-conscious* whole, a whole in and through consciousness of self; the one self being the universal self as such, . . . the other the determinate individualities.'⁵

This surely brings out the point at issue quite clearly. The state, *e.g.*, is a self-conscious whole, it is conscious of itself in that its members are conscious of themselves as members of it. But is there any reason to think that a whole, the parts of which are self-conscious individuals, must itself be self-conscious and a self-conscious individuality? There are 'Hegelians' who have denied that there is any such

¹ P. 296.

² P. 277.

³ P. 278.

⁴ P. 280.

⁵ Pp. 286, 287.

reason. Dr. McTaggart, I understand, is one of them. Mr. Bradley would seem to be another, for whilst denying that the Absolute as such is self-conscious, he regards it as manifesting itself in finite spirits, some of which, at any rate, are self-conscious. This very disagreement shows that there is a difficulty here which ought to have been discussed. And we have here an instance of the fatal neglect (to which I drew attention above) on Prof. Baillie's part of modern discussion and criticism of the Hegelian position. To disregard a criticism is not to refute it; and if Hegel's position is to be re-established in its pure form, it must be argued and not merely asserted.

To put the whole point quite shortly: It is one thing to say that many individual consciousnesses have an identical (*i.e.*, universal) content; it is another to say that this content is itself 'a self-consciousness'. We may grant that there is a *union* between self-conscious individuals, and that the individuals are conscious of it, and conscious also that in it they find their true self-realisation. But does it follow that therefore the union itself has the predicate of being a self-consciousness? 'Society, a universal self-consciousness, does exist as an order of self-conscious individual wills,'¹ says Prof. Baillie. But are these two qualifications of society identical? It is an 'order of self-conscious wills,' but is it therefore itself something that can be called a self and said to be conscious of itself? I, *e.g.*, am a subordinate member of a university; I accept my position, and try to do my duty in accordance with it. I recognise the corresponding duties and positions of all other members, and am in turn recognised by them. We are all devoted to our work, we find in it our common life, our common good, our self-realisation; our selves are—if we must use the term—'universal'. And we may further say, that the University exists and is maintained in so far as we work and live as its members. But in all this, have we made one step towards saying that the University is a Self-conscious Individuality, conscious of itself *in* and *through* all its members? In short, I fail to see, how we can treat any kind of social whole (whether state or church or family or club) as 'self-conscious' in the sense in which we treat its individual members as self-conscious. We cannot, that is, ask whether the state is self-conscious in the sense in which we can ask this question about another human being, or even an animal. A self-conscious being is, I take it, a subject which can have experiences. Can we call any kind of social whole a subject in this sense?

¹ P. 285.

In short, all depends on keeping our categories properly distinct, on not running our 'points-of-view' together. The important point, in every case, is *what is the central subject of our predicates*. To take an analogy: force, as Prof. Baillie tells us, is a higher category than 'thing,' though 'thing' is included as a 'moment' in force. This means that when we talk about forces, we are not talking about things, and the predicates which are true of forces are not true of things. Similarly, individuals may be necessary parts of a social whole, but from that it does not follow, that predicates which are true of individuals are therefore true of the social whole of which they are members, or *vice versa*, that predicates which attach to the social whole attach therefore to its individual members, even though these should be 'included' in the whole. I am not attempting then to deny, *e.g.*, the reality of the *volonté générale*, but I do deny that when we make it the subject of predicates, take its 'point of view,' we can describe it as a self-conscious individuality. On the other hand, when I take the point of view of an individual citizen, and consider his relation to the *volonté générale*, I can describe it as an idea of which he is conscious as being pursued by himself in common with the majority of his fellow-citizens. The position of the *volonté générale* does not seem to me, in its ultimate principle, to be different from the position of a common world, *e.g.*, of perception. In the same sense in which many subjects can perceive a self-same and identical object, in the same sense they can have a self-same and identical object of will. We may, if we choose, call the identical content of many consciousnesses 'universal,' but that leaves wholly open the question as to the detailed nature of this universal content. It may be anything from an object of perception to the highest spiritual reality, but whether it must itself be called a self-conscious individuality is another question. At any rate, it does not follow from its universality.

In this connexion, another point may suitably be discussed about which there hangs to my mind a certain obscurity. I am puzzled as to what experience the Hegelian is talking about. He sometimes speaks about Experience, Knowledge, Consciousness, etc., without any further qualification. This means then, I take it, experience wherever and whenever it may be found. But, on the other hand, the limiting qualification 'human' is often introduced, and we find the philosopher protesting that *human* knowledge and experience are the theme of his discourse. In fact, the whole discussion lapses continually from predication about Experience into

predications about 'us'. It is 'we' who take up the point of view of the whole; it is in 'our' experience that a certain conception is found. Now one would like to be told clearly what the force of the qualification 'human' exactly is. Is it meant to introduce a certain *relativity* into experience? And if so, by contrast with what is this relativity defined? It would be intelligible enough if we contrasted human experience, *e.g.*, with the experience of animals or, perhaps, of angels, but these empirical distinctions seem slightly out of place in a philosophy which professes to interpret Experience as such. Or, maybe, the contrast intended is with Absolute Experience. But any distinction which we may make between 'our' experience and Absolute Experience is after all '*our*' distinction and thus we remain within 'human' experience. Or rather, in this universal application, the word 'human' loses all its qualifying and limiting force. The Hegelian might just as well eschew 'human' altogether in talking about experience and, boldly identifying himself with the Absolute, treat all experience as the various modes of the Absolute's self-contemplation. In short, it seems doubtful, whether any kind of *relativity* of knowledge can be accepted or defended by the Hegelian. Hegel himself apparently recognised none. And even such modified relativity as Mr. Bradley defends (*viz.*, that we know by general principles certain characteristics of the ultimate reality, though we do not find these features realised in the details of actual experience) can no longer be maintained. *The distinction 'for us'—'for the Absolute' must go in all its forms*; for the very fact that we can make it shows that we are beyond it. This is, I think, what the true Hegelian must maintain. Whether it is tenable, I doubt very much. But it would clear the air and help philosophical discussion, if this position, supposing it to be seriously held, were more openly and boldly stated, and above all more strenuously and convincingly defended.

I have had in mind in discussing this point, not merely Prof. Baillie's book,¹ but still more Dr. McTaggart's criticism of Hegel's treatment of Evil. Working with the antithesis: in the Absolute Experience there is no evil—in our experience there is evil, Dr. McTaggart constructs the following dilemma: 'Either the evil round us is real, or it is not. If it is real, then reality is not perfectly rational. But if it is absolutely unreal, then all our finite experience—and we

¹ The main passage in Prof. Baillie's book is to be found on p. 118. I have quoted it below in a different connexion (see p. 562).

know of no other—must have an element in it which is absolutely irrational. . . .¹ I quote this passage merely to illustrate the difficulties into which the Hegelian gets once he admits relativity and the distinction of 'for us'—'for the Absolute' as an ultimate distinction. And Dr. McTaggart's criticism is, I am convinced, what a Hegelian in his choice phraseology would call an 'external' criticism, one not made on the basis of principles admitted by the system. If the true Hegelian makes the distinction at all, 'for us' can only mean: if we argue on the level of any category below the highest. I recollect in this connexion an illuminating passage in the 'Preface' to the *Phenomenology*² where Hegel points out how false it is to say that every error has in it a measure of truth and every truth a measure of error. This is to combine them 'like oil and water, unmixed and externally'. He adduces the similar difficulty besetting phrases like 'unity of subject and object,' 'unity of finite and infinite,' etc.—a difficulty arising from the fact, that 'subject,' 'object,' etc., are here used with the meaning which they bear *apart* from their unity, and which therefore is not adequate to their meaning *in* their unity: 'ebenso,' he goes on, 'ist das Falsche nicht mehr als Falsches ein Moment der Wahrheit'. Well, it is not my business to decide whether Hegel is right or his critics; but it is my business to draw attention to the aporia so that future 'idealistic constructions of experience' may grapple with it, and give us argument, not dogma.

As for 'error'—Prof. Baillie admits³ that it presents a difficulty to his position and requires explanation. And he gives a reference to ch. iv. *en bloc*. But I have searched in vain in that chapter for so much as a mention of error. The reason is that for Prof. Baillie the problem of error 'put more formally' (!) changes into the problem 'by what process shall we criticise and connect these various truths [*viz.*, Art, Science, Religion and other 'planes' of experience] so as to show an inherent necessity running through them all'.⁴ This is a highly laudable enterprise, but in what sense the tracing of the necessity running through, *e.g.*, Art and Science is an 'explanation' of error can be clear only to a Hegelian. Is there no error *within* the field of science? Are there no principles of conduct which are morally disastrous? And are the special problems arising out of these not worth discussing in a 'construction' of experience?

The question as to the exact sense in which the experience

¹ *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 187.

² *Werke*, ii., p. 31. ³ P. 100. ⁴ P. 100.

with which we are dealing can be called 'human' arises in a somewhat different form, when we are told that 'experience takes place only in finite centres'. Some such doctrine seems implied in the following passage from Prof. Baillie: 'Experience is . . . realised at once in individual minds and yet in no given individual mind completely. It takes all the diversity of finite mind to experience all that can fall within man's experience. With man's experience as a whole we are alone concerned, for this is the only experience historically realised.'¹ I confess, I cannot make out from this passage whether or not Prof. Baillie means, that experience is found *only in human minds*, and that there are no finite minds at all except historically realised human minds. His words would easily admit of this interpretation, yet (to say nothing, *e.g.*, of the experiences of animals which certainly are 'finite,' but not human) I really can see no valid reason whatever for the assumption, that a certain kind of creatures on this planet are the only possessors of experience. 'Finite mind' or 'finite experience' must surely for the purposes of epistemology (as well as metaphysics) be defined by the peculiar 'finite' character of its *content*, and not by means of the 'historical realisation' of experience in human beings. For finiteness is a logical characteristic and has nothing to do with historical facts. It is to be noticed that Mr. Bradley who holds the view of experience taking place only in finite centres and in the form of finite 'thisness' very strongly² nowhere affirms that all finite centres are human.

But even if the principle is stated in this modified form, there is a further difficulty which troubles me, and which I will attempt to formulate at the risk of being told that I have misunderstood everybody. The view that experience is found only in finite centres seems to me to elevate a purely empirical distinction into an ultimate metaphysical fact. I am not, be it observed, attempting to deny the distinction of finite and infinite, but I do wish to question the legitimacy of the phrase 'finite centres'. Above, I said that finiteness was a logical characteristic, which I take to mean that a given experience (or 'plane' of experience) as defined by its content, which in turn is defined by its dominant category, is finite or the reverse, according as the category is finite or the reverse. In that sense, *e.g.*, a world-view based on the category of mechanism is clearly 'finite'. But that, obviously, leaves alone the question in what finite centres—human or otherwise—the idea of mechanism may occur as

¹ P. 118. ² *App. and Real.* (sec. ed.), p. 226.

a psychological fact. I am merely pleading for consistency. If the Hegelian really professes to 'interpret' Experience and show up the inner necessity which runs through all its forms, what business has he with the question, where and how Experience 'occurs'? Surely Experience ought to be to him the one and sole ultimate fact, which does not occur, but simply *is*. And the question of how and under what conditions experience 'occurs' in a human being or in any other kind of finite mind, is plainly an *empirical* question—a detail *within* the ultimate fact. In all this talk about 'finite centres' the cloven foot of that psychological Empiricism, of which the Hegelian has such a horror, seems to me to be protruding.

If he wishes to escape it, the Hegelian should be in dead earnest about his original principle, *viz.*, that experience is to be defined by its objective content and not by the circumstances of its 'occurrence'. 'Individual minds' should for him *form part of the objective content of Experience*; they are one element empirically distinguished from others, and I do not see what right we have to make all the rest of this objective content dependent on one particular element. On the contrary, we must surely say that these other elements (nature, for example, both inorganic and organic, plants, animals), however different in kind from human minds, have, in their own way, the same sort of existence as we have. To put it quite baldly: it is possible to argue that every form and kind of existence is in its own way a manifestation of the Absolute (or if we prefer religious language, a realisation of the divine); but it is quite impossible to argue that the rest of existence is a manifestation of the Absolute only in so far as it occurs in the experiences of human minds. Such a doctrine seems to make shallow, instead of deepening, the spiritual forms of experience, from which in the end Idealism derives its force and its inspiration. There are experiences in which the Self finds itself in the 'other,' and realises its unity with the universe, but it can do so only by recognising at the same time what I should like to call the *sanctity* of the independence of 'other' existence. Any theory which even seems to reduce the world to an accident of the existence of 'finite minds' violates this fundamental need of true Idealism. As against 'finite minds' (souls, if we like) material objects ('things') may stand lower in the scale of being, but being in the end they have in the same sense, if not of the same degree, as minds. Such a view has at least the advantage of inculcating a proper respect for the wealth and variety of the facts of experience, without the full recognition of which

the life of the Absolute can but be starved and impoverished. I hope I shall be forgiven if I quote here a passage from an article by Prof. Bosanquet¹ which has suggested to me the above line of thought. Discussing the theory that the Absolute is a 'society of selves'—a theory obviously akin to the view that Experience is found only in 'finite centres'—Prof. Bosanquet points out that we cannot get the 'content of life, pains, conflicts, sacrifice, satisfaction' out of a universe composed merely of persons; we need an 'outside' or 'other,' which must not consist simply of other persons. 'It is things, is it not? which set the problems of life for persons; and if you turn all things into persons, the differences which make life interesting are gone, except in as far as for practical purposes you turn the persons back again into things, *i.e.*, your food, or your own body, or the place in which you were born. . . . If the instruments and attributes of my life are turned into other persons, I, surely, am reduced to emptiness and deprived even of my character, for my character is not without external activity. This criticism may be mistaken, but it may pass as affirming that *we must take as actual the distinctions which give life its content.*'² To draw from this passage the moral for my argument: If the theory that experience occurs only in finite centres means that all I ever experience is in the end other finite minds or souls or selves like my own, but in most cases more or less thickly disguised, it lays itself open to all the difficulties above urged by Prof. Bosanquet against a universe of 'persons'.

Perhaps I am attaching an exaggerated importance to this point, and perhaps I am led, in consequence, to scent traces of this mistake, where there are none. However that may be, I have some doubts about certain passages which occur where Prof. Baillie discusses the ideal of knowledge as involving 'the completest unity in the greatest diversity'.³ Speaking of the consciousness of objects Prof. Baillie there says: 'The diversity here lies in the two elements distinguished, *viz.*, consciousness and a somewhat or objects'.⁴ This phrase may be a mere slip, or again my difficulties may arise out of the vagueness of the word 'consciousness,' but I cannot reconcile the statement just quoted with the definition of consciousness as always and everywhere an 'awareness of somewhat'.⁵ If consciousness by its very nature involves

¹ "Contradiction and Reality," *MIND*, N.S., 57, p. 8.

² Italics mine.

³ P. 80. I gratefully acknowledge that my attention was drawn to this point by a remark of Prof. Bosanquet's.

⁴ *Ibid.* ⁵ Cp. above, p. 552.

'objects,' I do not see how consciousness and objects can be treated as the diverse elements which have to be reduced to unity. On the contrary, by taking his stand on this fundamental unity Prof. Baillie, as I understand him, turns the flank of Dualism. Besides how can you characterise or define or describe 'consciousness' or 'awareness' or 'experience' except by stating its objective content? Apart from that has it any quality, any definite feature? And if not, how can it form one side in an antithesis to be overcome? How can it, a mere featureless blank, supply a contrast to the objects? And how without this contrast can their unity be a problem to be solved? What makes it difficult to take the above passage as a mere slip is that similar passages occur elsewhere, *e.g.*, 'experience in all its forms starts with the distinction of consciousness from objectivity,'¹ or again: 'the object world is experience all in its diversity, the subject world is experience focussed in its unity'.² It occurred to me for a moment, that Prof. Baillie in distinguishing 'consciousness' and 'objectivity' might mean no more than the distinction, say, between our opinions and facts, things as they appear to us and as they are, or perhaps the psychological distinction between the object and a given person's perception of the object. However, for an Idealist these are surely distinctions falling *inside* Experience, and not distinctions which can help us to formulate the ultimate problem of philosophy. I am the more confirmed in this view by the fact that when Prof. Baillie proceeds actually to discuss particular planes of Experience, and to exhibit each as a special form of 'individuation,' *i.e.*, of unity in difference, we hear no more of the abstract opposition of consciousness and objectivity. On the contrary, *we get the unity in the shape of some universal principle or category*, which binds together the content of that particular form of experience. In short, what we have to do is simply to exhibit in the structure of the objective content of a given plane of experience the principle which gives unity to all its diverse elements. A given plane of experience is constituted just by its objective content, and if we wish to discuss the characteristics of that experience, we must discuss just *what* we experience, *i.e.*, the objective content. There can be no question then of distinguishing these two sides and somehow achieving their reconciliation. If we choose to say that at a given level of experience 'the mind reduces to unity' the objective manifold by means of a certain principle—there is little harm in

¹ P. 83. ² P. 120.

this way of speaking as long as we remember that the principle itself is *as objective as* the manifold which it reduces to unity, and that in short *both* unity and diversity are characteristics of the total objective content of a given form of 'awareness'. That this is the line which Prof. Baillie actually follows when he comes to details may be illustrated by the case of 'Understanding' which has unity through the category of Force: in understanding 'the object is known as falling in its entirety inside a single conscious unity, which when resolved into its different constituents *just is the full content of the object*. . . . To seek to understand means either to grasp the unity holding together the differences of which we are aware, or it means showing how this unity breaks up and expresses itself in these various differences. . . . Now Force is just the objective way this effort appears when Understanding works, it is the principle on which it proceeds. . . .'¹ In view of such passages I think I may fairly claim, that Prof. Baillie himself bears witness against his words,² and that his practice is better than the theory which he had laid down at the start.

The last point which I wish to discuss is the question whether the order of stages of Experience from Sensation up to Religion, which Prof. Baillie traces for us with the help of Hegel, is to be understood as logical or historical or both. From a number of passages about the 'historical realisation' of experience,³ we must conclude that the answer which Prof. Baillie would have us give is 'both'. But, if so, we should have been grateful if Prof. Baillie had discussed the difficulties of that answer, which will occur to most readers, and which indeed have often been pointed out. The question whether the development is temporal or logical may be put in more technical language thus: Are the various modes of Experience *stages* in the temporal evolution of the Absolute or *moments* in its eternal completeness? Or if we say they are both, how is the temporal side related to the eternal?

Lest we should argue *in vacuo*, let us get down to the basis on which Prof. Baillie himself takes his stand. It is that all the various modes or planes of experience are in actual fact found *side by side*. One may be higher than

¹ P. 190. Italics mine.

² Cp. also this passage from p. 72: 'Wherever we can be said to know, be the object what it may, that will fall under the scope of the inquiry. But this means that the problem embraces every way of being conscious of an object.' This seems to contain my point.

³ *F.g.*, p. 106.

another, and even include it as a 'moment' in itself, but, for all that, the 'moment' exists *also* in its own right as a 'stage'. Thus we find sensation both side by side with perception and as an element in perception. The same applies, at the other end of the scale, to morality and religion. And so throughout the whole chain.

Furthermore, we must beware of falling into the mistake of regarding all lower modes of experience as modes of the highest mode. *I.e.*, we must not treat the highest mode *alone* as real and the rest as merely its 'appearances'. Thus we may not treat, *e.g.*, sensation as an incomplete form of philosophy or of religion. Each mode of experience contributes an element of value, all its own, to the Whole. Hence in arriving at the content of the Whole we must take all modes 'together,' for 'all forms of experience are real and actual just because they are experience'.¹

This, if we choose, we may call the great empirical basis of Hegelianism. It represents the 'facts' which it accepts and tries to 'construct'.

Now this interpretation might be purely logical. That is, having made a catalogue, as it were, of all actual forms of experience we might set ourselves to arrange them in an ascending order of value according to the degree in which each realises a certain principle, say the principle of 'complete unity in greatest diversity'. Now one and the same principle cannot be expressed in a variety of forms, unless there is an identity of content in these forms; and this condition we find realised in that each lower stage reappears as a moment in the next higher stage. In this sense the highest stage may be treated as (1) distinct from all the lower, (2) containing them as moments within itself, (3) giving us clearest knowledge of the principle active in all stages. Thus we can see the justification for a passage like the following: 'Spirit therefore is "absolute" in the sense that, being the culmination, it contains as *moments* of itself what were formerly treated of as *stages* in the life-history of experience. These stages *were really* the content of Spirit *spread out* in detail; that they are so, is only seen when Spirit comes out as their result and goal,' etc.²

Now quite apart from the word 'life-history,' which raises special problems, the difficulties which I would urge against the above theory are these. Why should the 'moments' of Spirit appear *also* as stages and survive as such side by side with the stage in which they are moments? If the whole

¹ P. 132. ² P. 310.

content of Spirit is explicit¹ in its 'moments,' why should it be further explicit ('spread out') in the quasi-independence of 'stages'?

Or to urge what is fundamentally the same objection in a different form: A mode of experience as a 'moment' in the highest stage is *not wholly identical* with the same mode as a 'stage' in its own right. Hence there arises the momentous question, which I regret to say Prof. Baillie nowhere raises, whether the advance from one stage to another is pure gain, or whether it does not also *involve some loss*. Take, *e.g.*, science and religion. Prof. Baillie himself points out,² that their attitude towards 'Nature' is very different, nature being for science a conceptual construction, for religion a manifestation of spirit. This shows beautifully, why the two modes must be kept apart—the same result follows also from the fact that religious categories do not 'explain' in science and *vice versa*—but it does not show what becomes of science considered as a 'moment' of religion. When we cease to think in terms of a conceptual construction and think instead in terms of manifestation of spirit, there surely is some loss, however much gain there may be. A certain way of looking at nature is 'merged,' has become less explicit, has disappeared in the total mass.

And there is a third way in which I will put my criticism. All Experience deals with reality, each mode of experience in its own way. All lower stages deal with realities which, as they stand, *are not spiritual* (*e.g.*, Perception as dealing with Things; Science as dealing with Laws). The only ground which we have for saying that, in spite of appearances, they are at bottom spiritual is, that at the level where we apprehend reality as explicitly spiritual, these lower stages are taken to be included as 'moments'. But, then, the admission that this highest level is itself but 'a' mode of experience, a 'point of view' as Prof. Baillie himself repeatedly calls it, seems to rob it of some of its interpretative force. I mean: we may have a right to say that *from the point of view of religion* all reality is spiritual, but we have *no* right to omit this qualification and to assert straightway and absolutely, as Prof. Baillie does, that all reality is Spirit. For so long as each mode of experience is actual in its own right, reality, as it presents itself to us in experience, is not wholly spiritual. That follows inevitably from admitting each mode of experience both as a stage *and* as a moment, and from

¹ Let the reader recollect that for Prof. Baillie religion (the stage of Spirit) is the absolute Spirit's consciousness of its own self.

² P. 313 n.

making even the highest mode (in which we are said to take the point of view of the whole) after all *one mode amongst* others. In fact, it does not seem to me to be consistent to say (1) that in religion the Absolute Spirit is conscious of itself, (2) that religion is but a particular mode of human experience amongst others—even though it be the highest. And if we say that *all* reality is spiritual, because it is so for religion, we come into manifest conflict with the two principles (1) that we must not treat the lower levels of experience as forms of Religion, (2) that these levels deal with reality.

In short, at the level of experience at which all lower levels are present as 'moments,' reality may be Spirit; but from that we cannot take the step across to the assertion that all reality is Spirit, when the levels of experience are not treated as 'moments' of the highest, but are taken 'together' and 'side by side' as 'stages'. The *supreme concept under which all forms of experience fall* is 'awareness of somewhat,' and Spirit is the objective 'somewhat' of certain forms only. That is all, as far as I can see, which Prof. Baillie's argument in strict logic goes to show.

If, then, we turn from the logical aspect of the problem to the temporal implied in such phrases as 'life-history,' 'development,' etc., the main difficulty is, that even treating history as the manifestation of the Absolute *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, the highest stage of experience is not, either in the development of the individual or of the race, the last, but has *itself* a history and occurs itself in lower and higher forms. We saw this in the case of religion,¹ and I need not repeat here the difficulties which I pointed out there. Yet, without some reference to the actual development of experience as an 'historical' fact, it must be admitted that the mere logical arrangement of stages loses much of its attractiveness. It is very tempting to begin with some simple stage and to show how its inherent imperfections and contradictions—or, if we prefer it, the incomplete realisation of its immanent ideal—drives the 'typical individual mind' on to the next stage, and so on, until at the highest stage it attains to the vision beatific of the ideal in its full resplendent reality. Not an ignoble dream, but if it be the true tale of the ascent of experience, (1) we cannot consistently say that the highest stage is merely a 'point of view,' a particular form amongst others; and (2) we shall find it hard to say why the stages that our 'typical mind' leaves behind in ascending should survive as such. Indeed this difficulty by itself is enough to

¹ Cp. p. 555.

put any view of the development as purely temporal and historical wholly out of court.

The confusing mixture of a logical and a temporal point of view in tracing the inner coherence of experience arises, in the end, wholly from the attempt to trace the development of a 'typical individual mind'. This is nothing but an artificial construction, an audacious attempt to translate a logical connexion into an imaginary 'historical' fact.

I cannot conclude without an attempt to trace the real cause of the trouble which lies far deeper than a more or less dialectical criticism of the contradiction of 'stages' and 'moments' is capable of revealing. I know that the above criticism might be met by a frank abandonment of the whole machinery of stages, etc., and by saying instead: 'Take any particular form of experience and ask yourself, whether your mind finds satisfaction in it. And if not, ask yourself why not? and what is needed to supplement that experience so as to satisfy your ideal? If you ask yourself these questions, you will find yourself driven, by the inherent logic of your own ideal, from step to step through the course which has been traced. Begin to reflect on experience at all, and this is the line which your reflexion must inevitably follow.' Well, let us grant that these are the steps through which we must pass *if* we reflect, and through which we have passed *in so far as* we have reflected. But these statements clearly are abstract and hypothetical. The life-history of a 'typical' mind is not that of any actual, historical mind. The question is: where are we to attach the generalisation to the solid ground of fact? Where and how does the typical mind *exist*? And here we have reached the cause of the trouble. The words 'real' and 'reality' are ambiguous. The question what is real may mean: What exists? and in what sense does it exist? But it may also mean: What is the real nature of that which exists? In short, it is the old puzzle about *existence* and *essence* which thus meets us at the heart of Hegelian Idealism. It is unnecessary for me to trace the part played in the history of philosophy by this antithesis. It will be enough if I remind the reader of its supreme importance in present-day thought. In most recent times it has, in the distinction of 'existence' and 'idea,' 'that' and 'what,' supplied the central problem of Mr. Bradley's whole philosophy. It appears in the general distinction of 'fact' and 'value,' and it appears no less in such a very special problem as whether scientific conceptions such as ether, vortex-rings, corpuscles mean 'realities' (*i.e.*, existences) or are merely 'descriptive shorthand'. And again we find it in

the distinction of mental events (sensation, perceptions, ideas, etc.) and their 'meaning' or 'objective reference,' and in all the further questions that this distinction inevitably raises as to the 'existence' of the object over against the mental events. Generalisations are dangerous in philosophy—still, I think, it is a fair generalisation to say that Prof. Baillie deals with the problem of essence rather than that of existence. He has not asked: what exists? but: what does each form of experience reveal to us about the *nature* of the world and about ourselves, in short, about what exists? Perhaps he thinks the problem of existence uninteresting. But I cannot see that it is either unimportant or meaningless. Or perhaps he thinks that the two problems can only be answered together. That may be so, but do we know the answer? Mr. Bradley has argued not unconvincingly, that in *our* experience the answer is not found beyond the general postulate that it must be found in the *Absolute* Experience, which is not, *as such*, accessible to us. And thus the end of my criticism brings me back to the point from which I started: In the very heart of Prof. Baillie's position we have found a problem which post-Hegelian speculation in its very reaction against Hegel has emphasised and made explicit, but of which Prof. Baillie has offered us no solution.

V.—DISCUSSIONS.

REALISM AND INFINITE DIVISIBILITY.

ONE hardly needs to plead an excuse for coming back at any time to the problem of the infinite divisibility of space and time—for discussing again a notion to which Berkeley attributes “all those amusing geometrical paradoxes which have such a direct repugnancy to the plain common sense of mankind, and are admitted with so much reluctance into a mind not yet debauched by learning”.

The matter can in no sense be regarded as settled. The old Zenonic difficulties cannot be said to have been admittedly laid to rest. A majority of those who accept the infinite divisibility of finite spaces and times accept it, I believe, in such a form that they may fairly be accused of holding what is flatly self-contradictory and absurd. In vain they quote authorities, appeal to the mathematicians, plead “the laws of our sensibility,” or pass over the subject in silence, hoping that no one will stir up difficulties which seem to give rise to profitless dispute. We do not conquer our difficulties when we evade them, or when we appeal to authorities who appear to contradict themselves as freely as we contradict ourselves.

In a recent publication¹ I have discussed at length the doctrine of infinite divisibility, and have pointed out that the only serious attempt made by those who hold it, in the form alluded to above, to meet the difficulties in question is not a successful attempt. It consists in falling back upon the old distinction between the divisible and the divided.

Granted, it is said, that a given finite line, which we perceive, is infinitely divisible; it does not follow that it is composed of an endless number of parts, which a point moving over the line must exhaust, for the line is *infinitely divisible*, not *infinitely divided*.

That this distinction does not meet the difficulty was made clear enough by David Hume; and, indeed, a very little reflection seems to make it evident that we have here no way of escape from our troubles. We say a thing is divisible, because we believe that it can be divided, and we believe that it can be divided only because it has parts. It never occurs to us to maintain that a mathematical point is divisible. Why not? Because, by hypothesis, it has no

¹ *A System of Metaphysics*, New York and London, 1904.

parts. If it had parts, it would be theoretically divisible. And any constituent of a line whatever, if it is divisible, must be conceived as differing from the mathematical point in this particular. Hence, if a line really is infinitely divisible, it must consist of an infinite number of parts.

Now, it seems repugnant to the notions of space and time, as revealed in our experience and as treated in the sciences, to speak of a given portion of either space or time as composed of a limited number of partless parts. There is surely some reason why men should talk as they do of the infinite divisibility of spaces and times. We have the more reason for thinking the conception of infinite divisibility significant, and not a mere blunder, in that the paradoxes referred to above in the citation from Berkeley have been known and freely discussed for centuries, and have been felt as a plague by so many acute and earnest minds, but have, nevertheless, not discouraged men from adhering to what seems to be an indefensible doctrine. The common opinion appears to be: I can see no way out of these difficulties, but I *must* accept the doctrine.

Such considerations as these may well cause a prudent man to hesitate before he denies the infinite divisibility of finite spaces and times. He will be inclined, rather, to ask himself whether he is not in the presence of a truth which gives offence only because it has been misconceived, and which, purged of misconception, may be made void of offence. Certainly, it is too much to ask of a reasonable man that he accept as true what is inherently absurd, no matter who may champion the absurdity. But, on the other hand, it also seems too much to demand that he relinquish a way of regarding space and time that he rather dimly feels to be in real harmony with his experience, and that appears to be in harmony with sciences which he cannot but respect. There ought to be some way out of the seeming *impasse*.

I have, in the work referred to above, attempted to make such a restatement of the doctrine of infinite divisibility as will justify the attitude which it seems natural for us to take toward space and time, and will, nevertheless, not make preposterous demands upon our credulity. I have followed the line of thought opened up by Berkeley, but have had no intention of supporting his idealism, with which I am not in sympathy. In his very keen and kindly criticism of my book,¹ however, Prof. Miller has pointed out that it seems idealistic to speak of infinite divisibility as "a system of substitutions," and has suggested that, to bring my doctrine into harmony with realism, the chapter which contains such expressions would have to be rewritten.

I have no intention here of answering Prof. Miller, whose position seems to me well taken. There certainly is an idealistic suggestion in such expressions as the one alluded to. What interests me is to see whether the doctrine can be so expressed as to be unequivocal.

¹ See MIND, April, 1906.

cally realistic, as it was intended to be. It is the task of this paper to find such an expression.

I have maintained that we are directly aware of two orders of experience, the objective and the subjective. What these are can best be made clear by illustration.

I stand at a considerable distance from a tree and look at it. I am conscious of a certain experience of colour. If I close my eyes or turn my head, this experience disappears. If I walk towards the tree, the experience gives place to a successive series of other visual experiences, differing more or less from each other. All such changes we are in the habit of describing as changes in our sensations; in accounting for them we habitually refer, both in common life and in science, to the changing relation of something to our organs of sense, and we confound such changes, if at all, only by accident, with a different class of changes of which we are aware just as directly.

Suppose that I stand at a certain point and look at the tree in question. My eyes remain open, and my body does not move perceptibly. Nevertheless, there may be striking changes in my experience. I say that the tree is swaying because the wind is blowing through it; or that it is falling because the axe of the woodcutter has cleft its stem. There are changes in my sensations here too. If there were not, I should know nothing of the wind or of the fall of the tree. But no man, in actual practice, is incapable of distinguishing between the two classes of cases referred to; and it is only as the result of a train of philosophical reflection—in my opinion misguided—that one may be led to describe the second set of occurrences as no more than a change in sensations.

We all say, in the one case, and we say it as the result of an observed distinction within our experience, that our sensations have changed, while the external thing, the tree, has remained the same. In the other case, we say that the thing has changed, as well as our sensations. We do not make such statements at random. They are the result of observed distinctions in what is revealed in experience.¹

In the second of the two cases, we have revealed to us a part of the external world with which we busy ourselves both in common life and in the physical sciences. That there is a physical world, and that we know something about it, hardly seems to me matter of legitimate dispute. But when we come to ask ourselves what the world is, and when we realise that we can know it only as it is revealed to us directly or indirectly, there is certainly room for reflection, and it is natural that there should be differences of opinion as the result of such reflection. However, I think that, if

¹ I have tried, in my *Introduction to Philosophy* (New York and London, 1906), to give a brief and clear account of the two orders of experience, i.e., of the physical and the mental. Is it impossible, within the limits of this paper, to discuss them fully?

we fall into perplexities, we should hold to the truth that we all do, as a matter of fact, distinguish between the objective and the subjective, and we should take great care not to be led into some illegitimate obliteration of the distinction.

Now, he who stands at some distance from a tree, and distinguishes between the motion of the tree and his changes of sensation as he opens and shuts his eyes, has experience of the two orders, the physical and the mental.

If he stands nearer, he does not see the tree as he saw it before; but he again has an experience of the physical and the mental. Were there no fixed relation between his experience in the one case and his experience in the other, he would, of course, not say that he perceives the same tree. But there is such a relation, guaranteed by observation, and the expression he uses is not without significance.

Again. The man may, leaving the realm of the directly perceptible, conceive the tree to be composed of atoms and molecules not revealed to sight or touch. Here he is concerned with something still different. But it should be remarked that he who takes this step does not take it blindly and without a reason. He passes, by analogy, from what he has experienced to something that he thinks himself justified in conceiving as though he could perceive it.

Here, too, if he will, he may talk of the distinction between subjective and objective. He may think of the atom as he or some other creature might be supposed to perceive it under such and such circumstances; or he may abstract from all this and may busy himself with the objective interrelations of atoms, as, in fact, certain physical sciences do.

It is important to notice that, at each stage, one may concern oneself either with the subjective or with the objective—with actual or conceivable experiences of minds, or with external things.

Let us represent diagrammatically the tree as it reveals itself, or is conceived to reveal itself, under each of the three aspects described above:—

X X
X X X X
XXXXXXXX

For the sake of simplicity and exposition I shall consider but the one object, and shall take into consideration only its space-filling aspect, the one with which we are immediately concerned.

He who stands at a considerable distance perceives the tree as having part out of part (xx), but he does not perceive it as having an unlimited number of parts, and it seems to lead to hopeless absurdities to say that what is directly revealed to him is constituted of such.

He who stands nearer also perceives the tree as having part out of part (xxxx), and more parts are perceptible than were perceptible before. But it seems just as absurd to say that we have here an unlimited number of parts directly presented.

He who conceives the tree as composed of atoms spatially related to one another may attribute to it vastly more parts (xxxxxxx) than were perceivable in either of the above cases. He may not even try to picture to himself such a number of parts, but may use as their representative some mathematical expression. Nevertheless he will not confound the mathematical figures with the actual number of parts attributed to the object. He attributes the actual parts to the object which he conceives to exist, and he distinguishes between any symbol which he may employ and the parts attributed to the object. Moreover, the word "part" does not become meaningless to him when used in this way. It draws its significance from the experience of parts which he has had in perceiving physical things.

When we speak of a physical thing, we do not mean, either in common life or in science, the thing as seen from this distance or as seen from that distance, nor the thing as conceived in this or in that particular way. When we busy ourselves with these single experiences, as such, we are in the realm of the subjective. We are concerned with *how the thing looks*; and the question may always be raised: *looks to whom, and under what circumstances?* We are dealing with the thing as some one sees it or conceives it. The thing, taken simply, always means to us something more.

The single experiences referred to are not disconnected. It is possible, theoretically, to pass from one to another, and to say why the thing now looks like this, and now like that. Any one of them may represent the thing—it is the thing as perceived in a certain way. But how many of them may there be, and how may they differ from each other? This, surely, is a question for the psychologist and not for the student of physical science. When we have raised it, we are dealing, not directly with things, but with the appearances of things.

Is there any reason, that we can see, why one should stop at a particular point in attributing parts—not to some one's experience of a thing—but to *the thing*, in the sense given? Apparently not. In our treatment of *the thing*, the differences between different experiences are dropped out of account. There is a certain plan that runs through them all, they are *composite*, and we may develop our mathematical doctrine of the divisibility of spaces without regard to the limitations of this experience or of that. Of course, if it were developed without regard to the constitution of experience as a whole, it would be useless.

To me it seems that all this means that we can accept the *plan* of the objective order, of the physical world, and can, in pursuance of our purpose, overlook the subjective altogether. In a geometer's account of lines, surfaces and solids, we hear nothing at all about the varying sizes under which such present themselves to given persons under given circumstances. And yet the geometer is certainly concerned with what has a significance for the experience of

every one. Geometry is applied to the arts; it concerns practical life. But it could not possibly interest us, or, indeed, mean anything to us, if it had no bearing upon the things that we actually perceive and with which we have to do.

Now, I cannot but think that, when we thus overlook the subjective, when we abstract from individual aspects of the objective order, and busy ourselves with the objective order simply, with the plan that runs through our experiences as a class, we are dealing with the world in a thoroughly realistic way. We do not ask how the world looks to this person or to that; we inquire concerning its internal constitution.

This is not idealism. This is realism; and it is a realism which does not overlook the fact that every man who talks about the external world at all must be thinking about it as it is revealed to him directly or indirectly. The objects which compose it are not directly revealed to him in just the same way under varying circumstances; nor need they be revealed in just the same way to different persons. Nevertheless, geometry has a significance for him in the different phases of his own experience, and it is a common ground upon which different men may meet.

I have for convenience spoken only of space, but it is clear that we treat time in the same way. We speak of thousandths of an inch and of thousandths of a second. We guess at the probable or possible size of an atom, and we discuss the time taken up by its vibration. Had we never had any direct experience of succession, this would mean nothing at all to us. As it is, it does mean something. To give it a meaning we are not compelled to make the monstrous assumption that any brief period of time directly experienced by any one is actually composed of an endless number of parts. But the analogy between our treatment of space and of time is so close that I need not dilate upon the matter.

The path to idealism is a broad one, and easy to follow. It presents an unusual attraction to bright minds that are influenced by abstract reasonings, and are not content with that rather stupid adherence to instinct and tradition which so often serves as a guide to the feet of the unreflective. The idealist is right in pointing out that we can talk significantly of things only as we know them. We must ever deal with experiences of some sort. From such a position it seems an easy thing to go further and to maintain that all existence is psychical existence, and that we must always remain within the charmed circle of sensations and ideas. I may say frankly that for years this seemed to me the only road for the philosopher to follow.

Yet it is a road that appears to be condemned by the actual procedure of common sense and of science. *Things* are not treated like *sensations* by either of the two. We may deal with the subjective in both, and sometimes we do so. But we can also deal with the objective in both, and we constantly do so. A careful

analysis shows, I believe, that our procedure is in each instance justified.

There are such things as sensations ; they are not to be confounded with physical things ; and, as a matter of fact, we do not confound them with physical things. And since physical things and sensations are different—since the external world is not to be confused with the psychical experience of any one—it may be absurd to speak of the latter as theoretically infinitely divisible, while it is not at all absurd to talk in this way of the former.

GEORGE STUART FULLERTON.

VI.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

Studies in Humanism. By F. C. S. SCHILLER, M.A., D.Sc., Fellow and Senior Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. London: Macmillan & Co.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1907, Pp. xv, 492.

WHAT is most distinctive of Mr. Schiller's philosophical position is his view of the part played by subjective activity in the development of Knowledge. This is concentrated in his assertion that the individual mind *makes* truth and does not merely find or discover it. If we inquire in what way truth is made by our agency, we find that the doctrine of the making of truth presupposes a peculiar view of the nature of truth, and that this, again, rests on a certain conception of the nature of the original data furnishing the initial material on which our mental activity operates. Such data, considered in abstraction from the work of the mind, constitute what Mr. Schiller calls 'primary reality'. Primary reality, being a presupposition of the mind's activity, cannot itself be ultimately created by that activity. We can give no account of it except that we find it immediately presented in our experience. As having this character of immediacy, the content of primary reality may be said to consist of *facts*, and the advance of Knowledge may, in this sense, be said to proceed upon a factual basis. So far, Mr. Schiller seems to be affirming only what is familiar and commonplace. But at this point, he takes a new departure leading to startling results. He proceeds to point out that though primary reality is factual as consisting of original data which we do not make but merely find ready made, this does not justify us in identifying it with fact in the ordinary sense in which we contrast fact with fiction. On the contrary, primary reality includes impartially both fiction and fact, both what is true and what is false. The kind of being which belongs to it is merely presence to consciousness; it exists inasmuch as it enters into the experience of an individual mind. In this sense, what appears *is*, whether it be a true appearance or a false appearance. Seeing a match box, I may assume without hesitation that there are matches in it. That there are matches in the box is something which I believe or postulate and it must therefore be something present to my mind. On opening the box, I may find it empty; in that case I may proceed to say that what I believed or postulated, when I

thought that there were matches in the box, is *false*. But in pronouncing it false I presuppose its existence as a relatively original datum—a part of primary reality. Similarly what appears to us in dreams is in this respect on the same level with what appears to us in waking life. Whatever distinction we may make between dreams and waking experiences presupposes that both are immediately presented to consciousness; otherwise we could not compare and contrast them. But it is just this immediate presence which constitutes primary reality. Hence, primarily, reality is real in no sense in which a dream is unreal. It consists essentially of such stuff as dreams are made of. If we choose to call it fact, then “everything is fact *quâ* experienced, including imaginings, illusions, errors, hallucinations. Fact in this sense is anterior to the distinction of ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ and covers *both*” (p. 187).

Starting from this conception of “primary reality,” we find that the question concerning the nature of truth assumes a definite shape which predetermines its answer. The problem must be formulated as follows: What do we mean when we distinguish certain contents of primary reality as true from others as false? Plainly, we cannot mean that the true contents exist whereas the false do not. For the existence of that which is said to be true or false is presupposed as an original datum, whichever of these predicates we assign to it. It is equally evident that we cannot mean to assert the presence or absence of similarity or correspondence or any other relation between primary reality and something which is not primary reality; for primary reality, being all that is given as our original datum, we cannot compare it with anything beyond it, or make any assertion whatever concerning what is not included within it. The identification of truth with systematic coherence is also inadmissible. Two judgments P and Q are ordinarily said to be coherent when they are so related that if P is true, Q must also be true; similarly they are said to be inconsistent when they are so related that if P is true, Q is false. In this sense, the distinction of coherence and incoherence presupposes the distinction of truth and falsity; the distinction of truth and falsity cannot, therefore, be derived from it or identified with it. But if coherence be taken in any other sense, then, contents of primary reality, considered in abstraction from subjective interest and activity, are all equally coherent or incoherent. They are all on the same level as being simultaneous or successive appearances to the individual mind. What thus actually appears cannot be incompatible with anything else which actually appears simultaneously or successively. “So long as you do not care what appears, no course of events can be any more ‘contradictory’ than the shifting scenes of a kaleidoscope. Whatever appears ‘is,’ even though it lasts only for a second. Its reality, such as it is, is not impaired by its impermanence, nor by the fact that something else comes up and takes its place in the twinkling of an eye” (p. 220).

Mr. Schiller concludes (1) that the predicates *true* and *false* can

apply to nothing but primary reality, and (2) that they can have no application to primary reality when it is considered without reference to the interest and activity of the individual subject to which it is presented. If, however, we consent to take account of subjective interest and activity, it becomes possible to give a clear, consistent and satisfactory answer to the question: What is truth? We may regard the adjectives *true* and *false* as *valuations* expressing the satisfying or unsatisfying nature of the contents of primary reality. The distinction of true and false will thus be a special case of the more general distinction of good and bad. But it is only a special case which has to be defined and distinguished from other special cases. We have to determine what particular sort of valuation is expressed when we call one content of immediate experience true and another false. Mr. Schiller deals with this problem very carefully and conscientiously. In the first place, it is clear to him, that truth is not a primary but a derivative value. Unless we began by finding our experiences satisfactory and unsatisfactory, in other ways we could not appreciate them as true or false. Further, there would be no place for the distinction, if we found everything perfectly satisfactory. For, if this were so, we should simply acquiesce in appearances as they happened to occur, having no motive for accepting some to the exclusion of others. But, as a matter of fact, we are always more or less discontented with what we find at any moment and we are constantly striving to alter it. Our action in part takes the form of selective attention emphasising certain items of primary reality and ignoring other items. It also partly consists in imagining alternative possibilities in contrast to the situation initially presented. But if I understand Mr. Schiller aright such activity as this would not of itself be sufficient to generate the distinction between truth and falsity. This is essentially dependent on the endeavour to attain ends by the use of means—on what may be called distinctively *practical* activity.¹ Practical activity does not proceed blindly. It is its nature to be prompted and guided by appropriate contents of primary reality which are suggestive of special lines of behaviour issuing in the “unmaking and remaking” of our original or relatively original data. But no contents of primary reality as they are passively given suffice of themselves to determine practical activity. It is indispensable that besides being *given* they should also be selectively *taken* or “*accepted*” by the subject as the basis of his operations. As thus accepted they become “assumptions” or postulates which claim to be true. Their claim to be true is simply a claim to afford guidance which shall enable us actively to control the course of our experience—to predetermine the flow of primary reality in accordance with our needs and desires. Whether the claim is justified or not can only be determined by results. The proof of the pudding is in

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the eating of it. So far as our assumptions lead to practical success in the endeavour to control our experience, they cease to be mere claims and become validated claims. They have earned their title to be valued as true. Truth is the value which belongs to an assumption inasmuch as it guides to efficient action. On the other hand, falsity is the label which we attach to assumptions which lead to failure instead of success.

We are now able to understand precisely what is meant by the assertion that ultimately we make truth and do not merely discover it. The "making of truth" is a phrase which serves to give rhetorical emphasis to the distinctive features of Mr. Schiller's theory as contrasted with opposing views. But we must not take it too literally. The individual makes truth inasmuch as truth is throughout relative to his aims and interests and varies as these vary. In so far as an assumption is actually found serviceable for any purpose pursued by any mind in any phase of its development, the assumption is *to that extent* true. For other minds or for the same mind at another time entertaining other purposes, the assumption may prove more or less unserviceable and *to that extent* it is false. Again, it is we that make truth inasmuch as it is we that make *assumptions*. The contents of primary reality can acquire the value which we call truth only on condition that we accept them by our own act as the basis of our practical procedure. It is important to note that this act of acceptance or postulation always bears the character of a selection among possible alternatives. Hence it is always open to us when one assumption proves inadequate to make trial of another. We are limited here only by the limits of our imagination of possibilities. As experience advances, new prospects open out before us and our purposes become more comprehensive and far-reaching. Hence our working postulates require corresponding modification to adapt them to the altered conditions of their application. Old truths become relatively obsolete and have to be reshaped to meet new needs. From the later point of view the old truths are then re-valued as false, so far as they are then recognised as inefficient. But they are false only from the later point of view and not from the earlier. They were true once in so far as they fulfilled their function of furthering practical activity; they have ceased to be true in so far as they now fail to fulfil this function. Thus truth is not something fixed in rigid immobility independently of temporal vicissitude. It changes and develops as our needs change and develop. It is of our own making as being relative to our varying purposes and to our variable selection of working postulates. It is made by us in this sense; but in this sense only. There is another side to Mr. Schiller's doctrine, which it is very important to bear in mind, though he does not himself lay stress on it in this connexion. His whole account of the making of truth implies that the part played by the mind in the process is always of the nature of an experiment. But an experimenter cannot predetermine what the issue of his experiment will

turn out to be. The very fact that he is experimenting implies that in this respect he expects and desires a decision between alternatives to be imposed on him instead of being made by him. So far as the experiment leaves him free to choose between alternatives, it fails to fulfil its function. Similarly, when once we start with a certain purpose and a certain guiding assumption, the result is determined for us and not by us. We do not ourselves decide but only find by trial whether or not the guiding assumption will lead to successful control of our experience. To this extent, then, according to Mr. Schiller, truth is something which is imposed on us and which we desire and require to be imposed on us. Truth could not be made, were it not also, in this sense, *given*; any more than we could walk without anything to place our feet on.

The pragmatist view of the nature of truth is fruitful in consequences. It leaves no room for theories which have no discernible bearing on the process by which human interests move towards their own satisfaction. *A fortiori*, it condemns all doctrines which by their inherent nature tend to disable or paralyse human activity in the pursuit of its ends. Accordingly we find Mr. Schiller strenuously opposing all views which, in his opinion, render human agency illusory by treating the universe as completely predetermined irrespective of our voluntary activity. This is the ground of his advocacy of free will as against determinism, of his insistence on the reality of change, and of his uncompromising hostility to the doctrine which makes individuals and their doings unreal "appearances" of a timeless Absolute. Humanism must establish the reality of Freedom. And if Freedom is to be real there must be indetermination; the reality which is to be determined by our agency must be relatively indeterminate when considered in abstraction from our determination of it. Further, our choice must itself be real and not merely an outcome of other conditions; it must in its own right count as a factor in determining the course of events. If we inquire how far the determinable indeterminateness of the universe extends, Mr. Schiller answers that this can only be ascertained by trial, and that previous failure need never be regarded as absolutely destroying all hope of ultimate success. Hence our best working postulate is that the universe is "completely plastic". This means that even the most stubborn facts may prove modifiable by our efforts if we can only hit on an appropriate mode of treating them. Where there is life, there is hope, and we ought never to take up a final *non possumus* attitude. Of course, it is to be borne in mind that the reality of which Mr. Schiller is speaking, is ultimately what he calls 'primary reality'. It is this and not the Bradleyan Absolute or an 'independent' material world to which he attributes complete plasticity. It is an open question how far such complete plasticity is reconcilable with any other view of the original data on which the mind operates.

Mr. Schiller, then, condemns and he is bound by his principles to condemn all theories which seem to him irrelevant or hostile to the

progressive satisfaction of human needs. To all other claims to truth which have in any degree been validated by their successful application or which promise fruitfulness in the future, his attitude is one of cordial hospitality. In so far as they enable us or have enabled to control our experience in accordance with our needs, they are to be valued as true. In so far as they appear to yield a basis for new experiments in this direction, they are, at least, promising hypotheses. But even the most firmly established truths have no title to absolute finality. However efficient they may have proved and however wide, various and important, the interests which they subserve, they remain to the end only postulates for the guidance of action; they are, therefore, always to be regarded as liable to modification when they are confronted with requirements to which they are inadequate. Their truth is their efficacy as postulates and they are therefore always liable to be superseded by newer truths which are found more efficient.

The "independent" existence and operation of material things is a postulate which has been and is being verified in a superlative degree by its practical success. It is therefore rightly valued as an established truth. But this constitutes no reason for regarding its truth as different in kind from that of other truths which have not been so fully substantiated. In principle there is no reason for treating it as incapable of modification and improvement in view of other interests than those for which it has proved adequate. Like other truths, it is of our making and it may not be a completely finished product. If I understand Mr. Schiller aright, the making of it is supposed by him to take place in the following way. The individual finds given, as original data, certain appearances which include as part of their content the appearance of having existed before they were perceived and of being such as to persist after they cease to be perceived. These appearances of independence are, however, merely contents of primary reality and, as such, they are in themselves neither true nor false, being equally capable of becoming either. The same appearance of independence is present to the mind when we dream of a stone and when we see a stone in waking life. But the dream appearance is rightly condemned by us as false, and the appearance in waking life is rightly valued as true. The question at issue concerns the nature of the difference between the false appearance of independence and the true. According to Mr. Schiller, there is only one essential difference assignable. When the appearances of independence in waking life are accepted as postulates for the guidance of practical activity, they prove efficient in enabling us to control the course of our experience. Hence, they are valued as true, and because what it is postulated is 'independent' existence, they are also valued as *real*. On the other hand, dream appearances of independence turn out to be useless when we endeavour to apply them as working assumptions. Hence they are, for us, untrue and unreal.

Each of us, as a member of society, recognises the existence of other minds in social communion with himself. This is a pre-eminently successful postulate and it is therefore true in a very high degree. Indeed, it is of more fundamental importance, from Mr. Schiller's point of view, than the independent existence of material things. For, human purposes can in general only be achieved by human co-operation; but co-operation depends on mutual understanding and agreement, which imply the sharing in a common truth. Postulates can only be successful if they are accepted by many minds entertaining the same aims and purposes. Thus an assumption on the part of an individual which is rejected by the society in which he lives is a failure. In the long run he must either gain social acknowledgment for it or abandon it. Thus the validation of human claims to truth must in general take the form of a social validation. None the less, the recognition by each mind of the existence of other minds is itself to be regarded as having no other ultimate justification than its working value in enabling the individual to control the course of his experience. In the successful postulation of other human minds, we become, in the first instance, members of human society. The postulate then becomes of paramount importance as a controlling condition of the process by which other human truths are tested.

I have now given a fairly complete account of what I take to be the essential tenets of Pragmatism in the special form which Mr. Schiller gives to that doctrine. If I have in any respect misunderstood and consequently misinterpreted his meaning, I think that I must, at any rate, have expressed myself with sufficient relevance and distinctness to make it easy for him to put me right. In any case, failure to understand, on my part, will not be due to any want of lucidity in Mr. Schiller's exposition, but to my own dulness or to the inherent difficulties of the subject.

His doctrine, as I understand it, appears to me to possess a high degree of internal consistency. I do not affirm that it is entirely coherent; but the incoherence, if it exists, seems of too subtle and evasive a nature to furnish matter for profitable discussion. Criticism in this direction is likely to be confronted with serious difficulty in deciding whether Mr. Schiller's assertions are really inconsistent with each other or only with the preconceptions of the critic. The error of the system, if it be erroneous, is to be sought for rather in its initial assumptions than in the logical connexion of these assumptions with the consequences developed from them. Its Achilles' heel seems to me to be the conception of 'primary reality'. Our original data cannot consist in alternative possibilities capable of being either true or false. The factual element in what we call facts, in distinction from inference, assumption, hypothesis, theory, etc., cannot be of this nature. It must be immediately experienced in a radically different sense from that in which Schiller and James speak of immediate or "pure" experience. Disagreement on this fundamental question com-

pels me also to disagree more or less with nearly all Mr. Schiller's main tenets in the form in which he has stated them. The limits of space prescribed to a review debar me from detailed discussion either of this fundamental difference between us or of the further divergences which it necessitates. I accordingly reserve a full treatment of this topic for a future article in *MIND* in which I shall endeavour to develop my own positive view in contrast to what I regard as unsatisfactory in Mr. Schiller's position.¹

For the present, I shall confine myself to two criticisms. The first relates to Mr. Schiller's uncompromising polemic against the acceptance of propositions as self-evident or necessary *a priori*. He seems to assume *a priori* and as self-evident that all "a priorism" and reliance on self-evidence must necessarily be a peculiarly pernicious form of dogmatism. He seems to assume that in accepting a proposition partly or wholly on the ground of its self-evidence, we must, so to speak, regard it as impregably fortified within its own defences, and secure against all possibility of future correction or modification. There is here, I think, some confusion. It is one thing for me to affirm that a proposition is self-evident: it is quite another for me to affirm that I am an infallible judge of its self-evidence. But if I do not claim infallibility, there is no reason why I should dogmatise; there is no reason why I should refuse to submit what I take to be self-evident to further sifting and testing through its application within the growing system of knowledge and action. And the sifting and testing will have a two-fold bearing: it will be a sifting and testing not only of the truth of the original proposition, but of its supposed self-evidence. If the proposition is false, a fully satisfactory result is not obtained, unless the appearance of self-evidence is destroyed. It is not enough, that I should be externally reduced to admit that somehow or other it must be false, although I am still unable to understand how it possibly can be so. The testing process is not complete until I am enabled to see precisely why what I took to be self-evident is really not self-evident. One who thinks it necessarily true that dwellers at the antipodes must fall off the earth's surface, may have his conviction shaken or overthrown by the testimony of circumnavigators. But this is not of itself sufficient. He has not grasped the whole truth of the matter until he has been led to detect the inadvertence and confusion underlying his fallacious estimate of self-evidence. In general, Mr. Schiller seems to me to be mistaken in assuming that because all claims to truth require verification, they are therefore all initially groundless. Some may have grounds which subsequent experience will only serve to make clearer, and none, I should maintain, are in this respect absolutely arbitrary postulates.

My second criticism of Mr. Schiller's pragmatism is itself of an

¹ I shall also take the same opportunity to pay a debt which I owe to Mr. Prichard by showing the real purport of certain views of mine concerning presentation which he has failed to understand.

essentially pragmatic nature. I find a difficulty in the practical application of his theory which seems to indicate a radical defect in it. After close study of his work, the only interpretation which I can put upon his central thesis is that the working value of a postulate is not merely the sole test of its being true, but is virtually identical with its truth. Now, when I attempt to apply this doctrine to my belief in the existence of other minds in social communion with mine, I find myself confronted with a serious difficulty. The belief does indeed work admirably in enabling me to control the course of my experience, and thus ministers to my interests in the highest degree. But the most important part of its working value seems to be lost, when I seriously attempt to identify working value with truth. I am interested in my fellowmen as having experiences of their own in the way of perception, thought, emotion, desire, choice, etc. It is indispensable to this interest that I should posit "primary reality" as existing for them which does not or need not exist for me. My sympathy with my neighbour's headache presupposes that he is actually feeling it. But according to Mr. Schiller's theory, my belief in other minds might be as true as truth can be, even though there were no emotions, feelings, desires, purposes, etc., experienced by any one except myself. All that, in his view, is required to constitute truth, is that I should postulate experiences other than mine, and that this postulate should enable me to control my own experiences. The postulate would still be true even though I were merely dreaming of the existence of other minds, provided that it gave me a guiding clue for actively determining the development of my dream. On the same condition, it would be true if human bodies behaved as they actually do, without any connexion with guiding minds. Now it seems clear enough that so long as we continued in our fool's paradise, it would make no practical difference to us whether or not there actually existed experiences or "primary realities" other than our own. But what I wish to point out is that we can remain in our fool's paradise only so long as we abstain from the fruit of Mr. Schiller's tree of knowledge. When I clearly and resolutely treat the truth of my belief in other minds as virtually consisting in its efficiency as a guide to practical activity, then all which makes it most precious to me evaporates. My interest in others becomes a veiled form of self-interest and my world becomes cold, dull and heartless. Mr. Schiller would certainly be ready to abandon his own theory rather than accept this result of it. It would seem his pragmatism itself fails to satisfy the pragmatic test, and therefore requires modification and correction. He cannot, I think, consistently deny that he does identify the truth of a postulate with its working value. For this identification seems to underly his whole treatment of the subject. His theory of Knowledge proceeds throughout *as if* truth were merely working value. If he admits any other element in its constitution, he certainly fails to show what this element is or what

difference it makes. And according to Mr. Pierce's pragmatic criterion, this is equivalent to saying that he does not recognise it at all.

In conclusion, I would draw attention to certain vital points of Mr. Schiller's doctrine with which I find myself in cordial agreement. He seems to me to be quite right in insisting that theory of Knowledge is essentially concerned with "human truth"—that it is concerned with the distinction which we ordinarily make in daily life and in scientific inquiries between certain propositions which we recognise as true and others which we recognise as false. He is right also in maintaining that there is no true proposition recognisable as such by us which is not verifiable and no falsity which is not corrigible by its application to relatively new data. I agree with him, further, in the view that all adequate verification involves the successful use of propositions as postulates for the guidance of our activity. Truth must therefore be, in some sense, relative to our emotions, desires, purposes, etc. Finally, I am at one with him in his incessant protest against any form of doctrine which implies or suggests that the content of the universe and the course of events is entirely predetermined independently of our voluntary agency. If a broad acceptance of these general positions is sufficient to constitute pragmatism, I am a pragmatist. But I do not accept any of them in precisely the form in which Mr. Schiller presents them, and I therefore remain in doubt whether he would be willing to concede me the title.

G. F. STOUT.

The Theory of Good and Evil: a Treatise on Moral Philosophy.

By HASTINGS RASHDALL, Fellow and Tutor of New College, Oxford. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1907. Two volumes. Pp. xx, 312; xv, 464.

THIS work, dedicated to the memory of its author's two masters in ethical Philosophy, Thomas Hill Green and Henry Sidgwick, is professedly an attempt to formulate an ethical theory which, while deeply influenced by both, is more adequate to the demands of contemporary reflexion than the theory of the moral life which is to be found either in the *Methods* or in the *Prolegomena*. "Neither of the great writers to whom I feel I owe most in the special department of Ethics . . . can well be regarded as having said the last word upon the subject by students of a generation later who have profited not merely by the criticism which each of them supplies upon the other, but by the general progress of Philosophy since the first appearance of Sidgwick's *Methods of Ethics* (1874) and of Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics* (1883). Since the last-mentioned date the supposed easiness of this branch of Philosophy, or the superior attractiveness of Logic and Metaphysic, has led perhaps to

a certain unwillingness to write separate treatises on Ethics, at least among those who take what one may call a constructive view of the subject. But the period—almost a quarter of a century—which has elapsed since the death of Green has been a period of great philosophical activity, and (I venture to think) of great philosophical progress, and there has been much incidental treatment of ethical questions in the works both of English and of foreign Philosophers. There seems therefore room for a fresh systematic treatment of the main problems of Moral Philosophy in what I will venture to call (in spite of great differences both of opinion and of temperament) the spirit which animated both of them" (Pref., pp. vi., vii.). It seems a little strange to characterise the ethical work of recent German and French writers as "incidental," and in spite of his own disclaimer of "a more exhaustive knowledge of the literature bearing upon this and cognate subjects"—a knowledge, he suggests, which is not to be expected from a busy Oxford Tutor—the author knows enough of the foreign literature (German at least) to know that attention has been chiefly directed, on the Continent if not in this country, to the ethical aspect of the philosophical problem. But there will be general agreement that there is plenty of room for such an ambitious ethical undertaking as the present, and that the author's wide and thorough knowledge of the subject, his practical interest in the questions of Ethics, and his cautious and balanced temper of mind, promise much for the success of such an undertaking.

The work is divided into three Books, the first of which, entitled "The Moral Criterion," occupies the first volume, while the second volume contains Book ii., "The Individual and the Society," and Book iii., "Man and the Universe". It will be observed that the first two Books are purely ethical, while the third deals with the metaphysical implications of ethics. The relation of the second to the first Book is thus more particularly explained: "To arrive at a clearer and more definite conception of the Moral Criterion—a clearer and more definite answer than is contained in that common moral consciousness from which we must all start, to the question 'What ought I to do, and why ought I to do it?' will be the object of our first book. In the second book I shall enter at greater length into some of the current controversies connected with our subject, by the examination of which I shall hope further to elucidate and define the results arrived at in the first book. Most of these controversies may be said to centre round the question of the relation of the individual and the individual's good to society and a wider social good. I have therefore styled the book 'The Individual and the Society'." The division of topics does not commend itself to the reader as a very happy one. It would have been better, I think, to have included the controversial chapters of Book ii., on "The Hedonistic Calculus" and on "Self-realisation and Self-sacrifice," as well as the chapters on "The Commensurability of all

Values" and on "Moral Authority and Moral Autonomy," in the general discussions of Book i., and to have reserved Book ii. exclusively for the constructive consideration of the relations of Society and the Individual. The work would further have greatly gained in value, in my opinion, as "a treatise on Moral Philosophy" by the omission or condensation of much of the controversial matter (especially in those cases in which there is nothing new to be said on the controversy, and the controversy itself has really become antiquated, as in those of "Psychological Hedonism" and "The Hedonistic Calculus") and by a very considerable condensation of the argument in Book iii. This last Book seems to me much inferior in interest and value to the earlier Books. One feels, in reading it, that the author is retraversing ground which has been gone over again and again in recent years (in Gifford lectures and otherwise), and that he seldom, if ever, succeeds in throwing any fresh light upon the ultimate problems here discussed. In spite of the generous space which he allows himself, considering that he is writing an ethical treatise, and of the great amount of reiteration which the Book contains, the author is constantly reminding us of the limitations by which his argument is beset, and tantalising us by stopping short of the real *crux* of the problem. The space thus saved might have been devoted with great advantage to the discussion of some of the more concrete questions of individual and social morality. As the author himself says, "In the present work the treatment of particular virtues or duties has hardly gone beyond the limits of illustration. To give a more detailed account of the ideal of life—of the chief goods of life, their relative importance or their place in the good, and the main rules of action which conduce to the attainment of these goods, is, I believe, a task which falls strictly within the province of Moral Philosophy. It might even be contended that the very general discussions with which this work has been chiefly occupied are the mere Prolegomena to an ideal 'System of Moral Philosophy'." But in the present state of ethical science, there is no consensus even as to the Prolegomena. It is here that the purely theoretical or strictly philosophical difficulties of the subject lie, though it is after these Prolegomena are settled that the real difficulties for the practical ethical judgment begin" (vol. ii., p. 459). I cannot help thinking that there is a certain amount of consensus as to the Prolegomena which a writer of the present day is warranted in taking for granted, for example, the falsity of Psychological Hedonism and of Indeterminism, and that the more strictly all extra-ethical questions are excluded from an ethical treatise, and the more practical and detailed is the treatment of the ethical problem itself, the better will be the result from the ethical point of view. The author, however, holds out the hope that perhaps he will "some day be tempted to essay some fuller account of the practical ideal which to my own mind would seem to result from the principles which I have endeavoured to indicate".

One is conscious of a double purpose running through the work: the author is at once ambitious to make an independent contribution to ethical science and concerned to provide a text-book for undergraduate students. The work is, he admits, "on a larger scale than the books generally described as 'Text-books,' or 'Introductions,' and is occupied to some extent with difficulties and controversies which can hardly be called 'elementary'"; yet in writing it he has "had chiefly before his mind the wants of undergraduate students of Philosophy" (Pref., p. v.). The book bears unmistakable traces of the lecture-room, and the admirably clear form of the presentation should render it very useful from this point of view, while the difficulty which arises from its size and from the inclusion of so much controversial matter in Book ii. and from the metaphysical character of Book iii. might be overcome by the separate publication of the first volume, which contains the first Book alone. (The author himself suggests that "those who want a short and fairly elementary treatment of the subject might perhaps read Book i. by itself, or pass at once from Book i. to Book iii.") Yet there can be no doubt that this secondary purpose has affected injuriously both the plan and the execution of the work, and has in considerable measure diverted the author from the more important task of producing an independent treatise, while the latter ambition has so far asserted itself as to interfere rather seriously with the production of an ideal text-book.

Mr. Rashdall calls his own ethical theory "Ideal Utilitarianism," because "it combines the utilitarian principle that Ethics must be teleological with a non-hedonistic view of the ethical end," and holds that "actions are right or wrong according as they tend to produce for all mankind an ideal end or good, which includes, but is not limited to, pleasure" (vol. i., p. 184). Not that the good consists of various elements unaltered by their relation to each other. "We can give no account of 'the good' without breaking it up into various 'goods'; and yet no one element in the good can be unaffected by the relation into which it is brought in the consciousness of the person enjoying it with the other elements in that good. In particular, the value which is set upon the good will determines the kind of pleasure which can be regarded as good by the good man" (vol. i., p. 220). "It seems to me perfectly clear that the moral consciousness does pronounce some goods to be higher than others; and that at the head of these goods comes Virtue, while many other things—intellectual cultivation and intellectual activity, æsthetic cultivation, emotion of various kinds—are also good and of more intrinsic value than mere pleasure" (vol. ii., p. 37). This view has been widely held. It is the view of Plato and Aristotle, of "all the older English moralists, in whom Platonic and Aristotelian traditions were universalised by Christianity—the view of Cumberland, of the Cambridge Platonists, and (substantially) of Clarke. It was equally the view of the Moral Sense school." And now that

the malign influence of Kant has spent its strength, "on the whole there is observable a very general tendency to come back to the view of the older seventeenth-century writers, and to assert that Morality consists in the promotion of true human good, but a good of which pleasure is only an element. . . . If it is not the view of Hegel, in whom Moral Philosophy is practically merged in political Philosophy, it is at least the view of many who call themselves his disciples. And yet the system remains without a name. . . . We still lack a neat and recognised term to denote the view of Ethics which is at once teleological and anti-hedonistic. On the whole, perhaps, the term 'ideal Utilitarianism' seems the best that is available. Eudæmonistic Ethics might better serve to distinguish such a view from the rigorist or ascetic theory which refuses even to include pleasure in its conception of the end; but (through the persistent misrepresentation of certain writers) the term Eudæmonism has become too much confused with Hedonism to be wholly free from ambiguity" (vol. i., pp. 216-218).

The present reviewer, who has persistently used the term "Eudæmonism" to describe a view essentially similar, without experiencing the inconvenience referred to, is perhaps too deeply committed to the general view here advocated to judge its merits and demerits quite impartially, but the author differs sufficiently from other representatives of the theory to enable us to signalise the nature of these divergences. In his anxiety to avoid what he calls "the 'self-realisation' doctrine of our ethical exquisites," a doctrine against which he brings all the stock objections (Book ii., ch. iii.) and which he misunderstands and misrepresents no less fatally than the late Prof. Sidgwick in his *Lectures on Green*, he comes very near stating a doctrine which does not escape the vices of a mechanical and institutional account of the various elements in the good. It is assumed, indeed, that these various elements or "goods" are ultimately reducible to the unity of *the* good, that our several judgments of moral value can be harmonised in a single judgment of moral value. But inasmuch as their unifying principle remains undiscovered, each of these judgments is accepted as (for us) an ultimate and inexplicable deliverance of the moral consciousness, to all intents and purposes an intuition of the moral sense or individual conscience. "Such formulæ as 'activity for the sake of activity' or 'self-realisation' spring from an unwillingness to admit the simple, ultimate, and unanalysable character of the idea of good, without the admission of which there can be no such thing as Morality. The contents of our moral consciousness cannot be translated or paraphrased into any language which does not contain the word 'good' or its synonym" (vol. ii., p. 106). The result is a scheme of "lower" and "higher" goods, which *remain* lower and higher, in spite of the admission that the worth of each element in the good is determined by its relation to the other elements or to the good as a whole. "The vast majority of those states of consciousness to

which we attach value . . . appeal to our higher and to our lower nature at the same time. . . . The lower kind of satisfaction often depends upon and arises from our consciousness of the highest kind of value" (vol. ii., p. 56). But in that case can it any longer be properly described as a "lower kind of satisfaction"?

Closely connected with this defect is the account of the place of pleasure, which remains merely one among other goods or elements of good. "It is true that pleasure is an element in every state of consciousness to which we can assign ultimate value. . . . Even with regard to Virtue, it is difficult to answer the question whether I should judge Virtue to possess value, if it gave me no sort of pleasure or satisfaction. . . . Pleasure is an element in everything to which we attach value" (vol. ii., pp. 37, 38). It would surely be more adequate to say that satisfaction or pleasure is our *sense* of value; that, instead of being one of a series of goods, it is their common mark or criterion, the quality by which we apprehend their value, while at the same time it is not dissociated from the rest of our nature, and its reports of the comparative moral value of different activities are more or less trustworthy as the judgments of reason become the judgments of sensibility, as we learn to find our pleasure in the right objects or in those activities in which the true or rational self is realised. As Aristotle would say, that which gives pleasure or satisfaction to the good man is good, and is known to be good because it gives the good man satisfaction.

In general the theory leaves one with the unsatisfactory impression of a miscellaneous assortment of "goods" rather than that of a unitary good or system of goods. It is not only as regards the relation of virtue to pleasure, but as regards the relation of the so-called "higher" to the so-called "lower" goods and more particularly the relation of what Aristotle calls "theoretic" to "practical" good, that one is conscious of this defect. The ultimateness and inexplicableness of the several goods or values leaves us necessarily without a theory of their mutual relations, without any common measure of moral value. The same defect attaches to the account of the relation of individual to social good. It is good to act benevolently, to sacrifice one's own individual good or pleasure; but the latter also is good, and stands in no organic relation to the former good.

But Mr. Rashdall's point of view will be made clearer by following in greater detail his own method of reaching it, by considering the truth and the error contained in the opposed theories of Utilitarianism and Intuitionism or Rationalism. Having disposed of the older, or simply hedonistic, form of the Utilitarian theory in his discussion of "Psychological Hedonism" (Book i., ch. ii.), he makes Sidgwick's theory of "Rationalistic Utilitarianism" the subject of more special and searching examination (ch. iii.), arguing that "the acceptance of rationalistic Hedonism kills and eradicates all those impulses upon which it has to depend for the practical fulfilment of

its own precepts, by pronouncing that they have no true worth or value—no less so than Mill's Associationist explanation of the love of Virtue as due to a psychological confusion and muddle-headedness comparable to that of the miser. . . . The whole force which makes Reason appeal to men as deserving of respect it derives from that conviction of the intrinsic value or goodness of rational conduct which Reason, as interpreted by Sidgwick, pronounces to be illusion" (pp. 58, 59). Sidgwick's misunderstanding of the idealistic theory of good is also well exposed. "The important point to insist on is that, when we pronounce character to have value, we are just as emphatically as the Hedonist pronouncing that it is in actual consciousness that value resides, and in nothing else. It is the actual consciousness of a man who loves and wills the truly or essentially good and not mere capacities or potentialities of pleasure-production . . . which constitutes the 'goodness' or 'virtue' which is regarded as a 'good' or 'end in itself' by the school which Prof. Sidgwick is criticising. A 'virtue' or 'faculty' is, of course (as Prof. Sidgwick urges), a mere abstraction, but only in the sense in which pleasure is an abstraction also. . . . No doubt the self cannot be regarded as having value when abstracted from the successive conscious states in which it manifests itself, but it is equally impossible to estimate the value of the conscious states in entire abstraction from the permanent self which is present in all of them" (p. 65, text and footnote). "To ask what is the ultimate good of man apart from his knowledge of the 'objective relations' in which he stands to the world and to his fellow-men is really to ask what *would be* the good for man if he were a mere animal" (pp. 68, 69). Mr. Rashdall's statement of the result of this examination of Rationalistic Utilitarianism suggests the criticism already made upon his own theory: "We have felt compelled by the very considerations that led us to regard the preference of other people's well-being to our own as rational, to treat such a preference on our part as intrinsically better even for ourselves. We have in fact (with Kant) recognised the existence of two *prima facie* rational ends—Virtue and Happiness, the latter being treated as part of the true well-being of man only in so far as is consistent with the predominance of Virtue" (p. 71).

The discussion of Intuitionism (ch. iv.) is excellent, and offers no ground for criticism. An important distinction is drawn between the "intuitive" and the "infallible" character of our moral judgments ("Self-evident truths are not truths which are evident to everybody"); but the summing up of the truth and error in the theory is again significant for the author's own view. "What then is the difference between the intuitions which we have rejected and the intuitions which we have felt ourselves compelled to accept? The intuitions of the Intuitionist are supposed to lay down invariable *rules* of conduct; the *a priori* or immediate judgments which we have admitted relate to *ends*, to the relative value of different

elements in human Well-being or *εὐδαιμονία*. In other words the intuitions of the Intuitionist disregard consequences; ours relate precisely to the value of different kinds of consequence. The Intuitionist pronounces intuitive judgment upon *acts*; our intuitions relate to *ends*; his take the form 'this is right,' ours always the form 'this is good'. . . . The old intuitive rule of Veracity is supposed to say, 'Do not lie under any circumstances whatever': our judgment of value gives us only 'Truth-speaking is good; lying is bad'. And the moment the intuitive or *a priori* truth is put in this new form, the irrationality and unworkableness of the old intuitional system disappears. We are not forbidden to calculate consequences. Certainly we must trace the bearing of an act upon universal Well-being; but in our *εὐδαιμονία* truth-speaking, or rather the truth-speaking or truth-loving character, finds a place. . . . It remains true that truth is good, and speaking an untruth an evil; but like other goods, truth may have to give way to greater goods; lying is always an evil, but it may be the less of two evils" (pp. 91, 92). The result of the discussion up to this point is that "the true criterion of Morality is the tendency of an act to promote a Well-being or *εὐδαιμονία* which includes many other good things besides pleasure, among which Virtue is the greatest. The value of these elements in human life is determined by the Practical Reason intuitively, immediately, or (if we like to say so) *a priori*. All moral judgments are ultimately judgments as to the intrinsic worth or value of some element in consciousness or life" (p. 93).

The idea of Duty thus emerges as the central element or category of the moral consciousness. The author agrees with Sidgwick as to the ultimateness and unanalysableness of the idea of moral obligation. "There is implied in every ethical judgment the idea that there is something which is intrinsically good, which it is reasonable to do, which is right, which ought to be done. These different modes of expression I regard as alternative ways of expressing the same unanalysable idea which is involved in all ethical judgments—as much in the Utilitarian's judgment that he ought to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number as in the Idealist's judgment 'I ought to aim at the greatest Virtue or Perfection for myself or for others'" (p. 102). The next chapter (v.) is accordingly devoted to an examination of the Kantian theory of Duty, and is entitled "The Categorical Imperative". Though the discussion forms an important stage in the general argument, and contains some excellent statements, it must be said that the chapter, as a whole, is one of the least satisfactory in the ethical part of the work. The criticism of Kant proceeds upon the familiar lines, and is far from convincing. The author holds that Kant "assumed that out of this bare idea of a categorical imperative, without any appeal to experience, he could extract a moral criterion, *i.e.*, that he could ascertain what is the actual content of the Moral Law, what in detail it is right to do" (p. 108). In the idea of duty, according

to Kant, "we are presented with a form which needs no filling up from experience, a form which is (so to speak) its own content" (p. 109). The appeal to experience is "an appeal which our categorical imperative was intended by Kant to exclude" (p. 112). Kant attempted "to extract out of the bare form of the Moral Law a knowledge of the particular actions which are right or wrong" (p. 113). "All his difficulties arose from the attempt to give a meaning to, and to find a content for, this idea of 'right' without appealing to the idea of 'good'" (p. 135). Now it is obvious that the thesis "that without any appeal to experience we can get at the content as well as the form of the moral law, can easily be shown to be a pure delusion" (p. 109); that, in any of its formulations, the categorical imperative "is too vague to be really of any use as a moral criterion without knowledge of a kind which cannot be extracted out of the formula itself" (p. 131); and that "we must cast to the winds the whole of his elaborate attempt to get at the details of conduct without appeal to experience or calculation of consequences, and to exhibit that good will as actuated by the mere form of a universal law without any regard to the content or matter of it" (p. 134). But the previous question remains, whether Kant was in reality the victim of this delusion, whether he did really attempt this impossible feat, and it is difficult to understand how any unbiassed reader of the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* could attribute to its author such an absurd position. Take, for example, such a statement as the following: "All the matter of practical rules rests on subjective conditions, which give them only a conditional universality (in case I *desire* this or that, what I must do in order to obtain it), and they all turn on the principle of *private happiness*. Now, it is indeed undeniable that every volition must have an object, and, therefore, a matter; but it does not follow that this is the determining principle, and the condition of the maxim. . . . Thus the happiness of others may be the object of the will of a rational being. . . . The matter then of the maxim may remain, but it must not be the condition of it, else the maxim could not be fit for a law" (Abbott's transl., p. 123). The categorical imperative does not itself suggest specific courses of conduct; it is not the criterion which determines right conduct in detail, or tells us *what* we ought to do. It merely decides whether a given course of conduct is fit to be pursued by a moral agent, or *how* we ought to act. It determines the spirit of right action, the true relation of reason to sensibility; but that it presupposes an empirically determined situation is evident from all the illustrations given by Kant himself. It is preposterous to say, as Mr. Rashdall does, speaking of the Caliph Omar's order that the books in the Alexandrian library should be burned, that "the consistent Kantian, *i.e.*, a disciple of Kant in his most logical but least rational moments, ought to be able to say whether they should be burned without knowing what sort of books they were or even that they were books

at all" (p. 137). Nor is it easy to comprehend how he allows himself to say that "Kant nowhere explains the relation in which the three rules [or statements of the categorical imperative] are supposed to stand towards one another" (p. 109, footnote).

Yet the contribution which the Kantian theory of duty makes to a sound ethical theory is admirably stated in the concluding pages of the chapter. "Love of any particular good object is always liable to interfere with the promotion of some other, and, it may be, more important good. . . . Now duty means, as we have seen, precisely devotion to the various kinds of good in proportion to their relative value and importance. No one then can be trusted at all times and in all circumstances to attribute to each good precisely its proper degree of worth in whom there is not strong devotion to that supreme good in which all others are summed up. It is not necessary that a man should make the sense of duty the sole motive of all his conduct, provided it is always ready to inhibit an action the moment he sees any reason for believing that it is contrary to his duty" (pp. 125, 126). "Goodness in the narrower moral sense—the right direction of the will—is itself the greatest of goods, and must always be paramount in the ideal man; but the ideal man will care about many other things besides the right direction of his own and other people's wills—knowledge, beauty, particular persons, social intercourse, various pleasures in proportion to their intrinsic value. It is scarcely possible that he should acquire this habitual right direction of the will without more or less consciously thinking of it; but, in so far as he does come to love the things prescribed by Reason, respect for duty as such will tend to pass into a sense of the relative value of the goods which he loves, and to lose that abstractness, and also that sense of constraint and obligation, which are elements in the sense of duty as understood by Kant and his followers. At bottom the sense of duty is the due appreciation of the proportionate objective value of ends. In this sense alone is the 'feeling of obligation' an ultimate and indispensable element of the moral consciousness" (p. 128).

The exaggeration of the rationalistic element in the moral consciousness leads to the "moral sense" or "conscience" theory of ethics, which is carefully examined in chapter vi., "Reason and Feeling," in which the failure of the moralists of this school to account for the objective significance of our moral judgments, as well as the inadequacy of the theory to account for the actual content of these judgments, are clearly shown. "When certain states of feeling appear to be selected for approval or condemnation by a kind of instinct which can give no further account of itself, these are, in so far as they persist after the fullest reflexion, not merely isolated feelings of approval or disapprobation such as the deliverances of the Moral Sense are sometimes supposed to be, but feelings which are elements in a single, interconnected, articulated ideal of human life" (pp. 157, 158). The author adds an instructive Note

on the Æsthetic Judgment, bringing out the parallel between it and the moral judgment.

It is only possible to call attention to the important chapters on "Justice" and "Punishment and Forgiveness," with which Book i. closes, and to the excellent account given of "Vocation" and "Moral Authority and Moral Autonomy," in chapters iv. and v. of Book ii. My reasons for not following the author into the metaphysical discussions of Book iii. have been already indicated; I should like, however, to acknowledge the merits of the discussion of the Evolutionary theory of Ethics in chapter iv.

Dr. Rashdall's interpretation of Kant has been challenged earlier in this notice. I cannot close it without a reference to two other cases of doubtful interpretation of important ethical positions. We are told (vol. ii., p. 74) that Plato, "while recognising the moral usefulness of the combative instinct (*τὸ θυμωίδες*) as the ally of Reason against the lower passions, did not see that these too were capable of being, and ought to be in various degrees, educated and guided by Reason, instead of being merely crushed and suppressed". How can this doctrine of the "suppression" of "the lower passions" be reconciled with the Platonic idea of justice or complete virtue as consisting in "the doing of its own proper work by each of the inward faculties"? Again, the author says that Aristotle "assumed that the imperfectly virtuous acts by which the habit of virtuous action was formed would be done from some non-moral motive. How the repetition of a series of acts influenced by *wholly* non-moral motives would result in a habit of acting from moral motives, of doing the virtuous act for its own sake, is never satisfactorily explained; that is the great hiatus of Aristotle's ethical system" (vol. ii., p. 79). But did not Aristotle believe in degrees of virtue, and hold that "imperfectly virtuous acts" were done not from "*wholly* non-moral motives" but from motives *incompletely* moral or rational?

JAMES SETH.

Pragmatism, a new name for some old ways of thinking:¹ *Popular Lectures on Philosophy*. By WILLIAM JAMES. Longmans, Green & Co., London, New York, Bombay and Calcutta, 1907 Pp. xiii, 307.

THE readers of MIND will hardly expect from the present reviewer anything else than whole-hearted appreciation of one who is avowedly his leader. But the distances of a far-extended battlefield may at times compel the most loyal lieutenant to take upon himself the

¹ A Review of Prof. James's *Pragmatism* from a different standpoint will appear in the next number of MIND.—EDITOR.

responsibilities and risks of an independent initiative, while the choice of tactics naturally depends somewhat on the requirements of the controversial situation. It may, therefore, add to the interest and conduce to the clearing up of this situation to consider in this review (I.) how far the methods of Prof. James's book are suited to the rigours of our philosophic climate, (II.) what are the novelties which it contributes to the growth of Pragmatism and what is their significance, and (III.) whether Prof. James anywhere takes up positions into which his adherents may hesitate to follow him.

I. As is avowed in the title and as befits Lowell Lectures, Prof. James's book is thoroughly popular, in the best sense of the term. It is, in other words, a book which all can understand, and all but the most fanatical of intellectualists can enjoy. On both these grounds it is a book which no educated man should fail to read. It is popular in the sense of being lucid and well-written and well-composed. It never long pursues an abstract train of thought without illuminating it with concrete illustrations and relieving it with delicate touches of humour. It always approaches the steeper portions of its route by a series of most subtly graduated steps. But it is emphatically *not* popular in the sense of using unsound arguments or of failing to drive its point home. Hence it forms probably the best book ever written for the purpose of arousing interest in philosophic questions. And yet its culminating portion (the sixth and seventh lectures) really forms a most masterly exposition of what was (until now) perhaps the obscurest and most difficult aspect of the Pragmatist position, and gives the completest reply to most of the stock objections.

Prof. James's method, however, is by no means controversial, and so is the better adjusted both to the American taste and to the American situation. For though in that country the rise of Pragmatism has been attended by vast clouds of criticism, this polemic has always been of a curiously loose and general character. Hence only those who have followed the controversy very closely will fully appreciate how urbanely Prof. James disposes of misrepresentations, how deftly his rapier punctures wind-bags and how gracefully he evades the air-beating of stationary windmills in his almost quixotic crusade against intellectualism. How for example could the idolatry of abstractions be either hit off or shown up more happily than by this quotation from the "biography of an eminently rationalistic mind"? "It was strange that with such admiration for beauty in the abstract, my brother had no enthusiasm for fine architecture, for beautiful paintings, or for flowers" (p. 229).

II. But of course Prof. James is well aware that the struggle between intellectualism and humanism must be decided by the closest and most strenuous reasoning, and accordingly he propounds a number of new and weighty arguments, of which the following seem particularly worthy of attention.

(1) He makes it abundantly plain that the pragmatic objection

to the 'copy' or 'correspondence' view of truth refers *only* to the alleged relation of truth to a *transcendent* original, and that there are plenty of 'copyings' and 'correspondences' *within our experience*, which are pragmatically unexceptionable. This is not perhaps an advance on Prof. Dewey's original intention, but it is an important service to have it made quite obvious that truth cannot depend on any but immanent 'agreements,' and that no appeal to 'correspondences' or 'agreements' which are *immanent* can possibly form a defence of the *transcendent* correspondences which both the realist and the absolutist positions have been found to involve.

(2) Prof. James has advanced beyond any other pragmatic writer up to date in illustrating and explaining how Pragmatism conceives the condition of *potential truth*, truth, that is, which is not in use, but merely stored up in the mind as a reserve wherewith to meet the situations which emerge in our life. It would appear that just as objects of sense-perception are never wholly perceived at any one moment, so in the whole body of Truth as it exists at any time for any mind only a small part is actually undergoing verification at any one time. The rest remains *verifiable* and may be called potentially 'true'.

It is easy to see what a light this throws on the origin of the disagreement between the rationalist and the pragmatist. The former regards the 'potential' condition as the proper, normal and typical condition for a 'truth' to be in: the latter protests against such an abstraction from purpose and insists that when we put a truth into "cold-storage in the encyclopedia" we do so with the intention of taking it out again and using it, contending that no truth can be thus stored up indefinitely without undergoing deterioration. It is expedient, he would say, that potential truths should still rank as 'true' even when they have joined the reserves; but they do not really remain efficient or 'verifiable,' unless they are from time to time called out for active service.

On the other hand there is no essential connexion between verifiability and verification for what one would like to call the rationalistic theory of Truth, if only it were more than an attempt to deny the pragmatic interpretation of the common-sense notions on the subject. Hence it follows that on this theory the existence of *unverifiable* truth must be conceded, and even insisted on. This again will be found to imply the assertion of sundry unknowables and possibly other still more bizarre consequences, which need not now be dwelt on.

Rationalism, however, is apparently still in blissful ignorance of any such logical implications of its standpoint. Nay, it actually professes to believe that Pragmatism is not entitled to speak of verifiable truths!¹ The reply to such contentions need hardly go beyond a reference to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* ©. 3, which may also suggest

¹ Cf. the *Journal of Philosophy*, iv., 12.

the probability that such 'Megarianism' must end in the very 'Protagorean' perplexities which were alleged against the pragmatist.

Prof. James's way of posing his rationalistic critics, however, is simply to ask them how (apart from pragmatic motives) they can ever take a forward step in actual thinking and select out of the body of verifiable truths those which are actually asserted. "When shall I acknowledge this truth and when that? Shall the acknowledgment be loud—or silent? If sometimes loud, and sometimes silent, which *now*? When may a truth go into cold storage in the encyclopedia? and when shall it come out for battle? Must I constantly be repeating the truth 'twice two are four' because of its eternal claim on recognition? or is it sometimes irrelevant?" (p. 231).

(3) In illustration of the Pragmatic Method Prof. James adds considerably to the hints he has elsewhere given about his metaphysics. He shows that 'God,' 'freedom,' 'design' and 'pluralism' are all to be understood as pragmatic conceptions, and it ought to make monistic fanaticism thoroughly ashamed of itself to find how clearly Prof. James has been driven into 'pluralism' by the flimsiness of its arguments, and how easily and advantageously the notion of the Ultimate can be substituted for that of the Absolute (p. 159).

(4) It is clear, therefore, that Prof. James nowhere withdraws from any of the positions he has occupied, though he would doubtless think it churlish to grudge Intellectualism whatever consolation it may be able to derive from the fact that he freely speaks of 'theoretic' interests. But this is not a concession so much as an example of the psychological generosity of statement so habitual in him, which leads him always to view his opponent's position from the inside. For in the mouth of a pragmatist 'theoretic' interests are not, of course, things exalted above all relation to other human purposes. They are either individual fads or social recreations or in some other indirect way connected with the vital functions of society, and the only objection to the word 'theoretic' is that it may mislead those who use it into the false abstractions which divide the mind into a number of 'independent' 'faculties'. Still, if it is a comfort to any philosopher to continue to speak of purely 'theoretic' truths, there is no pragmatic reason why they should be tabooed, provided that their nature is thoroughly understood.

III. Prof. James shows this pragmatic toleration very finely also in his dealings with the religious aspects of Absolutism. He takes it as one of three great types of 'Weltanschauung' (the other two being the naturalistic and the pragmatic), which is intrinsically 'tender-minded' and monistic, and he strongly suggests that which of these three a man will adopt will depend ultimately on his own temperament. In both these contentions Prof. James is doubtless right, though he may be thought at times to overstate the pragmatic value of 'the Absolute'.

For example it is all very fine to depict the consolations of religious monism with such eloquence as this—"all are one with God

and with God all is well. The everlasting arms are beneath, whether in the world of finite appearance you seem to fail or to succeed"—and generously to admit that Absolutism is pragmatically true because it works religiously and that "when men are reduced to their last sick extremity absolutism is the only saving scheme" (pp. 292-93). And psychologically no doubt this is what many often feel. But what about the logical grounds of this feeling? What if it does not really save, but only seems to? What if doubts arise *within* this scheme of thought? What if it is doubted whether the One is 'God' any more than 'Devil,' 'spirit' as much as 'matter,' and whether it can secure its own reality except by the sacrifice and annihilation of all 'finite' appearance? After all there is a short and broad way from every monism to materialism or illusionism, as the history of all monistic systems shows. Where are the consolations of Absolutism then? Surely before we can be called upon to drug ourselves with them, it should be shown that they are rational and possible inferences from absolutist principles. Surely what is called in question nowadays is whether in the last resort Absolutism has the 'definite meaning' and religious value it pretends to, nay whether ultimately it means anything at all. But what proof of any of its cardinal assertions has ever been forthcoming?

The truth is that just as absolutist epistemology is cleft by a chasm which it recognises as 'the problem of Error,' so absolutist 'theology' is fissured by 'the problem of Evil,' and that the more Absolutism tries to reduce the one to the other the clearer it becomes that the other shatters its system. Either Error or Evil (and *a fortiori* both) are fatal to every absolutism. In practice no doubt it is true that monists bridge the gap by a mystic act of faith, and grasp the 'infinite' without abandoning the 'finite'. But this merely shows that in ultimate analysis Absolutism is a far more pronounced and desperate form of faith-philosophy than any Pragmatism which insists that the postulates of our faith must be verified before they can rank as fully true.

Similarly as regards the temperamental influence on philosophic options. That in view of the historic facts its existence must be admitted is plain—there is no other way of vindicating the sanity of philosophy in the eyes of men. There comes a point, no doubt, in all the great philosophic controversies, when both alternatives are seen to rest on sheer subjective choices which determine the whole course of the subsequent contentions. But this point has hardly yet been reached in the controversy between Absolutism and Humanism. The arguments of neither have yet been carried to their logical limits, and much 'skri' has still to be wearily traversed before the watershed is reached and the bloodshed can cease. It may be predicted also that when the logical implications of consistent and complete intellectualism are fully developed, it will lose its attractiveness to all but a very few minds.

It seems therefore somewhat surprising to find Prof. James con-

trasting the stability of the intellectualist's view with the 'restlessness' of the pragmatist's (p. 277), and describing him as "a happy-go-lucky anarchistic sort of creature" (p. 259). For close inspection shows that the steadfastness of the former is that of one stuck in a bog, while the mobility of the latter is that of one who has learnt to swim. It is true no doubt that until recently the expositions of the Pragmatic Method were of a very general and sweeping character. But the reason was simply that the reigning intellectualism had become so stagnant and intolerant that the right to be heard could be extorted from it only at the point of the sword. Hence it was necessary to postpone the application of pragmatic methods to the details of philosophic problems. But by this time it is plain that the pragmatic school has established itself all the world over and that it can more and more apply itself to the solution of outstanding problems. Moreover this was what it really aimed at all along, and what its criticisms really demanded.

When, for example, it inquired of intellectualism how it conceived the bearing of psychology on logic, of desires and interests on thought, of 'will' on 'reason,' how it found room for human purposes in its scheme, how it discriminated between 'true' and 'false' and what it took 'truth' to mean, how it related 'truth' to the 'good' and the 'real,' how it conceived the relations of 'reason' and 'faith' and the solution of cognitive problems, why it assumed associationism and apriorism to be the sole epistemological alternatives, how it deduced the Many from the One, or rose to the One from the Many, how it connected our truth with absolute, etc., what were these pragmatic questions doing but trying to develop perfectly definite and specific problems which intellectualism had been compelled to leave unsolved? Surely, if intellectualism were really the complete, noble, clean, rigorous system it popularly professes to be, is it likely that any one should have taken the trouble and incurred the obloquy of impugning it? In point of fact every fresh question which is raised on the pragmatist side reveals further incoherences in the ideal of 'coherence' and further confusions in those who cherish it.

And what after all is the position in which 2,000 years of intellectualism have left philosophy! Philosophy is reduced to the position of a common scold among the sciences, whose 'reflections' are mere vituperations which are ignored by the sciences it impotently rails at; it is hopelessly divorced from life, despised by men or suspected of secretly pandering to scepticism, alienated from religion, constitutionally incapable alike of advancing knowledge and of guiding conduct, helpless not only to realise its own ideals, but even to state them precisely and coherently. In short is it not baffled in all its undertakings and in every way discredited and dishonoured? Nay, in what respect does it really stand higher than in the days when Plato, the great systematiser of intellectualism, first deplored its status? The general endowment of education has no doubt resulted in the establishment of a number of professors of philosophy (*cf.* p. 100). But

these posts are possibly of greater benefit to the professors than to their subject, and it is to be feared that Plato, could he see them, would be as little impressed by them as by the 'bald-headed little tinker' of the *Republic*.

If such are the fruits of the *ancien régime*, what more can be feared from anarchy and revolution? But is it anarchical to declare that each man has the right, and the duty, to interpret his own experience, and to construct a philosophy adequate to that? Is it not rather a tardy recognition of human freedom and responsibility? And could it possibly seem anarchy to those who have fully grasped man's social nature and his desire (in philosophy also) to co-operate with others and to discover or devise a ground for common action? Surely, these are the fears of minds who either have the passion for obscurity or despair of rendering their pet convictions anything more than the esoteric doctrine of a few. It is impossible to believe that Prof. James really agrees with them (*cf.* pp. 51, 123): he has once more chivalrously understated his own case in the language of others, out of psychologic courtesy.

One more regret, and this review may close. It seems a pity that Prof. James does not employ the convenient distinction between 'making' and 'creating' truth. For the latter word suggests (what is of course sheer misconception and absurdity) that Pragmatism professes to describe the creation of truth out of nothing. Whereas of course creation out of nothing is no more observable by us here than anywhere else. But such things are, like the spots in the sun, merely enhancements of Prof. James's steady brilliance.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

VII.—NEW BOOKS.

Lectures on Humanism with Special Reference to its Bearings on Sociology.

By J. S. MACKENZIE. London: Swan Sonnenschein; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1907. Pp. vii, 243.

PROF. MACKENZIE's amiable, readable and interesting little book, composed of lectures delivered last year at Manchester College in Oxford, is hardly intended to be taken too seriously as a contribution to the very equivocal and ill-defined science yecept sociology, and it is much too popular, tentative and apologetic to contain anything much for the fiercest critic to fall foul of. Unfortunately, however, it also illustrates a chronic and apparently incurable failing of the philosophic intellect. Why is it that philosophers will not consent to keep to one definite meaning for their technical terms? Why do they insist on using them all in several senses? Why is it that a philosopher has no sooner tried to fix a definition for a term than the next one comes along and uses it in some other sense, near enough to be confused with the first and different enough to vitiate the arguments of both? In the other sciences respect for the sacredness of technical meanings is one of the first obligations inculcated on the student and constitutes a motive which only urgent scientific necessity and due notice avail to set aside. It is a curious fact, for which no reason is forthcoming, that this has never been the practice in philosophy.

And so one could not censure Prof. Mackenzie, if only he had succeeded in rendering clear the sense in which he proposes to use the new term 'humanism' and in showing that it can be usefully applied to the classification of philosophies. But in both these respects his reader has much difficulty in following his argument. He begins (p. 2) by contrasting humanism with 'naturalism' and describing it as "a point of view from which human life is regarded as an independent centre of interest". But of what philosophy could not as much be said? Certainly the crassest naturalism and the wildest supernaturalism are in some sense and degree interested in man, while the word 'independent' is far too ambiguous to limit the meaning. Prof. Mackenzie subsequently suggests that humanism is antithetical also to supernaturalism (pp. 12, 159, etc.), and that the fundamental idea of humanism may be taken to be that of end or purpose (p. 55). If so, he should surely have worked out precisely the implications of a consistently teleological view of the universe, and made it into his criterion for discriminating between genuine humanism and its mimics. As it is, he leaves a fundamental vagueness about his conception, and gets involved in endless difficulties. There is hardly a statement in his book, either about humanism in general or about the humanistic character of any historical philosophy in particular, which has not to be subjected to reservations or restrictions which often amount to its practical withdrawal. In the end we are told, *e.g.*, "that it seems clear that the opposition between supernaturalism, naturalism and hu-

manism cannot be accepted as an absolute one" (p. 160), and that the most adequate form of humanism holds that "the world is to be regarded as having a certain reality and importance of its own, but must ultimately be interpreted in relation to human life" (p. 187). It becomes necessary, therefore, to admit that "in this sense the term almost loses its more specific meaning," and "almost ceases to be opposed to naturalism," and that "we cannot really make any sharp distinction" between different forms of humanism; nor (we may add) of anything whatsoever. In short one constantly feels the need of clear-cut conceptions which are really applicable to the situation and can be consistently carried through.

When he comes to apply his notion of 'humanism' to the historical systems of philosophers, Prof. Mackenzie fares no better. Expressly and by implication nearly every philosopher exhibits at least "a thin vein of humanism" to his sympathetic imagination. But then *per contra* he can find no one (not even himself!) in whom the humanism is pure and unalloyed. The treatment of Spinoza may be taken as typical. On page 10 we are told that his demand that human life should be studied just as if it were a circle or a triangle is naturalistic. But it is at once suggested in a footnote that though this implies an absence of teleology, it is chiefly a demand for the 'dispassionateness' of mathematics. As if 'dispassionateness' and devotion to geometry were not both intensely human ideals, despite their pretty obvious inability to cover *all* the spheres of human interest! On page 40 it is suggested, however, that Spinoza "to a very large extent anticipates the humanism of the later German idealists, just as Berkeley does, but in an even more remarkable degree," but that "this element cannot be reconciled with the purely logical development" of his system. Lastly, on page 31, the secret of Spinoza appears to be that "it would perhaps be truest to say that he is a humanist who habitually expresses himself in the language either of naturalism or of supernaturalism"! The classifications of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Berkeley, Bentham and others similarly go astray.

Again, when it is applied to the questions actually under discussion at the present day, Prof. Mackenzie's 'humanism' speaks with a most uncertain sound. Not that his last lecture does not contain some decidedly suggestive remarks about teleology, time, evil, ultimate reality, etc. But they leave things pretty much as they were, and betoken an uncertainty which seems to be subjective in the author as well objective in his dicta.

Now is not all this very inconvenient? What has Prof. Mackenzie gained by so extending the technical use of 'humanism'?¹ Nothing, I fear, to counterbalance the damage he inflicts on the cause of clear thinking. Moreover his policy would seem to entail two grave disadvantages upon himself. His doctrine is sure to be confounded with that of humanists whose standpoint is more clear-cut, if less inclusive, than his own. And he is sure to be charged with attempting to steal their thunder. Neither result will be either welcome or just to Prof. Mackenzie, I should suppose. But was it necessary to incur them?

It seems a mistake, then, to try to make 'humanism' too inclusive. It excludes Naturalism on the one side, doubtless, at least as definitely as Prof. Mackenzie supposes. But it, quite as clearly, excludes Absolutism on the other. And this he has slurred over or failed to observe. It is, however, very important that there should be no mistake either

¹ His historical *right* to do so is not of course to be questioned. For the term was used as a philosophic description in this very journal some years before any attempt was made to define by it the generalisation of pragmatism.

about the fact, or about the grounds, of this exclusion. They are essentially humanistic, and form the essence of Humanism. Just because Humanism centres human interests in man, it must oppose a doctrine which regards man as an insignificant derivative from an Absolute which could dispense with humanity and so cannot, in the end, remain related to it. Just because Humanism is fundamentally teleological, it cannot in principle accept Absolutes which cannot be conceived as aiming at ends and exhibiting intelligence by choosing means. This is a perfectly clear issue. It means that Humanism *must* reject Absolutism because it cannot tolerate any dehumanising of the world which renders it impenetrable to our intelligence. Hence Humanism cannot think it an essential difference that the being which renders all human life and effort nugatory and unmeaning should be conceived, now as infra-human, now as supra-human. Now it is quite true that few absolutisms contemplate from the first the utter alienation from all human interests to which they are logically driven at the last. But while recognising this, Humanism insists that the consequences of Absolutism shall be thought out to the bitter end. For good intentions can hardly palliate bad logic, even in a rationalist's philosophy. The issue, at any rate, should be fairly faced. Let Prof. Mackenzie (or whoever else feels a vocation) construct, if he can, an Absolute which can have a purpose, and can really be related to man, or have any bearing on any human interest; and then, if he succeeds, he will find Humanism ready to welcome him. But until he has accomplished this, let not Humanism and Absolutism be spoken of in the same breath. Surely the challenge of Humanism has become so plain and clear that it is idle to ignore it.

A word of sincere appreciation, however, may fitly conclude this notice. Prof. Mackenzie has done good service by vindicating for philosophy the use of the term 'humanism,' and by ably exposing the absurdity of confining it to the literary reaction against medieval scholasticism. The scholars of the Renaissance were, no doubt, true Humanists (in the philosophic sense) so long as they were liberating human thought from the fetters of a pedantic theology. But they speedily evolved a new pedantry of their own, and their services scarcely justify the grotesque exaltation of pedantry which would restrict 'humanism' to the study of classical literature, or even, as Prof. Mackenzie well points out, in the tradition of the Scottish Universities, reduces the study of 'Humanity' to that of Latin!

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

Hypnotism, or Suggestion and Psychotherapy: A study of the Psychological Psycho-physiological and Therapeutic Aspects of Hypnotism. By AUGUST FOREL, M.D., D.Phil. et Jur., Chigny, Switzerland. Translated by H. W. ARMIT, M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P. London and New York: Rebman, Limited. Pp. xii, 370.

This is a translation of the fifth German edition of Dr. August Forel's *Hypnotism*. The first edition appeared in 1889, when as yet the use of hypnotism by medical men had not become a commonplace; the fifth edition appeared in 1905, and it contains a fair representation of all the leading discussions in the interval. In the first and second chapters, the author aims at placing his subject under large philosophical generalities. The standpoint is represented by: "Every purely psychological phenomenon possesses its physiological side—the movement of a material element in the brain. In one word, nothing is psychical without being at the same time physical, and, if we could observe the non-ego we should,

in all probability, find that in the same way nothing can be physical without being psychical" (p. 16).

Dr. Forel accepts Semon's theory of the mneme, the essence of which is that the susceptible substance of the organism is, before stimulation, in a state of primary indifference; after stimulation, in a state of secondary indifference. "If, after the stimulus has ceased, the susceptible substance of the living organism in the condition of secondary indifference shows permanent changes, Semon calls the action 'engraphic'. The change itself he calls 'engram'. The sum total, not only of the inherited, but also of the individually acquired engrams of a living being he calls its 'mneme'" (p. 4). The term 'ecphoria' includes the reproduction of the organic excitement and covers association, memory, "the physiological conditions of automatism, ontogenesis, phylogenesis, which are all psychologically recognised as introspective processes. Engrams are, therefore, ecphorised." This is another, and not inconvenient, way of figuring the well-known facts of organic memory. Other terms frequently used through the exposition are 'superconceived', 'hypo-conceived', 'super-consciousness', 'hypo-consciousness'. The term hypocoception covers such things as the dim consciousness of individual letters after one has acquired skill in reading. Of this the degree varies down to blank unconsciousness. The term is convenient. (Incidentally, one notes the unusual phrase "law of the preservation of energy," instead of "the conservation of energy," which is now the accepted English phrase. But the translation, though frequently yielding to German idiom, on the whole satisfactorily renders the original.) The author's views of perception, memory, and double consciousness, contain little that is not generally accepted; but the exposition is somewhat mixed up with general philosophical questions. In chapter ii., he goes somewhat more into detail regarding the relation of nerve activity to nerve substance and the conditions of consciousness. He gives considerable detail of the neuron and its activities. Semon's terminology (mneme, engram, etc.) is convenient for indicating complex results of stimulation, e.g., hallucination. Chapter iii. contains some historical facts on hypnotism, and discusses the Nancy theory of suggestion *versus* Charcot's. The criticism of the Charcot school is much to the purpose, although it is tinged with needless emotion. He regards Charcot's distinction of somatic and psychical as inconvenient, since all the conditions of consciousness are both somatic and psychical. Hysterical persons are unreliable and the most delicate, because the most unconscious, malingerers and comedians. They apperceive delicately by the senses and have at the same time very plastic imaginations, being thus at once suggestible and abnormally auto-suggestible. They are also inclined to catalepsy, lethargy and to fits (p. 61). On these grounds he maintains that Charcot's apparently constant sequence of stages was really due to hypnotic suggestion in hysterical cases, that is, they were really artificial creations, not true symptoms. Hence he does not allow that hypnosis is a neurosis. The Charcot school itself would now admit part of this criticism. At any rate, they would not dispute the range of suggestion. Chapter iv. enters into further detail about suggestion. The processes used and their applications are sufficiently described. Some excellent cases are given to indicate the conditions of amnesia, dissociation, negative hallucination, auto-suggestion, post-hypnotic suggestion, suggestion as to time, lasting results of suggestion, falsification of memory, etc. The historical case of Gottfried Keller is retold. It throws a keen light on the so-called lies of children. The author also discusses Vogt's views and pedagogical applications. This chapter runs to 125 pages and is the most important in the book. Chapter v. discusses suggestion and dis-

orders of the mind, including hysteria. "Hysteria is not a completely circumscribed clinical picture, but is a pathological symptom-complex or syndrome. The symptom-complex may be constitutional, or, more rarely, acquired; but both factors are not infrequently combined. This symptom-complex is characterised especially by a pathological dissociability (suggestibility and auto-suggestibility) in which the auto-suggestibility preponderates in the severer and more markedly constitutional cases. It is combined under numerous conditions with every form of psychopathic conditions" (p. 95). There follows a discussion of hysteria and the effect of hypnosis. Incidentally, the author declares that "we have never met with a single case of serious or lasting damage to the mental or bodily health, but have observed very many cures and improvements in illnesses in persons whom we have treated" (p. 197). Chapter vi. contains hints to the practitioner of suggestive treatment. These hints all bear the mark of careful and extended experiment. Many indications are given of types of disease successfully treated. Chapters vii. and viii. continue the same subject. These and the remainder of the book are almost entirely medical. Chapter ix. contains a very strong case of retrogressive amnesia, with protracted somnolence, analysed and cured by suggestion. This case deserves careful study. Chapter x. deals with a case of double consciousness. Chapter xi. discusses the question of the relation of hypnotism to medicine. There are some indications of a tendency to depreciate drugs unnecessarily; but on the whole the discussion remains scientific. Chapter xii. deals with the forensic aspects of suggestion. Chapters xiii. to xv. are somewhat in the nature of appendices on particular points. There is a short, but serviceable, index. The book is fully loaded with concrete material, and should become an excellent companion to any medical practitioner that wishes guidance in hypnotism. Incidentally, it offers some raw material for the psychologist as such.

W. LESLIE MACKENZIE.

First Steps in Mental Growth: a Series of Studies in the Psychology of Infancy. By D. R. MAJOR. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1906. Pp. xiv, 360.

The psychological study of childhood may be said to have passed through three developmental stages. First of all came the detailed description of the growth of the individual child: Preyer's classical work is, of course, the typical instance of this sort of work. There followed the period of generalisation, in which the separate life-histories of individual children were compared, with a view to the discovery of general laws: Sully's *Studies in Childhood* may be taken as an illustration. The third level is reached when child-study becomes explanatory, when its problems are formulated in scientific terms and approached by scientific methods: here belongs the best work of contemporary German investigators.

Prof. Major's book is based upon a record kept of his son from birth to the end of the third year. "Whatever interest or value the work may have must lie, mainly, in the record stripped of all theory and interpretation beyond what has been absolutely necessary for the presentation of a faithful narrative." In essentials, then, the work represents the first of the three stages just distinguished. This self-imposed restriction of the author's task is regrettable, since he might have turned his psychological knowledge and training to good account upon the generalising level (e.g., in a recasting of the psychological categories whose rigidity and insufficiency he more than once deplores), to say nothing of the further

work of explanation. Indeed, had he sought his parallels and confirmatory observations beyond the limits of the English language, he could hardly have failed to become interested in questions which he now passes without mention.

If, however, we look at what Prof. Major has done, rather than at what, in the present state of our knowledge, he might have done, the book must be given hearty commendation. Especially valuable are the chapters on the development of movements of hand and arm, on drawing, on the feelings and their expression, on the development of imitation, and on language. It is characteristic of the author's care and thoroughness that he distinguishes no less than fourteen stages in the process of the acquisition of language. There can be no doubt that "the data thus furnished will be of use to psychologists who may be engaged in the formulation of a theory of mental development".

P. E. WINTER.

Practical Health. By LEANDER EDMUND WHIPPLE. New York: The Metaphysical Publishing Co., 1907. Pp. vi, 316. Price \$1.50 net.

Mr. Whipple's special claim to distinction among "Mental Healers" is, it appears, his "Specific Image Treatment". Although a broad, general basis of health may be acquired along with "the general principles of metaphysical philosophy," extreme cases of disease require this "Specific Image Treatment," which consists in finding out "what particular thought-element the disease agrees with" and "establishing its opposite". The results achieved are said to be in the highest degree satisfactory, although the cases given do not seem to me very convincing. The whole science of mental healing, Mr. Whipple claims, is based on "a strictly spiritual philosophy of existence, involving a deep metaphysical process of reasoning and use of the thinking-powers". It is, beyond doubt, the poor and despised relation of highly esteemed philosophies. When Mr. Whipple says, "The real universe is composed of ideas. The *activity* of its 'ideas' is the *substance* of its 'things'"; when he rings the changes on health, and wholeness, and unity, and denies that things that change are actually real (pp. 174-5), we are reminded of certain aristocratic systems that never dreamed they could be made use of in any form, far less employed as a specific against diarrhoea. If Prof. James ever looks into this kind of literature, he can easily convince himself that Monism can have considerable Pragmatic significance. Nor must the upholders of Psycho-physical Parallelism adopt too superior a tone towards what appears to be the practical application of their theory. I would not be understood as merely making fun of Mr. Whipple. Occasionally I think him a little absurd, as when he makes mice die because those who experimented with them were thinking of certain diseases, and not because the bacteria of these diseases were introduced into the animals' systems; but I think he has considerable empirical data on which to base his hypothesis, and that the practices he recommends do as a whole make for health. Health undoubtedly "results from the thinking of right ideas" to no small extent. Mr. Whipple's book is not to me exactly inspiring, but the reading of it can do no one any harm, and it is full of good advice from which one might profit.

D. M.

Biographic Clinics (Vols. iv. and v.): *Essays concerning the Influence of Visual Function, Pathologic and Physiologic, upon the Health of Patients.* By G. M. GOULD. Philadelphia: P. Blakiston's Son & Co., 1906, 1907. Pp. 375, 399.

In notices of the first three volumes of these *Clinics* (*MIND*, xiii., 130, 432; xv., 271) the present writer has expressed the opinion that Dr. Gould has, in general, made out his case. The contention is, it will be remembered, that a good proportion of the nervous and especially the dyspeptic troubles to which civilised flesh is heir may be ascribed in the last resort to unrelieved eye-strain. The evidence which Dr. Gould adduces is derived in part from the life-histories of men distinguished in letters or science, and in part from current ophthalmological experience.

The present volumes bring further evidence of both kinds. In volume iv. we have studies of Balzac, Tchaikovsky, Flaubert, Hearn and Berlioz. The remainder of this volume, and the whole of volume v., are occupied with articles—constructive, critical and controversial—of a more technical sort. It is unnecessary to discuss them in detail. It may be noted, however, as a point of special interest, that the main sources of suicide are found by the author in venereal disease and the systemic effects of eye-strain. He is, perhaps, inclined to underestimate the force of heredity, and does not appear to have followed the recent advances in knowledge due to the application of biometrical methods.

E. B. T.

Esquisse d'Évolution Solidariste. Par GEORGES KURNATOWSKI. Paris: Marcel Rivière, 1907. Pp. 95. Price 2fr. 50c.

For this author history is nothing but a concatenation of successive emancipations to culminate in the complete liberty of the individual from all but self-coercion, and his present thesis is that Solidarity brings us nearer this goal than Socialism, of which he is a kindly but severe critic. He believes that many agencies will increase the class of autonomous producers, especially that electricity, delivered as a motive power to the home of the workman, will decentralise manufacture, thus doing away with the organised mass of workmen crowded round the machine driven by steam, which, he thinks, obsesses the constructive imagination of socialists. Their organisation of labour threatens to be the death-blow of individual liberty, but electricity will offer the means for a more effective synthesis of the collective and the individual spirit. Thus accepting the ideal of Anarchism, he prefers to call the result at which he aims Absolute Individualism, because he rejects the methods of Anarchism and insists upon the element of self-coercion. The growing solidarity of citizens and nations is a fact and the inevitable expression of the developing social consciousness. Already Peace is assured between countries republican in essence, and the peaceful federation of Europe is only hindered by certain despotic governments which will yet involve Europe in a final terrific conflict. Although relatively very weak in construction, this little book is worth reading. It is the work of a sensible, thoughtful man, and one remarkably free from prejudice. He has no idea that the absolutely free individual suffices for himself. He submits himself naturally to superior knowledge, and follows the direction of the most intelligent and noble characters, whose right it is to govern, and whose directions of themselves will ensure the obedience they deserve. A great ideal truly, but one wonders what is to effect the great change in human

nature which will ensure its realisation. Something more than electricity seems to be required.

D. M.

Les Raisons du Cœur. EDOUARD SCHNEIDER. Paris : E. Sansot et Cie., 1907. Pp. 288.

This book, although inferior in every way, is in much the same category as Tolstoi's account of his Religion, and explains how the author comes to accept the Christian revelation while separating himself from the Roman Catholic Confession, in which he was brought up, as well as from Protestantism. Full of doubts and repelled by the mere intellectualism of philosophy, he was driven back upon introspection which revealed to him results so delicate as to defy translation into the precision of intellectual language. He discovered that psychical truth, moral truth, religious truth are only different designations of a single and identical truth, which is the manifestation of God in our consciousness, and this led to the recognition of Jesus as the precise personification of our most intimate and elevated relations with God. Since the author regards the conclusions at which he arrives as purely relative to his own consciousness and disclaims any intention to impose them on others, we may refrain from enlarging on the weakness of the intuitionist position, and let the matter pass as a statement of one of the varieties of religious experience.

D. M.

Die Philosophie des Krieges. Von Dr. S. RUDOLPH STEINMETZ, im Haag. Leipzig : J. A. Barth, 1907. Pp. xvi, 352. Price M.7.

This mass of reflections, too unsystematic ever to have deserved the name of a philosophy of the subject, and itself the outcome of a philosophy with little to recommend it, nevertheless deserves to be read. If this were a political paper, I should have a good deal to say on the text offered by this book, but, fortunately, my present task is different. Dr. Steinmetz holds a brief for War. He is of opinion that its essential and eternally valid functions are : to preserve the division of mankind into states—the highest form of organisation of which it is capable ; to furnish each of these states with the best and only form for the application of its energy as a whole to some one end ; to be the occasion that calls forth the most extreme and the highest form of human exertion ; and, finally, to furnish a *Weltgericht* the judgments of which are beyond cavil or dispute. I confess to rather enjoying the criticism of Mr. Carnegie's plans and aspirations ; but, while as much convinced as Dr. Steinmetz of their immediate futility and possible mischievousness, that does not preclude a faith in the constant widening of the sphere of Law and consequent restriction of that of War. That the consequences will be wholly good is not, indeed, self-evident. It is well that some one should say boldly what there is to say in favour of War, as Dr. Steinmetz does, at a time when its claims are obscured by clouds of superficial sentimentality, or lost to view through failure of historical vision or lack of philosophical insight, and when its demands are shirked through ignoble ideals or sheer lack of manliness. War has played a great and not wholly evil part in shaping the destinies of mankind, and will continue to do so until a really efficient substitute for it, at present difficult to imagine, has been found ; but it is not quite rational enough to have the eternal reality our author ascribes to it. He has

much to say that is true enough, but good troops may enlist for a bad cause, and, being badly drawn up or led too far from their base, suffer defeat: and I think our author's arguments are in their case. He promised a dispassionate investigation of War; but you soon feel he has come not to bury Cæsar but to praise him. He is, in short, too one-sided. When he is investigating the disadvantages of War, he is really busy proving that they are no worse than those of peace. What is not clear is that we need have both—or either. He certainly hits the right nail on the head in insisting that, so long as the present division of mankind into states continues, there must be War. It is more difficult to follow him when he converts the argument simply and insists that there must continue to be War to ensure the division of mankind into states. Mankind, he insists, cannot be a state, therefore cosmopolitanism is all wrong and universal peace a silly dream, the realisation of which would be quite undesirable. Well, that is a big question. If a separate national existence is such a good thing, why should it ever prove a weakness, and why do we not see that we get more of it? Why do we submit to such clumsy aggregations as the modern state? Why are Bavarians and Prussians not leading a higher and a better life by cutting one another's throats at irregular intervals? Why does Scotland not again become a separate state at the cost of war with England? Why, for the matter of that, does the empire of Notting Hill not become an accomplished fact? And why, on the other hand, does the frenzied political life of Ireland just spring from its foolish fancy to be a separate state in impossible disregard of circumstances? It is quite plain that such an argument as Dr. Steinmetz's would carry one a great deal too far out of any foundation in reason or actuality. The peace accomplished within the bounds of the German and British empires shows that nations are capable of drawing together into vast communities the peace of which they feel it impious to disturb, and of drawing together into ever-increasing organic unity. Who shall put an end to such a process or mark its extreme limits? Just one remark in conclusion. As we have the author's word for it that he is incapable of mere national prejudice—a thing which leads to so much meanness, pettiness and spitefulness—we must ascribe his systematically disparaging and frequently offensive references to this country—and to this country alone—to his defects as an individual.

DAVID MORRISON.

Bericht über den II. Kongress für Experimentelle Psychologie in Würzburg, April, 1906. Edited by Prof. F. SCHUMANN. Leipzig: Barth, 1907. Pp. xviii, 266. Price M.9.

An interesting and valuable feature of this report is the series of reviews by most competent persons of the work done up to date in several departments of psychology. Külpe leads the way with an excellent critical account in 56 pages of the present position of experimental aesthetics. His paper falls into two parts, of which the first treats of the methods, and the second of the chief results of the experimental investigation of aesthetics. Krueger follows with a close and detailed discussion of psychological problems related to experimental phonetics in as many pages. The subject and its literature are treated exhaustively. Weygandt then surveys work on the psychological examination of feeble-minded children (12 pp.). Sommer discusses the relation between individual psychology and psychiatry in a very interesting manner (14 pp.). There are three problems which bring the alienist into touch with

psychology, namely, the need of a psychological account of pathological cases, the discovery of on-coming mental disease in the still normal state, and the question whether pronounced individual traits have in general any relation to the abnormal. These last two problems are set in relation to our present knowledge of mental disease. Last of all, Schumann discusses on broad lines the work and problems of the psychology of reading (30 pp.). The papers of Külpe, Krueger and Schumann must be warmly recommended to all interested in the progress of the subjects treated. They will be found very useful, the problems and the literature being most thoroughly handled.

Of the papers read at the Congress many have appeared or will appear in extended form in journals, but attention may be drawn to a few of the more important. Pfeiffer has developed a method for determining qualitative types of mind in schoolwork. It follows the line which Binet took in dividing writers into descriptive, explanatory, erudite and emotional types on the basis of written descriptions of given objects, but Pfeiffer's method is finer and more detailed. His results bid fair to be a most interesting contribution to experimental pedagogy, and to throw light on the development of the intellect and feeling in school children during successive years. Stumpf's paper on "*Gefühlsempfindungen*," which has appeared in the *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*, vol. xlv., marks an important stage in the history of the psychology of the feelings. A good case is made out for the classification of all feelings which are roused by peripheral stimulation and bear a reference to perceptual objects, as sensations. Four papers discuss experiments carried out at Würzburg in Külpe's psychological laboratory, and all four treat of problems connected with complex mental processes. Dürr has investigated the relation between voluntary action and association, while Messer has examined the functional and qualitative characteristics of the judgment process. Bühler, in referring to his work on complex thought-processes, justifies the distinction of a class of unitary mental processes—"thoughts"—not to be confounded with representations or unconscious excitations of such in any form. These thoughts are remembered, connected with one another, and reproduced in a way which precludes their reduction to sensation or feeling, or to these as qualified by certain functions. It is the "thought," or, as it has been called, the conceptual element in perception, etc., which gives sensational and representational elements any objective reference at all, and provides a basis for knowledge as a psychological state. Lastly, Schultze has investigated what may be called the effect-accent, that peculiar appearance which a line seems to have when it forms the basis of an expression in the drawing of a face, for example, and which it does not have when isolated. In close connexion with these four papers stands the work of Ach on the quantitative determination of the determinative strength of the instruction on the reaction experiment, or, in general, of the voluntary determination in relation to the associative basis brought into play by the situation to be met by an act of will, *i.e.*, by the stimulus. The determining power of the will is found to be enormously greater than that of the *ideo-motor* compulsion. This piece of work is likely to lead to interesting developments. These last five papers are significant of an important movement towards successful investigation of thinking which ought not to be overlooked.

Most of the other papers carry on familiar problems.

H. J. W.

Lehrbuch der Geschichte der neueren Philosophie. Von Dr. HARALD HÖFFDING, Professor an der Philosophie an der Universität in Kopenhagen. Leipzig: O. R. Reisland, 1907. Pp. x, 286.

Prof. Höffding takes advantage of the opportunity furnished by its translation into German to amplify, and in some respects to alter, the sketch of the history of modern Philosophy employed by him in teaching. In his modest Preface he expresses a sense of inevitable short-comings, but in spite of these his little book is quite successful in giving a valuable and graphic account of the development of European reflection from the Renaissance to the present moment. It is really astonishing how few links he has dropped, and how interesting and pregnant he manages to make even the briefest of his notices of individual writers. Notwithstanding his limited canvas he succeeds in presenting the great systems usually selected for detailed exposition in that historical setting in which alone they are really intelligible, and which is the best corrective of any tendency to a narrow devotion. When a full account is taken of an author's historical position he can never be made to descend upon our studies like the *Deus ex machina*. Prof. Höffding's synoptic vision begins to fail him with the close of the Romantic speculations, and he thereafter furnishes us with a rather slender clue to a labyrinth, but even to do so has entailed a mass of reading that is impressive and an amount of reflection that is possible to very few. He at least surveys the ground and guides to those writers from whom we may wish to learn. Prof. Höffding is, as always, almost more than just to English philosophy. His interest and appreciation is a standing reproach to any who may still tend to regard it as an evil tradition with which we must part. His book is furnished with a chronological list of the most important philosophical works.

D. M.

Der Intellectualismus in der Griechischen Ethik. Von MAX WUNDT. Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann, 1907. Pp. 103. Price M.2.80.

Students of Greek Ethics will find this a useful and interesting little work. The author traces the Intellectualism of Greek Ethics to three distinct sources which finally mingle in the mature ethical speculation of Plato. These sources are (1) what the author calls 'Homeric Intellectualism,' defined mainly by the antithesis between blind, impulsive passion and calm, deliberating, self-controlled reason; (2) 'Mystic Intellectualism,' which term covers everything from the occult teaching of the mysteries to philosophical speculation about the supernatural and divine; (3) 'Practical Intellectualism,' *viz.*, the value put upon skill, fitness for work, understanding one's business. Within each of these tendencies there is a certain development. Thus the author shows in a most interesting way how the originally psychological opposition between passionate impulse and calm reason becomes naturally an ethical opposition between wrong and right action; how the mystic intellectualist develops into Plato's dialectician and Aristotle's 'theoretical' man; and how finally the fitness for a craft becomes the 'virtue' of the citizen. The author then proceeds to trace very briefly how these three ideals of the calm and self-controlled man, the mystic sage and the skilled craftsman fuse into one comprehensive ethical ideal in the thought of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle—each laying different emphasis on different sides of the ideal. Finally, the history of this ideal in later speculation down to Neoplatonism is shortly outlined. The book may be recommended.

R. F. A. H.

Die Functionen des Zentralen Nervensystems: Ein Lehrbuch. Von Dr. M. LEWANDOWSKY. Jena, 1907.

Dr. Lewandowsky is a specialist for diseases of the nervous system and a physiologist who has had much experience of experimental interference with the central nervous system in the higher animals. Approaching his subject from these two points of view, he has written a clear and well-arranged account of the most important modern work done upon these two lines. The rapid progress of our knowledge of the central nervous system has been attended at every step by vigorous controversy and great differences of opinion on many fundamental points still obtain among the leading workers, while new problems keep coming into view far more rapidly than generally acceptable solutions of the old ones can be found. Unlike some of his active fellow-workers Dr. Lewandowsky discusses many of these problems with sound judgment, marshalling the evidence and holding the balance between the contending parties with a sure and impartial hand. The chapters on Aphasia and allied conditions are especially well done. The book may be strongly recommended to all psychologists, as being just the kind of physiological treatise they should read every few years.

W. M'D.

Het tegenwoordig Standpunt en de Beteekenis der Molekulairtheorie. By J. P. KUENEN, Rede bij de Aanvaarding van het hoogleeraarsambt aan de Rijks-Universiteit te Leiden, den 25^{ten} Februari 1907, uitgesproken. Leiden.

On the occasion of his recent installation to a Chair of Physical Science at the University of Leiden, Prof. J. P. Kuenen gave an inaugural lecture on the modern development and position of the molecular theory. He began by stating the case of the molecular theory as it stood some time ago, before the great discoveries of the last few years, and brought forward in its support the easy explanation of so many qualities of bodies in a fluid or gaseous state, and also, among other things, the recent advances of ultramicroscopic research. He then gave a short exposition of the main facts about radio-activity and its connected phenomena up to now discovered, which all served to bring the molecular theory into prominence again, after the reaction which some ten years ago had been in full force against it. The new facts not only supported the molecular theory but also extended it to the point of making room for different hypotheses in describing the building up of molecules and atoms out of still smaller particles, while at the same time they brought it into close connexion with the electro-magnetic theories of light and other phenomena.

The enormous advance which, in this way, has been made of late, ought not to make us forget that even by this advance the total number of unsolved problems has only been multiplied. It may be attractive to the human mind, it may even be the basis of all scientific research to try to bring all phenomena back to one common basis, and establish a theory which could explain them all, but for the present, Prof. Kuenen maintains, it would be unscientific to do so. Each class of phenomena still has its own theory, its own shortest and simplest way of describing them; and if we are to look for some sort of unity in nature, some sort of monism, let us do it by looking into ourselves and not around and outside ourselves. Only in that way can we keep room in our final theories for those higher phenomena of mind which cannot be interpreted as part of an objective world.

Il Suicidio nel diritto e nella vita sociale. DOTT. ANTONINO MARCHESE DE LUNA. Ermanno Loescher & Co., Roma, 1907. Pp. 166.

This is not so much a scientific as a practical essay, an ethical tract on the serious increase in suicide, and on methods, repressive and preventive, for checking it. Some half a dozen works, or chapters in works, dealing with the same subject by his fellow-countrymen are discussed, but the author does not extend his inquiries or criticisms to transalpine or transmarine opinion. The sanctions appealed to are ethical and secular, exclusively. The human unit is represented, no doubt justly, as not belonging to himself nor 'living unto' himself, but as born into his society laden with debt and duty. The final appeal is to educators of all kinds for a more adequate 'education of the soul,' the radical cause of suicides being identified as 'ineducazione psichica'. But as to the analysis and synthesis of the psychology of suicide the frank confession is made, '*non mi interessa approfondirla*'. The statistics of suicides are represented by one table of Italian cases during the last quarter of a century, with no corresponding figures of the changes in population by which the increase in those cases might be justly estimated. And the history of suicide is dismissed in the one brief generalisation,—a very rash though, of course, not an original assumption,—as to the paucity of suicides in the infancy of the 'storia d'umanità'. There is the further comment on the total absence of suicides under the matriarchate, but this judgment, though incidentally of high interest, belongs rather to 'prehistoric peeps' than to historical evidence. It is nevertheless conceivable that ethical opinion on this social phenomenon, the grave import of which no one will question, might receive guidance of some value from a more thorough historico-sociological investigation. Primitive societies frequently perform large functions of partial self-suicide, where they judge that, from various reasons, there is unfitness to let live. Older societies are reducing these functions to a minimum. Pending the transition, from those severer anthill-like corporate conditions, to a social organisation adequate for a more highly evolved state, a certain anarchic individualism is dominant, individuals disposing of their lives, much as the tribe used to do for them. Is the individual, during this transitional age, conceivably as good a judge of his unfitness to live as the society in which he lives?

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

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VIII.—PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. xvi., No. 2. **F. Thilly.** 'Causality.' [(1) The idea of cause is a general formula, meaning that one phenomenon is somehow dependent on another; its essential element is the idea of ground. Every science gives the idea a particular form suited to itself; so that the nature of the particular causes to be employed is not deducible from the idea of causality as such. (2) The causal function cannot be sensationally explained; we must connect our sensations. It belongs to the furniture of the mind, and in this sense may be called *a priori*. (3) The validity of the causal principle lies in the fact that it is a postulate of human thinking, and that there can be no knowledge without it.] **C. M. Bakewell.** 'The Ugly Infinite and the Good-for-nothing Absolute.' [Philosophy has always been haunted by the antinomy of the infinite, the endless regress implied in empiricism, and the absolute, the fixed and final standard of idealism. The Greek absolutists dubbed the infinite ugly; modern evolutionary empiricists dub the absolute useless. Now even the static absolute has contributed to clearness of logical thought, besides giving us some of our best devotional literature. But modern idealism is dynamic; and the dynamic absolutist finds the value of the conception of the fixed in making intelligible the possibility of working away from his empirical starting-point by definite and sure steps into a world of meaning where nothing is ever lost.] **R. B. Perry.** 'The Conception of Moral Goodness.' [The interaction of interest and mechanical environment involves material values; the inherent structure of a simple interest, desiderative values; the differentiation of a simple interest, or the reciprocity of two or more simple interests, involves fundamental moral values; the reciprocity of moral interests, justice and free ideal values.] **G. H. Sabine.** 'The Concreteness of Thought.' [The attempt to define the concrete cannot stop short of an experience in which universality and individuality are at once completely satisfied. Only the Absolute, therefore, is fully concrete; actual experience appeals to us as concrete because it is always partially organised. Thought, then, being a function of concrete rationality by which experience is at once universalised and individualised, it follows that the notion of a pure experience must be given up; that there is no difference of principle between reflective and constitutive thought; and that reality can be conceived only as the ideally rational experience which is the goal of thought.] **B. A. G. Fuller.** 'The Theory of God in Book A of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.' [The Aristotelian God is, no doubt, a pure ideal rising out of and reacting upon a world of finite beings, where alone (if at all) it can find concrete existence. Nevertheless, Aristotle gives a correct description of the structure and meaning of experience: for that is, in truth, a movement from possible to actual, from unrealised to realised capacities, not inaptly characterised as a striving of consciousness to think itself in rational form.] **Reviews of Books. Notices of New Books. Summaries of Articles. Notes.**

PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. Vol. xiv., No. 2. **J. R. Angell.** 'The Province of Functional Psychology.' [We may distinguish three types of functional psychology. It is (1) the psychology of mental operations, as distinct from the analytic study which deals with the 'what' of consciousness. It deals (2) with mind conceived as primarily engaged in mediating between the environment and the needs of the organism. This is the psychology of the fundamental utilities of consciousness, all possibly reducible to selective accommodation. And it is (3) a psychophysical psychology, which constantly insists on the essential significance of the mind-body relationship for an adequate comprehension of mental life. Logically, the first form is propædæutic to the other two; practically, all three are integral parts of a common programme. The advantages of functional psychology are its readiness of application, its suggestiveness for animal psychology and mental pathology, its close affiliation to philosophy, and in general the organic flexibility of its attitude.] **W. M. Urban.** 'Definition and Analysis of the Consciousness of Value, II.' [(1) The problem now is the further development of the appreciative distinctions in primary worth feeling—those descriptions of his feelings which the subject seeks as equivalents for his worth predicates applied to objects. (2) The views that feeling has innumerable modifications, and that it is merely intensity of pleasantness and unpleasantness, are unworkable. Mediating between the two, we find (3) that every concrete feeling attitude has two primary meanings, its directions and its references. The former are positive and negative, pleasant and unpleasant. The latter are either transgredient and dynamic (tension, restlessness, contraction) or immanent (repose, relaxation, expansion). Thus the tridimensional theory is a true description of feeling-attitudes, or feeling as related to conation. (4) It follows that the criterion of a feeling attitude is the presence of a cognitive act (presumption, judgment, assumption) as presupposition of the feeling. The transgredient reference appears in emotive attitudes where an habitual presupposition of reality meets with opposition or arrest; the immanent, where an accommodation is realised. (5) Acquired feeling attitudes arise by way of a progression in meaning or a value movement. They are (a) the acquired meanings of simple appreciation, the mode of obligation (transgredient) and the æsthetic mode (immanent), and (b) those of characterisation and participation: personal worths, values of utilisation, common meanings of participation value. (6) To account for the quantitative aspect of worth predicates, we must distinguish depth or degree of feeling of value from intensity of feeling tone. The distinction does not lead to a dualism, but is a natural outcome of the reference of feeling to conative dispositions. (7) The differentiation and fixation of objects and predicates of valuation must be traced to fundamental laws of psychical process. Such laws are capable of quantitative determination, and may be described as the Laws of Valuation.] **H. B. Thompson** and **K. Gordon.** 'A Study of After-Images on the Peripheral Retina.' [Detailed report of peripheral after-image phenomena observed on backgrounds of various brightnesses with the light-adapted eye in diffuse daylight. In a coloured after-image, that colour element is emphasised which in brightness approaches the brightness of the background.]

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. xviii., No. 2. **C. Spearman.** 'Demonstration of Formulæ for True Measurement of Correlation.' [Gives mathematical proofs of the author's formulæ for eliminating the effects of irrelevant factors and of inaccurate observation.] **M. Meyer.** 'The Significance of Wave-form for our Compre-

hension of Audition.' [We have to find a way of looking at curves which leads to a considerable resemblance between what we see and what we hear, and then to ask whether the ear can function mechanically in the manner suggested by this way of looking at the curves. Applying this criterion, the writer discards Stumpf's definition of an oscillation, and in his own finds support for his theory of audition.] **E. A. Alvord and H. E. Searle.** 'A Study of the Comparison of Time Intervals.' [There are great individual differences in the mode of reproduction of a standard interval: recourse is had to strain and relaxation, imagined movements, auditory rhythm, and auditory images of the limiting stimulus. With use of strain and relaxation, the longer intervals were shortened (fatigue?). With alternate long and short standards there was no effect of contrast, but rather a tendency to assimilation.] **E. Severance and M. F. Washburn.** 'The Loss of Associative Power in Words after Long Fixation.' [Under fixation, the meaning and the normal auditory-motor image disappear within the first few seconds, while the visual word remains familiar; then this too becomes a mere collection of letters, or even of strange marks. The meaning vanishes when the proper sound-image disappears under the law of shifting attention. The persistence of visual familiarity shows that associated ideas are not essential to recognition. The final stage of the process is a sort of auto-hypnosis.] **F. M. Urban.** 'On Systematic Errors in Time Estimation.' [In two sets of experiments, with long and short intervals, there appears a 'preference' for certain numerals. The high frequencies of these numerals in the latter case are due to known psychological conditions: overestimation of smaller and underestimation of larger times, reference to a visual mark. They are due, in the case of long intervals, partly to the choice of round numbers, partly to an unanalysed group of conditions. The low frequencies of adjoining numerals in both cases may, on the other hand, be brought under the general rule that the elements of a complex which are next to favoured elements with which they are not associated are at a disadvantage.] **L. P. Boggs.** 'Studies in Absolute Pitch.' [Reports tests (not very systematic) on various subjects. All had a musical inheritance, environment and training, but no special practice in memorisation. The ability to recognise the absolute pitch of tones seems to depend partly on discrimination of overtones, partly on the possession of a qualitative (absolute) tonal system.] **J. A. Bergström.** 'Effect of Changes in the Time Variables in Memorising, together with Some Discussion of the Technique of Memory Experimentation.' [The paper opens with a *résumé* of the methods of investigation of memory, and describes a universal memory-apparatus. Two sets of experiments are then reported: in the one, series of letters and associate words were read to the observers at varying intervals; in the other, non-sense syllables were visually exposed, with variation of exposure-time, of interval between exposures, and of pause between series and series. A review of the related literature leads to the distinction of four possible factors in the results: conditions aiding or obstructing the reception and association of the impression; changes and relative variations in retention; modifications in the recalling of impressions; and general conditions, such as fatigue or a general organising activity. Of these, the first appears to be predominantly important.] **F. Arnold.** 'The Initial Tendency in Ideal Revival.' [The initial tendency (and with it cases of apparently mediate association) can be explained if the present moment of consciousness is regarded, not as an isolated idea, but as an entire disposition which is excited by the cue, and which has in it a meaning and a tendency to explicate the series implicit in it.] **F. Angell.** 'On Judgments of "Like" in Discrimination Experiments.' [The number and correctness

of these judgments are determined by type; by the inductive effect of the course of experimentation; and by time-interval. They are rarely recognitive, but rather based on inference or on cognitive classification; if recognitive, they are apt to arise from accidental sensations or imagery.] Psychological Literature.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. iv., 6.
W. James. 'Pragmatism's Conception of Truth.' [The sixth of a course of Lowell Lectures of which the first two have appeared in the *Popular Science Monthly*. Written with Prof. James's well-known brilliancy and charm, and full of memorable sayings. "The truth of a state of mind means this function of a leading that is worth while." "Our experience is all shot through with regularities." "Truth lives for the most part on a credit system." "Truth is made, just as health, wealth and strength are made, in the course of experience" "We have to live to-day by what truth we can get to-day, and be ready to-morrow to call it falsehood." The most striking thing about rationalistic definitions of truth is "their unutterable triviality". They have nothing to say as to "when a truth may go into cold storage in the encyclopaedia and when it shall come out for battle". "Must I constantly be repeating the truth 'twice two are four' because of its eternal claim on recognition or is it sometimes irrelevant?" "A truth must always be preferred to a falsehood when both relate to the situation; but when neither does, truth is as little of a duty as falsehood. If you ask me what o'clock it is, and I tell you that I live at 95 Irving Street, my answer may indeed be true, but you don't see why it is my duty to give it. A false address would be as much to the purpose." Concludes that "it is the pragmatists and not the rationalists who are the more genuine defenders of the universe's rationality".] **H. W. Wright.** 'The Classification of the Virtues.' iv., 7. **R. S. Woodworth.** 'Non-Sensory Components of Sense-Perception.' [A continuation of his important criticism of the belief in imagery, which infers from the equivocal 'staircase' figure that 'the same sensations may give rise to diverse percepts,' and urges on psychological grounds that 'every percept has a felt quality of its own'. Such qualities are numerous and should be conceived as mental reactions. "A percept is not a synthesis of sensation and image; it is a reaction to the sensation." This, however, is not a mere 'universal form of thought,' but a biological conception.] **F. C. Doan.** 'Humanism and Absolute Sub-consciousness.' [The Absolute is a subconscious background; not however richer than the humane self-consciousness but becoming divine in it.]

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. iv., 8.
J. Dewey. 'The Control of Ideas by Facts.'—I. [Fruitful thinking which terminates in valid knowledge uses the distinction of facts and ideas and asserts an agreement or correspondence between them. The question is as to its nature. Dualistic epistemologies render it unanswerable: monistic ones, idealistic or realistic, leave it unsolved. Pragmatic or functional logic, therefore, does not invent the problem it tries to solve in a new way, by insisting that the distinction is relative to human purposes and interpreting 'agreement with fact' as meaning practical success.] **F. C. French.** 'A Factor in the Evolution of Morals.' [Taboo.] **C. H. Johnston.** 'Feeling Analysis and Experimentation.' [Points out that intent as well as content is revealed by introspection, and argues that "it seems most profitable to describe feelings in terms of bodily attitudes".] iv., 9.
E. B. McGilvary. 'The Stream of Consciousness.' [Criticises James for his analysis of the Ego into a multitude of successive owners of the stream of consciousness each inheriting the content of its predecessor, but rather

ignores that this metaphorical mode of representation is only intended to illustrate the superfluity of a transcendent knower beneath or behind experience.] **F. C. S. Schiller.** 'The Pragmatic Cure of Doubt.' [J. E. Russell in iv., 3, ignores the pragmatic way of dealing with 'theoretic' doubt, and demands to be saved from doubt by no act of his own and *without* trying a cure which has to be tried to be found to be satisfactory. This perverse demand ultimately proceeds from a refusal to recognise the reality of choices.] **J. E. Russell.** 'A Reply to Dr. Schiller.' [*I.e.*, to the above and the paper in iv., 2. I. To make the being 'lost' of a person who does not know where he is depend on his purpose and his desire to be elsewhere, is consistent, but a *reductio ad absurdum* of pragmatism. A man is lost if he does not *know the way out*, and cannot be lost so long as he has a map. II. To find the pragmatic answer to scepticism satisfactory, one must already have adopted the pragmatic view of truth, but this remedy is worse than the disease, and so "I must elect to remain in doubt in preference to being saved at the expense of my logical understanding".]

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. Vol. xvii., No. 4, July, 1907. **O. A. Shrubsole.** 'The Relation of Theological Dogma to Religion.' [Religion preceded and will outlast dogma: dogma will go when its work is done.] **M. A. Shaw.** 'Some Facts of the Practical Life and Their Satisfaction.' [Identification of oneself with an ideal is an act of faith, making that ideal a present instead of a future reality. Righteousness by faith means that the ideal is not external but internal—the real or perfect self—and a present which is dynamic of the future.] **W. R. Sorley.** 'Ethical Aspects of Economics.—III.' [The worth or ethical value of economic goods can be estimated, inasmuch as the moral or spiritual life rests on the basis of material goods, or is dependent on material wants and satisfactions. Moreover, wealth is always the result of work, and work has a moral value.] **F. Carrel.** 'Has Sociology a Moral Basis?' [Sociology is a bipartite science, one part independent (statistical sociology) and the other a branch of morals (moral sociology).] **J. E. Boodin.** 'The Ought and Reality.' [A real process or evolution implies an absolute direction giving meaning and validity to ideals. Our ideals are structures striving to reflect this direction or *ought*, which determines their worth and survival.] **H. Johnson.** 'Some Essentials of Moral Education.' **H. L. Stewart.** 'Self-Realisation as the Moral End.' [Vindication of the principle against certain types of negative criticism.] **J. Morse.** 'The Psychology of Prejudice.' [Prejudice, *i.e.*, *undue* prepossession for or against anything, is related negatively or contrarily to apperception. It is an arrest of apperception, a refusal or inability to apperceive, disordered apperception.] Book Reviews.

REVUE NÉO-SCOLASTIQUE. Mai, 1907. **J. Halleux.** 'Proofs of the Existence of God.' [A rehabilitation of what Kant calls the Cosmological Argument: the Prime Mover.] **F. van Cauwelaert.** 'Richard Avenarius' **G. Legrand.** 'Ampère and Maine de Biran: Theory of Relations.' [To Ampère's argument that things in themselves exist because we know the relations between things in themselves, it is replied that such relations evince the being of things in themselves only in the ideal order.] **C. Sentroul.** 'The Preambles of the Kantian Question.' [The assumptions from which Kant started.] **L. Noël.** 'Pragmatism.' [History of.] **O. Sisti.** 'The Thomist Movement at Rome.' [St. Thomas and Suarez, Essence and Existence.]

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE. 1er Juin, 1907. **E. Schiffmacher.** 'The Idea of God and the Idea of the Cosmos.' [Analogy of physical science and natural theology.] **A. de Gomer.** 'Free Will.' [Defence of, argues a difference between will and free will.] **C. Lucas de Pesloüan.** 'The Foundations of Arithmetic' (third article). **M. Thomas.** 'The Object of Metaphysics according to Kant and according to Aristotle.' [A review of M. Sentroul's book so entitled: raises the questions, What is a judgment? and, Whence comes the cognition of real existence? a valuable article.] There are instructive reviews of Dr. Schiller's *Studies in Humanism* and of A. Hamon's *Vie de la bienheureuse Marguerite-Marie*. 1er Juillet, 1907. **F. Mentré.** 'A Note on the Pragmatic Value of Pragmatism.' [Pragmatism suits the English character, suits the sceptic and even the mystic, but is the ruin of philosophy and of science, which progresses not without the disinterested study of truth for its own sake, 'useless studies,' as they are called, being indispensable to the 'useful'. This 'note' should be read by every pragmatist.] **Abbé Farges.** 'How Kant ought to be refuted.' [Quarrels with M. Sentroul for not insisting, with Aristotle and the schoolmen, that the mind through the senses has immediate intuition, not of sensations but of real objects. Kant is only refuted on this principle.] **E. Magnin.** 'An Observation.' [An extraordinary narrative of a cure of intestinal paralysis, tubercles and other complications by means of magnetism, aided by a secondary personality, who foretells accurately the stages of the cure and the date of its completion, 8th May, 1907. The narrator is the magnetiser himself.] **P. Fontana.** 'M. Durkheim's Course at the Sorbonne.' [An argument from totemism that religion has its roots neither in animism, nor in awe of nature powers, but in the sentiment of hum in society, as such.] 1er Août, 1907. **P. J. Cuche.** 'Study of Monism.' [A comprehensive sketch of Monist theories. The Law of Immanence, said to be the soul of Monism, is thus stated: "the one Substance is at once Force and Thought, and becomes by evolution all force and all thought".] **L. M. Billia.** 'Is not Idealism Christian?' [Idealism here is taken to mean Intellectualism as opposed to Pragmatism. The Good which the Pragmatist pursues must be a good in cognition.] **C. Lucas de Pesloüan.** 'The Foundations of Arithmetic.' [Final article.]

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE UND PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK. Bd. cxxx., Heft 1. **A. Meinong.** 'Über die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie, etc.,' Dritter Artikel. [Logic and epistemology differ as practice differs from theory. The one teaches us how to obtain accurate knowledge; the other shows what are the general conditions of all knowledge. But both assume a theory of objects, and their relation to it is much the same. The object of a concept is an incomplete representation. The object of a judgment is what Meinong calls an 'objective'. In conclusion, Meinong seems to rest the value of the new theory on its explanation of *a priori* certainty, and on its power to liberate us from what is called 'psychologism,' the painful and distorting method of reducing the processes of thought to specific mental experiences.] **Robert M. Wernae.** 'Das ästhetische Symbol.' [Symbols are of two kinds as they are addressed to the understanding or to the emotions. The former are signs agreeing with the thing signified in one respect only, as when the Trinity is symbolised by an equilateral triangle. Allegories are essentially of this description. In emotional symbols on the other hand—and it is with these alone that aesthetics are properly concerned—the image and the emotion that it expresses are fused together into a single aesthetic whole.] **Karl Groos.** 'Beiträge zum Problem des "Gege-

benen'' [The data of consciousness, or what is 'given' to it, must also be 'taken' by it; that is to say no analysis can bring us to a residuum of sensation which is not to some extent elaborated by reason. This original datum is rightly described as an experience, although it admits of being ideally distinguished into an *a priori* and an *a posteriori* element. As regards the data or assumptions of special lines of thought they possess no common characteristic, being selected in reference to the interest on account of which each particular train of reasoning was started.] Rezensionen, etc.

KANT-STUDIEN. Vol. xii., No. 2, June, 1907. **Walter Zschocke.** 'Über Kant's Lehre vom Schematismus der reinen Vernunft.' [The author tries to show that the transcendental schema is superfluous in the *Kritik of Pure Reason* and ought to be cut out. He argues (1) that it fails to do the work for which it was invented, *viz.*, to bridge the gap between the pure forms of the intuition and the pure categories of the understanding. It is a mere name for the problem of reconciliation, not its solution. (2) That no reconciliation is necessary, for the synthesis of the given manifold in space and time already involves elements of understanding, and, on the other hand, each category contains, besides the intellectual element of necessity, a reference to synthesis in space and time. Intuition and understanding thus inherently imply and supplement each other. There is no need to reconcile them by an external *tertium quid.*] **Bruno Bauch.** 'Erfahrung und Geometrie in ihrem erkenntnistheoretischen Verhältnis.' [The author combats the contention of Poincaré (in *La Science et L'Hypothèse*) that the superiority of Euclid's system of geometry over others is merely a matter of 'convention' and 'practical convenience'. He admits that all systems of geometry are alike internally consistent and 'antimonically' consistent, *i.e.*, are legitimate alternatives for the conceptual analysis of space. He also admits that no system of geometry is logically derived from experience or can be verified by experience. But the superiority of Euclid's system is due to the fact, that it alone makes possible experience of a real world of external things. It is 'erfahrungstiftend'; it is 'Möglichkeitsgrundlage für Wirklichkeitserkenntnis'.] Reviews, Self-advertisements, Notes.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE. Bd. xliii., Heft 4. **T. Ziehen.** 'Erkenntnistheoretische Auseinandersetzungen.—III. E. Mach.' [Mach is right in his insistence on the comparison of physical and psychical processes and uniformities. He has also, in the main, rightly apprehended the fundamental data of epistemology. He is, however, wrong in his account of the difference and the relation between physical and psychical. These are not identical, so that, *e.g.*, a given 'green' may be considered as dependent now on other stimuli, now on our optical organisation, and change from physical to psychical with the change of dependency: rather is the green-sensation (1) causally interconnected with other stimulus-sensations; (2) causally connected with brain-process, in the sense that this depends upon it; and (3) affected by brain-process, in the sense not of causality but of parallelism. From this point of view the writer discusses Mach's views of time, space and mass.] **H. Abels.** 'Über Nachempfindungen im Gebiete des kinesthetischen und statischen Sinnes: ein Beitrag zur Lehre vom Bewegungsschwindel (Drehschwindel).—I.' [Seasickness, which is a form of motor vertigo, is characterised by range of individual difference and by rapidity of habituation. These facts must be taken into account for a theory of rotatory vertigo. Neither Mach's nor Breuer's theory is adequate to them; the long duration of

the after-vertigo is inexplicable. If, now, we look at the effects produced upon the vestibular organ by the passage of a galvanic current, we find that the after-vertigo cannot be the result of the break-shock, but must depend upon a condition set up in the nervous apparatus by the nature and duration of the abnormal stimulation, and persisting for some time after its cessation. The same thing must then be true of rotatory vertigo.] *Besprechung.* [Cordsen on Lay's *Experimentelle Didaktik.*] *Literaturbericht.* Bd. xliii., Heft 5 u. 6. **G. Heymans** und **E. Wierama.** 'Beiträge zur speziellen Psychologie auf Grund einer Massenuntersuchung, II.' [Subjects the questionnaire returns to mathematical treatment, with a view to ascertaining the degree in which character is determined on the one hand by sexual predisposition at large, and on the other by direct hereditary influences proceeding from the father and mother.] **H. Abels.** 'Über Nachempfindungen im Gebiete des kinästhetischen und statischen Sinnes: ein Beitrag zur Lehre vom Bewegungsschwindel (Drehschwindel).—II.' [The author finds his crucial test in Ewald's experiments on pigeons with the pneumatic hammer: as the reaction is brief, it follows that the sensation of rotation set up by a stimulus of short duration has no considerable persistence. He then proceeds, by way of the Mach and Purkinje kinæsthetic illusions, to progressive movements; here the salient fact is the difficulty of arousal of after-images of progressive accelerations. This explains our prompt perception of the direction, velocity and extent of progressive movements, and is itself explained by the character of the movements made in everyday life. Turning to the sensation of rotation, he distinguishes three separate moments: centrifugal force, which gives us the perception of velocity, of the position of the axis of rotation, and of the magnitude of the radius; angular acceleration, which indicates the direction of rotation, and the positive and negative changes of velocity during the total movement; and tangential progressive acceleration, which reinforces the moment of angular acceleration, and in certain experiments fuses with the moment of centrifugal force to produce an after-image. The interplay of these three factors is traced in detail through the phenomena of rotatory vertigo and its after-effects, with the result that there is a close analogy between these latter and the negative after-images of other sense-departments, although in all probability the two groups of phenomena take their origin at different levels of the neuro-sensory apparatus.] *Kleine Mittheilung.* **M. Urstein.** 'Ein Beitrag zur Psychologie der Aussage.' [Account of a flagrant case of mistaken identity of a prisoner.] **N. Ach.** 'Zweiter Kongress für experimentelle Psychologie.' *Literaturbericht.* Bd. xliv., Heft 1 u. 2. **C. Stumpf.** 'Über Gefühlsempfindungen.' [There are three possibilities as regards the sensory feelings; they are attributes of sensation, independent processes, or themselves sensations. Külpe has disproved the first; there is no valid evidence for the second; we are therefore forced to the third. Coming to details, we find first a special class of sensations of feeling in cutaneous and muscular pains, bodily discomfort, feelings of being unwell; and in lust, feelings of being well, bodily comfort, diffused physical contentment. These are indubitably of sensational character. They are, *e.g.*, reproducible; though the reproduction easily passes over into actual sensation. In treating of the affective tone of other sense-departments, we must distinguish between strong and moderate stimulation. The former brings in, besides the quality of special sense, a feeling sensation of the first sort. The affective tones of moderate stimulation are best regarded as concomitant sensations of central origin. Whether these concomitants can be separately ideated is a question; but if they cannot, they may still be separate sensational elements, and their inseparability in idea may be due to physiological conditions. The advantages of this view are that we are put on the track

of a causal, instead of a teleological, explanation of the facts ; that we may attack feeling with all the weapons of sensational method ; and that we mark off the problem of emotion from that of simple feeling.] **F. Krüger** und **C. Spearman**. 'Die Korrelation zwischen verschiedenen geistigen Leistungsfähigkeiten.' [A study, by biometrical methods, of the results obtained from the application of various mental tests to students of psychology. The authors find a high degree and constancy of correlation between very various capacities of the individual (discrimination of pitch, addition of numbers, filling-out of defective texts, rapidity of writing, reading and counting). These correlations seem to be the effects of a common central factor. Knowing the correlations of three capacities, we may calculate the correlation of any one of them with the central factor : this correlation, termed the central value or median of the capacity in question, appears to be a constant. The central factor is probably to be explained, in psychophysiological terms, as due to a plastic function of the nervous system, varying with the individual ; but more work, psychological and biological, is needed on the point. On the score of method, it is necessary, in order to obtain unequivocal correlations and a coefficient of reliability of the method of test, to take at least two tests of each of the characters to be correlated.] Literaturbericht. Ankündigung. Berichtigung. Bd. xlv., Heft 3. **S. Witasek**. 'Über Lesen und Rezitieren in ihren Beziehungen zum Gedächtnis, I.' [First part of report of experiments with nonsense syllables, undertaken with a view to the comparison of the advantages for memory of repeated readings and of recitations without the visual cue.] **A. Mueller**. 'Die Referenzflächen-theorie der Täuschung am Himmelsgewölbe und an den Gestirnen.' [The surfaces of reference proposed by von Sterneck are mathematical construction, not psychological fact. The explanation of the apparent magnification of the sun and of the apparent form of the twilight sky, as based upon a wrong estimate of horizontal distances due to intermediate objects is neither new nor true.] Literaturbericht. Bd. xlv., Heft 4. **A. Pick**. 'Zur Lehre vom Einfluss des Sprechens auf das Denken.' [In a previous paper, the author had shown that the spoken word may, by its perseverational tendency, influence thought ; and had referred this influence to the subject's suggestibility. Accident has now brought him a case of traumatic hysteria combined with traumatic aphasia, the examination of which furnishes an experimentum crucis for the correctness of his view.] **S. Witasek**. 'Über Lesen und Rezitieren in ihren Beziehungen zum Gedächtnis.' [Apart from special results of a quantitative sort, the investigation shows that recitation is, in general, far superior to reading for purposes of retention. Economy of learning is attained by characteristic combinations of the two procedures, varying with the nature of the immediate task. It is probable that the difference between reading and recitation is not a simple difference of degree of attention, but that recitation implies another factor which we note in the experience of 'trying to think of' something. The nature of this factor requires special study.] Literaturbericht. Bd. xlv., Heft 5 u. 6. Literaturbericht. **K. L. Schaefer**, mit Unterstützung von **H. C. Warren**. 'Bibliographie der psycho-physiologischen Literatur des Jahres 1905.' [2,578 titles, as against 2,727 of the Psychological Index, and 2,463 of the same bibliography for 1904.] Bd. xlv., Heft 1 u. 2. **G. Heymans** und **E. Wiersma**. 'Beiträge zur speziellen Psychologie auf Grund einer Massenuntersuchung, III.' [(1) On the general subject of heredity, the study has shown that the individual character is determined both by sex and by direct paternal and maternal inheritance ; that the influence of sex is about three times as strong as that of paternal and maternal inheritance ; that the influence of same-sexed direct inheritance is 30 to 40 per cent. stronger than that of cross-sexed ; and

than the influence of maternal direct inheritance is 10 per cent. stronger than that of paternal. (2) The chief sex-difference brought out is that women are more active, more emotional, and less egotistic than men. (3) There are two main differences between the older and the younger generation. Both sexes show a tendency to lessened activity and moral retrogression. On the other hand, there is an upward movement, especially on the intellectual side, among the younger women. On the side of feeling and will, this is accompanied by intensification of all abstract or suprasocial tendencies, of self-feeling, of appreciation of the comic, and of irritability and self-dissatisfaction. No similar compensatory movement is found among the men. The authors recommend the prosecution of similar inquiries in other countries.]

ARCHIV FÜR DIE GESAMTE PSYCHOLOGIE. Bd. viii., Heft 1 und 2. **A. Messer.** 'Experimentell-psychologische Untersuchungen über das Denken.' [This paper of 224 pages gives the results of an investigation which at many points runs parallel to Watt's Experimentelle Beiträge zur Theorie des Denkens (*Archiv*, iv.). The method was essentially that of the verbal associative reaction, and for the most part Watt's apparatus was employed; the series began with the association of spoken to visual words, and gradually increased in complexity until, finally, sentences were displayed to the observer, which he was required to understand and to answer by way of agreement or dissent; a few experiments were also made with objects or pictures as stimuli in place of words. The writer goes into minute (and generally valuable) detail as regards the preparation, attitude and introspections of his observers. He finds the essential characteristic of the judging consciousness not in the formulation of the spoken sentence, nor yet in the occurrence of specific acts of affirmation or negation, but solely in the intention of the observer: "a certain relation between stimulus-idea and reaction-idea, to be described as the predicative or expressive relation, must be willed, intended, or at least recognised by the observer". Any reproduction of word by word thus becomes a judgment, provided that the observer had the intention of judgment; it is a question of the effectiveness of a task or problem. In everyday life, the problem is usually so familiar that it escapes our notice; only under experimental conditions do the *Urteilserlebnisse* become separately noticeable. Their exact analysis the writer leaves to further investigation, though he offers some introspective indications of their nature. He also gives a psychological classification of judgments. The paper concludes with chapters on psychical causality, the psychology of volition, dispositions of consciousness (*Bewusstseinseinlagen*), and individual psychology, in all of which interesting (and often very debatable) issues are raised.] **E. Duerr.** 'Bericht über den zweiten, vom 18. bis 21. April, 1906, in Würzburg abgehaltenen Kongress für experimentelle Psychologie.' Literaturbericht. **C. Spearman.** 'Fortschritte auf dem Gebiete der Psychophysik der räumlichen Vorstellungen: I. Tastsinn.' **A. Kowalewski.** 'Zur Literatur des Problems: Leib und Seele.' **M. Kelchner.** 'Neue Literatur zur Bestimmung des Gefühlsbegriffs.' Einzelbesprechungen. Referate. Neue Zeitschriften.

IX.—NOTE.

ERRATUM. "MIND," NEW SERIES, No. 63, July, 1907.

The paragraph (p. 363) beginning "Sensational elements are mingled," and ending "in an act of reason," in Section 13 of Miss Bodkin's article on "The Subconscious Factors of Mental Process," should follow immediately upon the paragraph ending "cerebral activity" (p. 362).

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MIND

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OF
 PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

EDITED BY

PROF. G. F. STOUT,

WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF PROFESSOR E. B. TITCHENER, AMERICAN EDITORIAL REPRESENTATIVE, AND OF DR. E. CAIRD, PROFESSOR WARD, PROFESSOR PRINGLE-PATTISON, AND OTHER MEMBERS OF AN ADVISORY COMMITTEE.

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